Math Exam

Front 1

Plurality

Back 1

The candidate with the most first-place votes. The winner does not need a majority of the votes.

Front 2

Standard Runoff Method

Back 2

First,you run a plurality round. Then, the top two candidates with the most first-placevotes compete within a runoff competition, where every voter choosesbetween those two candidates.

Front 3

Hare Elimination Method

Back 3

Run a pluralityround. Eliminate the candidate with the least number of votes in this round.Conduct a second with all the remaining candidates where every voter gets tochoose between the remaining candidates. Repeat until one candidate remains oruntil a candidate receives a majority of votes.

Front 4

Borda Method

Back 4

(A point system) Give points for every ranking a candidate receives on every voter’spreference list. (1 pt for last place, 2pts for next to last place, and so on.)The candidate that receives the most points from all of the voters wins.

Front 5

Condorcet Method

Back 5

(A round-robin tournament system) - Run every candidate against every other candidateusing separate, pairwise (one-on-one) competitions. All voters get tovote for one of the two candidates in each of these one-on-onecompetitions. If one candidate can beat every other candidate inpairwise competition, then that candidate is the Condorcet winner. If no suchcandidate exists, this method does not produce a winner.

Front 6

Sequential Pairwise with Agenda

Back 6

(A tournament system with byes) [Note:You must be given an agenda.] Run the first two candidates in one-on-onecompetition. All voters get to vote for one of the two candidatesbeing compared in each one-on-one competition. Take the winner and the thirdcandidate from the list and compare the two using pairwise competition. Repeatthe process of taking the winner and the next person on the list and comparingthem using pairwise completion until a final winner remains at the very end. [Note:Show this contest as a sequence of connected, pairwise competitions.]

Front 7

Agenda Effect

Back 7

Changingthe agenda within the Sequential Pairwise with Agenda Method can change theoutcome of the election.

Front 8

Insincere Voting

Back 8

Votingagainst your true preferences in order to alter the outcome of the election.

Front 9

Majority Criterion

Back 9

If there is a candidate that has amajority (over 50%) of the first-place votes, then that candidate should be thewinner of the election.

Front 10

Condorcet Criterion

Back 10

Ifthere is a candidate that is preferred by the voters over each of the othercandidates (in pair-wise competition), then that candidate should be the winnerof the election.

Front 11

Unfavorable Majority Criterion

Back 11

Ifa candidate is the last place choiceof a majority (over 50%) of the voters, then that candidate should NOT be thewinner of the election.

Front 12

Monotonicity Criterion

Back 12

Ifcandidate X is a winner of an election, and in a re-election, all the changesin the ballots are favorable to X, then X should still be the winner of theelection.

Front 13

Independence of Irrelevant AlternativesCriterion

Back 13

Ifcandidate X is the winner of an election. After one (or more) of the othercandidates is disqualified and the ballots are recounted, then X should stillbe the winner of the election.

Front 14

Pareto Criterion

Back 14

If everyvoter prefers candidate X over candidate Y, then the voting method should rankX above Y, particularly Y should not win the election.

Front 15

Arrow’sImpossibility Theorem

Back 15

Therecan never exist a voting method which satisfies all of the fairnesscriteria for all possible elections. In other words, every electionmethod can, in some circumstances, yield unfair results.

Front 16

Jefferson Method

Back 16

Rounds Down

Front 17

Adams Method

Back 17

Rounds up

Front 18

Webster Method

Back 18

If it's greater than or equal to .5 round up if not round down

Front 19

Absolute Cell Reference

Back 19

usedin equations with $’s around the letter in the cell address (such as $B$1) tokeep cells from being adjusted when copied.

Front 20

Relative Cell Reference

Back 20

usedin equations as the default reference to a cell (such as B1) in which the cellis adjusted when the equation is copied.

Front 21

The Quota Rule

Back 21

Everydistrict should get the floor or ceiling of its ideal quota (its ideal quotarounded up or down).

Front 22

AlabamaParadox

Back 22

This occurs when a state loses a seat, because thehouse size has increased.

Front 23

NewStates Paradox

Back 23

This occurs when a state loses a seat due to a newstate being added, even though thehouse size was increased to specifically accommodate this new state.

Front 24

PopulationParadox

Back 24

Thisoccurs when a faster growing state loses a seat to a slower growing state.

Front 25

Balinsky and Young’s ImpossibilityTheorem

Back 25

Therecannot exist an apportionment method which never violates quota and neverexhibits paradoxes. In other words, any apportionment method which neverviolates quota will sometimes exhibit paradoxes, and any apportionment methodwhich never exhibits paradoxes will sometimes violate quota.