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39 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
- 3rd side (hint)
Garratt v. Dailey
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Young boy pulls chair out from behind old woman
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Rule: Children can be liable for intentional torts if they can FORMULATE INTENT (can KNOW WITH SUBSTANTIAL CERTAINTY)
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Spivey v. Battaglia
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Man gives "friendly unsolicited hug" to coworker who he knows doesn't like to be touched. result: partial facial paralysis.
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For A&B, D must REASONABLY BELIEVE injury would result. Therefore, NEGLIGENCE.
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McGuire v. Almy
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Mentally ill woman strikes live-in nurse, acted with intent (had threatened to injure P)
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Mentally Ill can be liable for their torts IF they can formulate intent.
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Ranson v. Kitner
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D thought P's dog was wolf, shot it.
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Mistake as to identity does not negate intent.
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Smith v. Talmage
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D meant to hit first boy, hit P. (boys were playing on D's shed)
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Transferred intent--Intent to his first boy can be lifted, placed on boy who was hit.
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Five torts within trespass writ:
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Assault,
Battery, Trespass to Land, Trespass to Chattels, False Imprisonment |
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Battery--Elements
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1. Intent to cause harmful contact
2. Contact caused 3. Contact was harmful NEXT SLIDE: Liability? |
D is liable for FULL SCOPE of HARM, whether or not consequences were foreseeable, so long as elements are satisfied.
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Liability:
Battery v. Negligence. Two cases |
Spivey v. Battaglia: Negligence, therefore D only liable for foreseeable harm.
Kid who kicks other kid, resulting in crazy nerve dam.: liable for full harm. |
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Wallace v. Rosen
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D touches mom at top of stair to get her to move for school fire drill, mom falls down stairs.
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Rule: P must withstand "ordinary contact expected in society."
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Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc.
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D knocks P's plate from his hand, says racial slur.
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Plate is EXTENSION of P's PERSONALITY (EXTENDED PERSONALITY)
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Battery--Recovery
(3 kinds) |
Prima Facie Claim (Nominal damages)
Emotional Distress (Actual damages) Awful Cases (Exemplary damages) |
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Assault
Definition |
MANIFEST INTENT to commit HARMFUL CONTACT (battery) which causes IMMEDIATE apprehension
(Next: ELEMENTS) |
1. Intent
2. Attempted contact 3. Well-founded apprehension of contact 4. Apparent ability to carry out threat 5. IMMINENT |
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Western Telegraph Co. v. Hill
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Employee told P he would "fix her clock" while reaching over counter toward her.
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Illustrates Assault elements
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False Imprisonment
Elements |
1. Restraint of individual
2. Unlawfulness of restraint Next: Methods of false imprisonment: (3.5) |
Acts
Words Omissions Forcing P to abandon very valuable belonging (sometimes) |
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When it's NOT False Imprisonment
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One can only be KEPT IN (NOT kept out) in false imprisonment
If a SAFE ALT. EXIT exists, it's NOT False Imprisonment. |
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Big Town Nursing Home v. Newman
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P voluntarily admitted to nursing home, forced to stay, tries to escape, forced to come back. Home deposits his SS checks. (Example of WHAT?)
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FALSE IMPRISONMENT--Example of DIRECT PHYSICAL RESTRAINT.
P REQUIRED to test physical boundaries. |
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Hardy's v. LaBelle's Dist. Co.
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Employee P accused of stealing watch, D asks her to come next day, stay for qs. She does, takes lie detector test. (Example of WHAT?) (and: problem with claim?)
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FALSE IMPRISONMENT--Example of RESTRAINT BY WORDS.
NO LIABILITY--P WANTED to clear her name--not acting out of fear. |
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Enright v. Groves
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D, an officer, found P in nearby parked car after spotting her dog off a leash. Demands license, P only gives address, D arrests her, claims it's for leash law. (Ex. of WHAT?); (Policy??)
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FALSE IMPRISONMENT--Submitting to legal auth./false arrest.
Policy: ALWAYS submit to false arrest to avoid confrontation with officer. |
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Whittaker v. Sandford
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P wants out of cult, agrees to travel on D (cult leader)'s boat on condition she can leave in US. They arrive, he won't let her leave with kids. (Ex. of WHAT?) (Typical WHEN?)
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FALSE IMPRISONMENT--Limiting of P's independence/creation of dependence on D.
Typical with cults, drug treatment, etc. |
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Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress:
Elements |
1. Intentional or Reckless
2. Extreme or Outrageous 3. Causation 4. Severe |
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IIED:
Extreme or Outrageous: Markers |
Abuse of Power
Taking Adv. of Emotionally Vulnerable Repeated acts (stalking-type behavior) Serious threat of violence, not imminent |
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State Rubbish Collector's Ass'n v. Siliznoff
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P threatened to force D to sign note agreeing to pay P for picking up garbage in P's territory, D signs under extreme duress, suffers physical symptoms
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Case existed before IIED, but CLEAR example of IIED
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Taylor v. Vallelunga
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Daughter watched Ds beat father, but they didn't know she was there... NO LIABILITY because they couldn't have INTENDED to cause her emotional distress.
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Rule: D must INTEND BEHAVIOR, not necessarily RESULT.
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Slocum v. Food Fair Stores of Fla.
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Employee told shopper she stinks, refused to give pricing info. P suffered heart attack. NO LIABILITY.
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Rule: D's behavior NOT SEVERE ENOUGH to cause emotional distress in ORDINARY PERSON.
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Harris v. Jones
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P suing supervisor, who repeatedly teased P about his stutter, causing it to worsen. NO LIABILITY.
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Rule: P didn't prove that IIED was SEVERE enough, didn't prove that taunting caused worsening of speech impediment. (NOTE: Most courts won't require this level of expert testimony to establish severity)
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TRESPASS TO LAND
ELEMENTS |
1. PHYSICAL INVASION of P's property
2. INTENT to enter that particular property 3. Invasion caused by D's VOLITIONAL ACT. (What's not necessary for prima facie claim??) |
Damage!!
Notice of Boundaries!! Fence!! INTENT to TRESPASS (Mistake counts!!) |
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Herrin v. Sutherland
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D intentionally shot waterfowl above P's land. LIABILITY
(Two rules) |
Rule: Counts if D's buckshot, and not D, enters land, so long as invasion is physical.
Rule: P owns land above and below ground (to a point). |
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Rogers v. Board of Road Com'rs for Kent Co.
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D left snow fence post embedded in P's yard, P's husband was mowing, hit post, which his and killed him. LIABILITY
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CONTINUING TRESPASS--D had REASONABLE TIME after permission ended to remove.
Damages don't have to be FORESEEABLE to be RECOVERABLE. |
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TRESPASS TO CHATTELS
ELEMENTS |
1. Intent
2. Intermeddling with Chattels 3. Physical Damage/Impairing Value of Chattles OR Depriving Owner of Use OR Bodily Harm to Possessor/to Someone/thing P has Legally Protected Interest In NEXT: RECOVERY |
P can recover damages for INCONVENIENCE (rental fee for new chattel etc)
P may also be able to recover for EMOTIONAL DISTRESS (tho D's good faith arg may kill this recovery) If MALICIOUS, P can recover PUNITIVE DAMAGES |
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Glidden v. Szybiak
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4-year-old girl pulls dog's ears, dog bites her. D counterclaiming against girl, claiming trespass to chattel. NO LIABILITY
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Trespass to Chattel requires PHYSICAL DAMAGE--dog not injured by earpull.
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CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc.
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D spamming P's email server clients, overloading system, causing P to lose clients. LIABILITY
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Trespass to Chattel--D causing harm to thing P has legally protected interest in:
Taking up space on server, harming P's biz rep. |
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CONVERSION
ELEMENTS |
1. INTENTional
2. EXERCISE or DOMINION or CONTROL 3. SO SERIOUSLY INTERFERES with right of P to control property that D IS REQ'D TO PAY FULL VALUE OF PROPERTY. NEXT: Recovery |
Damages are so severe that D must "buy" item at FULL MARKET VALUE.
Also may have to compensate for EMOTIONAL DISTRESS. Think pets. (D can make successful good faith arg.) D may have to pay PUNITIVE DAMAGES if malicious D KEEP CHATTEL. |
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Pearson v. Dodd
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Senator Dodd sues two employees who stole files at night, photocopied, returned in am. NO LIABILITY (despite principle).
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Conversion can apply to COMMERCIALLY VALUABLE IDEAS (though didn't apply here--photocopied materials weren't commercially valuable)
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CONSENT
OBJECTIVE TEST |
Would a RPP have interpreted P to have been consenting?
Next: LIMITATIONS |
P may consent to CERTAIN acts/behaviors, but NOT OTHERS.
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Hacbart v. Cincinatti Bengals, Inc.
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Football player intentionally hit in back of head and neck with forearm--LIABILITY
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Rule: P consented to rules, but intentional hit to this place with forearm is NOT part of the rules P consented to.
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O'Brien v. Cunard S.S. Co.
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P stood on line with 200 others awaiting smallpox vaccination, raised arm to receive, now claiming she wasn't consenting. NO LIABILITY.
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Although P didn't VOCALIZE her consent, her BEHAVIOR INDICATED it.
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Consent in Medical Situations:
When is it NOT required? |
Imminent threat to life or limb, OR
When a complication arises during a procedure (IMPLIED CONSENT) Family members can also provide consent for a patient who can't. |
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Mohr v. Williams
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P consents to surgery on left ear, while unconscious MD discovers left ear is fine, but right ear needs surgery. LIABILITY
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Rule: A patient who consents to one kind of operation HASN'T CONSENTED TO ANY OTHER PROCEDURE or OPERATING FIELD.
(note: MD acted in good faith, which limits damages but doesn't affect prima facie claim) |
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May v. Roberts
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P consented to presence of D and assistant (also D) on belief that D was medical assistant, but was actually layman. LIABILITY
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Consent can't be got through FRAUD.
Legal standard for determining fraud: Would RPP under the circs have been deceived/mistaken? What about GOTCHA JOURNALISTS? If you consent to be filmed for any reason, you consent for another (think food critic) |