Chapter 5 begins with the sentence, “Let us speak from the point where we digressed” (1095b14). We digressed from the discussion of common opinions about the good and happiness in the middle of the last chapter to discuss the question of the method of our inquiry. Aristotle there supposes that it is “necessary for us, at least, to begin from the things known to us” (1095b3). Thus, in making this inquiry into the good and happiness, we will examine the common opinions about it on the basis of what is already known or obvious to us. The inquiry is to be a dialectical one, and we are invited to follow along rather than to listen passively. If Aristotle expected us to be passive listeners, then he could have given us only the conclusions of the
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I will outline what appears to be one of the more serious problems. After we discover that honor might not be the end of the political life, Aristotle writes that “someone might in fact suppose that virtue is to a greater degree the end of political life” (1095b31). But virtue too quickly appears to be incomplete, “for it seems to be possible for someone to possess virtue even while asleep or while being inactive throughout life and, in addition to these, while suffering badly and undergoing the greatest misfortunes (1095b33). All of this seems to be true, but it does not amount to a damning critique of virtue. A good conscience would prevent most from calling anyone who suffers great misfortune happy, even if that person was virtuous, but it seems that we could make this objection about anything that is posited as the human good. Regarding the next objection, if one can possess virtue even while asleep, then presumably one could possess happiness then too. But perhaps this is not so, and happiness, which we have reason already to suppose is a sort of activity, is not present in the inactive. If this is the case, then we might suppose that the true end of the political life is virtuous activity, but Aristotle does not here suggest this possibility. Perhaps he is saving
I will outline what appears to be one of the more serious problems. After we discover that honor might not be the end of the political life, Aristotle writes that “someone might in fact suppose that virtue is to a greater degree the end of political life” (1095b31). But virtue too quickly appears to be incomplete, “for it seems to be possible for someone to possess virtue even while asleep or while being inactive throughout life and, in addition to these, while suffering badly and undergoing the greatest misfortunes (1095b33). All of this seems to be true, but it does not amount to a damning critique of virtue. A good conscience would prevent most from calling anyone who suffers great misfortune happy, even if that person was virtuous, but it seems that we could make this objection about anything that is posited as the human good. Regarding the next objection, if one can possess virtue even while asleep, then presumably one could possess happiness then too. But perhaps this is not so, and happiness, which we have reason already to suppose is a sort of activity, is not present in the inactive. If this is the case, then we might suppose that the true end of the political life is virtuous activity, but Aristotle does not here suggest this possibility. Perhaps he is saving