Non Fatal Offences

Front 1

To establish the link of a illegal act to the death, there needs to still be proximity.

in order to establish guilt of the offence under section 3ZB there had to be something in the manner of the defendant's driving which was open to proper criticism, beyond the mere presence of his vehicle on the road, and which contributed in some more than minimal way to the death, although it was not necessary to prove careless or inconsiderate driving on the defendant's part; that since on the agreed facts there had been nothing in the manner of the defendant's driving which contributed in any way to the deceased's death the defendant had not caused the death for the purposes of section 3ZB

Back 1

R v Hughes [2013] UKSC 56

Front 2

No matter how unlikely a result it, if there is no nous actus then the liability for the whole result still exists.

Back 2

R v Mallet [1972] Crim LR 260

Front 3

the death of the victim was caused by loss of blood as a result of the stab wounds inflicted by the defendant and the fact that she had refused a blood transfusion did not break the causal connection between the stabbing and the death; that, since the criminal law did not require the victim to mitigate her injuries, and since an assailant was not entitled to claim that the victim's refusal of medical treatment because of her religious beliefs was unreasonable, the jury were entitled to find that the stab wounds were an operative or substantial cause of death.

Back 3

R v Blaue [1975] 3 All ER 446

Front 4

when a jury had to consider whether negligent medical treatment of injuries inflicted by a defendant was a cause of death it was sufficient for the judge to direct them that it had to be proved that the defendant's acts caused the death, but that they need not be the sole or main cause provided that they contributed significantly to it; that even though negligence in the treatment of the victim was the immediate cause of his death, it should not be regarded as excluding the responsibility of the defendant unless the negligent treatment was so independent of his acts, and in itself so potent in causing death, that the contribution made by his acts could be regarded as insignificant; but that it was not the function of the jury to evaluate competing causes or to choose which was dominant provided they were satisfied that the defendant's acts could fairly be said to have made a significant contribution to the victim's death

Back 4

R v Cheshire [1991] 3 All ER 670

Front 5

Animals dont have agency and can't constitute a novus actus.

Back 5

Harlot's Case 1560 1 Hale Pleas of the Crown 432

Front 6

the proper test being not whether the appellant actually foresaw the conduct of the victim which resulted in the actual bodily harm, but whether that conduct could have reasonably been foreseen as the consequence of what he was saying or doing, the summing-up was not open to objection and the conviction must be affirmed.

Back 6

R v Roberts (1971) 56 Cr App R95

Front 7

he critical question for the jury, it is common ground, was whether the deceased, Christopher Gray, ran or continued to run as a flight response to an attack or threatened attack by the appellant. If so, it was open to the jury to find the appellant guilty of unlawful act manslaughter. If, however, he was either unaware that he was under attack or threatened attack, or if his flight was of his own volition and unrelated to any act of the appellant's, or not reasonably foreseeable, then the appellant was entitled to an acquittal.

Back 7

R v Lewis [2010] EWCA Crim 151

Front 8

McNechie beat up someone and when taken to hospital and was found tosuffer from an ulcer that is removable but can be fatal. This was however notpossible due to the injuries from the assaulat and the ulcer burst and killedhim. It was said that his injury and the choice not to rescue were notindependent from the action

Back 8

R v McNechnie (1992) 94 Cr App R 51

Front 9

A reasonable act performed for the purpose of self-preservation, including a reasonable act of self-defence, does not operate as a novus actus interveniens ; nor does an act done in the execution of legal duty.

Back 9

R v Pagett [1983] 76 Cr App R 279

Front 10

that there was binding authority to the effect that the ambit of “bodily harm” was restricted to recognisable psychiatric illness. In any event, the extension sought by the Crown would introduce an element of uncertainty. By adhering to the principle of recognisable psychiatric illness the issue which had to be addressed could be clearly understood and those responsible for advising the Crown and defendants could approach their cases with an appropriate degree of certainty

But the long term beating of a wife causing her to commit suicide could have been pursued under gross negligence manslaughter

Back 10

Rv D[2006] EWCA Crim 1139

Front 11

the defendant did recognise the risk involved if he did not take adequate precautions, although he had thought he had minimised that risk and that therefore no damage would result. Nevertheless, *8 the justices were wrong in coming to the conclusion that that was not recklessness by reason of what the defendant had put forward. Accordingly, the appeal would be allowed and the case remitted to the justices with a direction to convict.

Back 11

Chief Constable of Avon v Shimmen (1987) 84 Cr App R 7

Front 12

the use of the word 'reckless' in section 1 ofthe 1971 Act Parliament had not intended to change the law in regard to the mens rearequired for the o­ence of recklessly causing damage to property, so that foresight ofconsequences remained an essential ingredient of recklessness in the context of the Go­ence; that the formulation of the test which made no allowance for a defendantÕsyouth or lack of mental capacity when assessing the obviousness of the risk ofdamage to property was based upon a misinterpretation of section 1

Back 12

R v G and R [2004] 1 AC 1034

Front 13

the use of these words is a clear indication that the magistrates have applied the wrong test is misconceived. It ignores the clear findings the magistrates have made in their opinion that the appellant was aware — not “should have been aware”, or “would have been aware”, but “was aware” — of the risks associated with running into the road, namely the risk of a collision and the damage to property. Aware of those risks, he then deliberately put them out of his mind and, for reasons of his own, ran out into the path of a car. For my part, I see nothing inconsistent in those two statements. Indeed, they seem to me to echo the observations of Lord Steyn in G to the effect that:“In any event, as Lord Edmund-Davies explained [I interpose that is a reference to the judgment in Caldwell ], if a defendant closes his mind to a risk he must realise that there is a risk and, on the evidence, that will usually be decisive: …”

Back 13

Booth v CPS [2006] EWHC Admin 192

Front 14

On a charge of destroying or damaging property contraryto section 1 (1) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971,' a personis " reckless" in the sense required when he carries out adeliberate act knowing or closing his mind to the obvious factthat there is some risk of damage resulting from that act butnevertheless continues in the performance of that act (post,p. 604D).

Back 14

R v Parker [1977] 1 WLR 600

Front 15

a person who put acid in a machine either with the intent that it should be ejected onto thenext user causing him injury, or with recklessness as to theconsequences, was guilty of an assault when such injury wascaused (assault can be caused indirectly)

Back 15

R v Harris (reported under R v Coley and Others) [2013] EWCA 223

Front 16

You dont have to be the source of the assault, causing someone else to run into something for example if you directly caused it still counts as battery.

Back 16

R v Martin (1881) 8 QBD 54

Front 17

where someone by act or word or a combination of the two created a danger and thereby exposed another to a reasonably foreseeable risk of injury which materialised, there was an evidential basis for the actus reus of an assault occasioning actual bodily harm. However, it remained necessary for the prosecution to prove an intention to assault or appropriate recklessness. In the present case, the respondent by giving the police officer a dishonest assurance about the contents of his pockets, thereby exposed her to a reasonably foreseeable risk of an injury which materialised. It was therefore erroneous of the court to conclude that there was no evidential basis for the actus reus of assault occasioning actual bodily harm.

Back 17

DPP v Santana-Bermudez [2003] EWHC (Admin) 2908

Front 18

even if the police officer intended merely to carry out the cautioning procedure when she took hold of the defendant's arm, that action was unlawful and amounted to a battery since it went beyond the generally acceptable conduct of touching a person to engage his attention; and that, accordingly, the defendant's conviction had to be quashed since the police officer was not acting in the course of her duty when she detained the defendant

Back 18

Collins v Wilcock [1984] 3 All ER 374

Front 19

that consent to an assault was not to be implied, as a matter either of legal analysis or of legal policy, in the case of a teacher at a school for children with special needs, including those with behavioural problems, notwithstanding that the risk of violence by pupils was known to be higher than in mainstream schools; that there was no good reason to deprive such a teacher of his right to report to the police a criminal wrong of which he had been the victim, or to impose any condition precedent on the exercise of that right; that there was little, if any, similarity to the contact sports cases, in which the rules governing the various sports were taken as a guide to what consents players might reasonably be regarded as having given to what would otherwise constitute breaches of the criminal law and reflected the reciprocity of risk of injury between players

Back 19

H v CPS [2010] EWHC 1374 (Admin)

Front 20

This case, when concerning battery decided that children could consent to battery as long as they understood it, such as injections

Back 20

Gillick v West Norfolk andWisbech AHA [1984] 1 All ER 365 (HL)

Front 21

fraud vitiated consent to an act which would otherwise be an assault only where it had induced a mistaken belief as to the identity of the person doing the act or as to the nature or quality of the act; that a mistake as to identity did not extend to a belief as to a person's professional qualifications and attributes; that the concept of informed consent had no place in the criminal law; and that, accordingly, since the patients had been fully aware of the defendant's true identity her conduct, although clearly reprehensible, did not found a basis of criminal liability in the field of offences against the person

Back 21

R v Richardson [1998] 2 Cr App R 200

Front 22

although most batteries would be directly inflicted it was not essential that the violence should be so directly inflicted. The direct application of force could be through a medium controlled by the actions of the assailant. In the present case, W had lost hold of the child as an immediate result of the appellant's action in punching her. There was no difference in logic or good sense between the facts of the present case and one where the assailant used a weapon to fell the child to the floor, save only that the present case was one of reckless and not intentional battery. Accordingly, it was plainly right that the offence of assault by beating should be available for the criminal condemnation of the appellant's conduct.

Back 22

Haystead v Chief Constableof Derbyshire [2000] Crim LR 758

Front 23

whether or not the word “maliciously” appeared in any section of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 defining an offence against the person, the mens rea of every type of offence against the person covered both actual intent and recklessness, in the sense of taking the risk of harm ensuing with foresight that it might happen; that failure to give thought to the possibility of risk was not sufficient to qualify for guilt on a charge of assault occasioning actual bodily harm, contrary to section 47 of the Act; and that, accordingly, the basis upon which the appellant had pleaded guilty did not amount to an offence in law and his conviction should be quashed (post, pp. 1082E , H–1083A ).

Back 23

R v Spratt [1991] 2 All ER 210

Front 24

The man was so so drunk that he argued that he could not have possibly had the intent

the rule at common law was that self-induced intoxication was not a defence to a criminal charge; that, although the rule had been mitigated for offences where a special intent had to be proved, it was still an effective rule which had not been altered by section 8 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 and, accordingly, self-induced intoxication by drink or drugs or both was not a defence to the assaults alleged against the appellant

Back 24

DPP v Majewski [1977] AC 443 (HL)

Front 25

Intoxication does not create recklessness, if the person would not have forseen the result anyway then intoxication does not create recklessness.

Back 25

R v Brady [2006] EWCA Crim 2413

Front 26

the self-administration of a sedative or soporific drug, even in excess, did not automatically raise a conclusive presumption that its effects could not negative mens rea in the way that self-induced intoxication by alcohol or dangerous drugs could; that the trial judge had misdirected the jury that the effects of such a drug leading to a defendant's incapacity were irrelevant; and that, accordingly, the conviction had to be quashed since the jury should have been directed that if they concluded that by taking the drug a defendant could not appreciate the risks to property and persons from his actions, they should consider whether the taking of the drug was itself reckless

Back 26

R v Hardie [1985] 1 WLR 64

Front 27

When he accidentally shot his friend during a jest, then there is no manslaughter because there was no assault

Mens rea being an essential ingredient, manslaughter could not be established in relation to the first ground except by proving that element of intent without which there could be no assault (post, p. 988C); and that the whole direction relating to the statement that it was manslaughter if death resulted from an unlawful and dangerous act on the part of the defendant was vitiated by misdirections based on an erroneous concept of the law

Back 27

R v Lamb [1967] 2 QB 981

Front 28

recognisable psychiatric illnesses fell within the phrase 'bodily harm' as used in sections 20 and 47 of the Act of 1861; and that, in the context of the Act of 1861, 'inflict' included the infliction of psychiatric injury on another and did not mean that whatever caused the *148 harm had to be applied directly to the victim

Back 28

R v Ireland [1997] 4 All ER 225 (HL)

Front 29

That the husband was not entitled to use force or violence for the purpose of exercising his right to intercourse, and if he did so he committed an assault.

An assault causing a hysterical and nervous condition is an "assault occasioning actual bodily harm."

Back 29

R v Miller [1954] 2 All ER 529

Front 30

To achieve manslaughter under unlawful act and actual bodily harm, then there has to be actual bodily harm, which if it isn't physical then it has to be a clear psychiatric illness.

There was binding authority to the effect that the ambit of “bodily harm” was restricted to recognisable psychiatric illness. In any event, the extension sought by the Crown would introduce an element of uncertainty. By adhering to the principle of recognisable psychiatric illness the issue which had to be addressed could be clearly understood and those responsible for advising the Crown and defendants could approach their cases with an appropriate degree of certainty. Accordingly, the defendant would be acquitted (post, paras 31, 33), R. v Chan-Fook (Mike) (1994) 99 Cr.App.R. 147; [1994] 1 W.L.R. 689; The Times, November 19, 1993, CA followed

Back 30

R v D [2006] EWCA Crim 1139

Front 31

a verdict of assault occasioning actual bodily harm might be returned merely upon proof of an assault together with proof of the fact that actual bodily harm was occasioned thereby

Back 31

R v Savage [1991] 4 All ER 698

Front 32

“The phrase "grievous bodily harm" meansreally serious bodily harm, but it is not necessary that the harm should beeither permanent or dangerous… It is not a precondition that the victim shouldrequire treatment or that the harm should have lasting consequences. Inassessing whether the particular harm was grievous, account has to be taken ofthe effect on and the circumstances of the particular victim. See R v Bollom.Ultimately, the assessment of harm done in an individual case in a contestedtrial will be a matter for the jury, applying contemporary social standards

Back 32

R v Golding [2014] EWCA Crim 889

Front 33

an assessment *51 had to be made of, amongst other things, the effect of the harm on the particular individual. It was therefore necessary, in determining the gravity of these injuries, to consider them in their real context but there was no pre-condition to a finding that the injuries amounted to grievous bodily harm that the victim required treatment or that the harm would have lasting consequences. In this type of difficult case, in which there were sometimes powerful reasons for witnesses to lie, both as to who injured a young child and whether more than one person was responsible, it was critical that juries were directed that they must be sure not only of the unlawful involvement of the defendant in the harm, but additionally that his responsibility for the injuries, whether as a principal or by way of a joint venture, was such as to make him guilty of causing or inflicting grievous bodily harm

Back 33

R v Bollom [2003] EWCA Crim 2846

Front 34

a defendant who, knowing that he was suffering a serious sexual disease, recklessly transmitted it to another through consensual sexual intercourse could be guilty of inflicting grievous bodily harm, contrary to section 20 of the 1861 Act; that the victim's consent to sexual intercourse was not, of itself, to be regarded as consent to the risk of consequent disease; but that if the victim did consent to such a risk that would provide the defendant with a defence to a charge under section 20; and that, accordingly, the judge should not have withdrawn from the jury the issue of the women's consent to the risk of infection

Also noting that if the motive of the sex was the transfer of the disease then no possible consent wold be good.

Back 34

R v Dica [2004] 3 W.L.R. 213

Front 35

a verdict of assault occasioning actual bodily harm was a permissible alternative verdict on a count alleging unlawful wounding contrary to section 20 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861; and that a verdict of assault occasioning actual bodily harm might be returned merely upon proof of an assault together with proof of the fact that actual bodily harm was occasioned thereby

To have been guilty under s.20, there had to be a foresight of some harm done.

Back 35

DPP v Parmenter [1991] 4 All ER 698

Front 36

The public interest requires that consent should not be a defence to a charge of assault occasioning actual bodily harm. The respondent and another youth quarrelled in a public street, where they agreed to, and did have, a fist fight. One was injured. The defendant was acquitted after the judge directed the jury that if the other party consented and the force used was reasonable, the defendant was not guilty. On a reference on the question of whether consent could be a defence to a fight in a public place, held, that public interest required that it could not, whether the offence was committed in a public or a private place.

Back 36

Att-Gen's Reference (No 6of 1980) [1981] QB 715

Front 37

although a prosecutor had to prove lack of consent in order to secure a conviction for mere assault, it was not in the public interest that a person should wound or cause actual bodily harm to another for no good reason and, without such a reason, the victim's consent afforded no defence to a charge under ss.20 or 47; (2) the satisfying of sado-masochistic desires did not constitute such a good reason; (3) since A had admitted the charges against them and since the injuries inflicted were neither transient nor trifling, the question of consent was immaterial and the judge's ruling had, accordingly, been correct

Back 37

R v Brown [1993]2 All ER 75

Front 38

The crown court judge rejected that on the grounds of the reference andBrown, and that decided that in those cases the pain was a signinficant part ofthe action and were very different to the case at hand. S.47 cases however themens rea only requires to only touching.

Back 38

R v Slingsby [1995] Crim LR 571

Front 39

If the touching was with consent, then the fact that in the course of the consensual activity some bodily injury, even serious bodily injury, resulted accidentally, then as a matter of principle no criminality could attach, R. v Donovan (John George) [1934] 2 K.B. 498, R. v Boyea (1992) 156 J.P. 505 and R. v Savage (Susan) [1992] 1 A.C. 699 considered, R. v Slingsby (Simon) [1995] Crim. L.R. 570 applied. Savage had been correctly decided in accordance with principle. The judge in the instant case had not been right to hold as a matter of law that consent was no defence either to the charge under s.20 or the charge of indecent assault, absent the necessary mens rea for those offences

Back 39

R v Meachen 2006 EWCA Crim 2414

Front 40

it was to be emphasised that there was a critical distinction between taking a risk as to the various potentially adverse and possibly problematic consequences of unprotected consensual sexual intercourse, and the giving of informed consent to the risk of infection with a fatal disease. For consent to the risk of contracting HIV to provide a defence, the consent had to be an informed consent (made aware of his HIV)

Back 40

R v Konzani [2005] EWCA Crim 706

Front 41

the trial judge was wrong to find that consent was irrelevant and was no defence to a charge under s.47 of the Act. The instant case involved no aggression or sado masochistic element, and the branding was carried out as a result of W's wife's request to have W's initials on her body as a physical adornment, R. v Brown and R. v Donovan (John George) [1934] 2 K.B. 498 distinguished.

As the motive of the action was not the pain in itself

Back 41

R v Wilson [1996] 3 WLR 125

Front 42

Genuinely held belief in consent to rough and undisciplined play is a defence to assault, and is a matter to be left to a jury. The defendants were pupils at a school and indulged in a game whereby two other boys were thrown in the air, and received serious injury on landing. Their defence was that they had not foreseen that such serious injury would result. The trial judge declined to give a direction that if the jury thought the defendants had indulged in "rough and undisciplined" play with no intent to injure, and in the genuine belief that the victims consented, they should be acquitted.

Back 42

R v Jones (1986) 83 Cr App R 375

Front 43

If the defendant onlysupplies the noxious substance and the other willingly administers it tohimself breaks the chain of causation.

Back 43

Rv Kennedy[2007] UKHL 38

Front 44

that for the purposes of section 24 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861, the concept of the “noxious thing” involved not only the quality or nature but also the quantity of the substance administered or sought to be administered and it was a question of fact and degree in all the circumstances whether a thing was noxious; that, on the true construction of section 24 “noxious” meant something less in importance than, and different in quality from, poison or other destructive things and that, accordingly, the jury had been properly directed

And that when considering poison repeated dosages could be added up

Back 44

R v Marcus [1981] 1 WLR 774

Front 45

(1) that the prosecution had to prove that the injection of heroin was a cause of death and not de minimis; (2) although F's consent to the injection of heroin might be relevant to consideration of whether D had acted with recklessness or gross negligence, the victim's consent was not generally a defence to a charge of manslaughter; (3) the use of heroin was potentially harmful and therefore it was a "noxious" thing for the purposes of s.23

Back 45

R v Cato [1976] 1 WLR 110

Front 46

F was a mentally ill womanwith no understanding of sex. She enjoyed the company of another male patientand it was agreed by all that a pregnancy would be a major problem. Howeverthey did not want to separate them and therefore they just wanted to sterilizeher, on the basis that this could be in the patients best interest then the HOLdecided that it would be lawful. It was said that it could also applied tocases where a person cannot decide because of a temporary mental state, such aspanic.

Back 46

Re F [1990] 2 AC 1

Front 47

Y was mentally ill and lived in an institution. Her mother and sistervisited her often, which was going to stop as her sister was suffering fromleukemia the sister’s best chance of living was a transplant from the mentallydisabled woman. The question was whether they could take a sample, because itis benefit to her sister, and she cannot give consent because she does notunderstand the procedure. And it was stretched and decided that it was in Y’sbest interests as she was benefitting from her sister’s visits

Back 47

Re Y (Mental Patient:Bone Marrow Donation) [1997] Fam 110

Front 48

even when his or her own life depended on receiving medical treatment, an adult of sound mind was entitled to refuse it; that, although pregnancy increased the personal responsibilities of a woman, it did not diminish her entitlement to decide whether to undergo medical treatment; that an unborn child was not a separate person from its mother and its need for medical assistance did not prevail over her right not to be forced to submit to an invasion of her body against her will, whether her own life or that of her unborn child depended on it, and that right was not reduced or diminished merely because her decision to exercise it might appear morally repugnant; and that, unless lawfully justified, the removal of the baby from within the applicant's body under physical compulsion constituted an infringement of her autonomy and amounted to a trespass, and the perceived needs of the foetus did not provide the necessary justification

Back 48

StGeorge’s Healthcare NHS Trust v S [1998] 3 All ER 673

Front 49

The UK's parental chastisement law at the time was seen to be in violation of human rights

Art.1 read with Art.3, demanded that contracting states adopt measures to ensure the protection of those within their jurisdiction and prevent them from suffering torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, with children and the vulnerable deserving particular protection in the form of effective deterrence. At F's trial, the onus had been on the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the beating went beyond the "reasonable chastisement" of a child permitted by English law. F's acquittal, notwithstanding that A's treatment fell within Art.3 demonstrated that English law as it stood failed to provide adequate protection for children, and the Government's failure in this respect constituted a violation of Art.3.

Back 49

Av United Kingdom (1999) 27 EHRR 611