Rotc

Front 1

Gulf of Tonkin Resolution

Back 1

Empowered President Johnson to…
“take all necessary steps to repel armed attack against US forces”
“take all necessary steps, including force, to assist S Vietnam and any member of SEATO”

Front 2

Events Surrounding the Paris Peace Talks

Back 2

Linebacker II forced the North to negotiate in earnest

Front 3

Uses of Airpower: Background

Back 3

Vietnam War was primarily a land war Most air power was used in conjunction with ground ops

Front 4

Uses of Airpower: Interdiction

Back 4

B-52—nuclear bomber modified to carry conventional weapons—was best known interdiction aircraft Arc Light: Name for B-52 interdiction missions

Front 5

Uses of Airpower: Close Air Support (CAS)

Back 5

Forward Air Controllers (FACs) were used to locate the enemy and mark targets for faster flying jets

Front 6

Uses of Airpower: Tactical Airlift

Back 6

Vital to successful US operations because of poor security on roads Missions often flown while under attack Supplies often air dropped because of enemy fire and poor landing facilities

Front 7

Uses of Airpower: Search and Rescue (SAR)

Back 7

Extremely important part of air support mission throughout Southeast Asia
Strengthened aircrew morale; fliers knew every effort would be made to save them if shot down

Front 8

Search and rescue

Back 8

By 1973, USAF had rescued 3,883 Americans

Front 9

Uses of Airpower: Air-to-Air Refueling

Back 9

KC-135s refueled fixed- wing aircraft

Front 10

Rolling Thunder: Restrictions

Back 10

off limits were MiG bases and nonfiring SAM sites

Front 11

Rolling Thunder: Effect of Restrictions

Back 11

Graduated increases in bombing intensity worked to advantage of N. Vietnamese Gave them time to recover from damage Enabled them to establish world’s most intense antiaircraft defense system Provided them will to fight on and a sense they could survive By 1965, it was clear that Rolling Thunder did not work!

Front 12

Rolling Thunder: Conclusions

Back 12

Rolling Thunder campaign, America’s longest, was a failure

Front 13

Linebacker I: Successes

Back 13

Linebacker I was the most successful US bombing campaign of the war

Front 14

Major Campaigns: Linebacker II

Back 14

Purpose of Linebacker II—Force the North Vietnamese to negotiate and sign peace treaty it was Very intense and logistically complex

Front 15

Linebacker II: Results

Back 15

North Vietnam returned to the bargaining table on 30 Dec 1972

Front 16

Vietnam War Results

Back 16

Decreased public opinion of government and military

Front 17

The Vietnam War: Lessons Learned

Back 17

US can’t win a counterinsurgency war in another country; only people of that country can and Graduated Response” is an ineffective way to employ airpower

Front 18

Weapon Systems

Back 18

Two key fighters developed
McDonnell Douglas F-15 Eagle
General Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcon

Front 19

Libya

Back 19

Operation EL DORADO CANYON
Air Force F-111s

Front 20

Panama

Back 20

JUST CAUSE began 20 December 1989 First use of F-117

Front 21

US Objectives in gulf war

Back 21

Immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait and Isolate and incapacitate Iraqi command structure

Front 22

The Five Strategic Rings

Back 22

1.leadership2.system essentials3. infrastructure4.population5. fielded forces

Front 23

Campaign Overview phase 1

Back 23

Strategic Air Campaign

Front 24

campaign overview phase 2

Back 24

Suppression of enemy
Air Defenses over Kuwait vicinity

Front 25

campaign overview phase 3

Back 25

: Air Attacks on ground
forces in Kuwait and vicinity

Front 26

campaign overview phase 4

Back 26

Ground Operations as
directed

Front 27

Lessons Learned—ONW/PROVIDE COMFORT

Back 27

Lack of an exit strategy

Front 28

The Crisis in Bosnia: Lessons Learned

Back 28

Lack of doctrine and Coalition/Joint problems

Front 29

United States & NATO Interests at Stake

Back 29

Serb aggression threatened peace throughout the Balkan, Belgrade’s repression in Kosovo created a humanitarian crisis of staggering proportions and President Milosevic’s conduct directly challenged the credibility of NATO

Front 30

NATO’s Objectives

Back 30

The unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons

Front 31

NATO’s Strategic Objectives

Back 31

Demonstrate the seriousness of their opposition to Belgrade’s aggression in the Balkans
Deter Milosevic’s attacks on helpless civilians, and reverse ethnic cleansing Damage Serbia’s capacity to wage war against Kosovo

Front 32

Lessons Learned by US Military

Back 32

Older platforms with smart weapons may be seen as good enough; smart weapons may be better than smart platforms