Lca (Blackwell)

Front 1

State the argument.

Back 1

God is the best explanation of why anything at all exists:

1. [PSR] Everything that exists has an explanation of its existence (either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause).

2. If the universe has an explanation of its existence, that explanation is God.

3. The universe exists.

4. The universe has an explanation of its existence (1&3).

5. Therefore, the explanation of the universe’s existence is God (2&4).

Front 2

Premise 1: what is its support?

Back 2

Analogy: you're hiking through a forest and find a glowing blue orb on the ground. You'd naturally wonder how it came to be there; you wouldn't think it just exists without explanation.

Now say that ball was the size of a house, a planet, or the universe - same problem; merely increasing the size of the ball does nothing to remove or explain its existence.

Front 3

Premise 2: what is its support?

Back 3

1. Do you think that if atheism is true, then the universe has no explanation of its existence? [Yes] Then you're implicitly admitting (2), as that's logically equivalent to, 'If the universe has an explanation of its existence, then atheism is not true' (synonymous with (2)).

2. As the universe is all of physical reality, if it has an explanation, it must be an immaterial, spaceless, timeless entity (or it's circular). Only two things fit that description: either an abstract object or an unembodied mind. Since abstract objects are causally powerless, it must be an unembodied mind (i.e., God).

Front 4

State two reasons to accept PSR.

Back 4

1. Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE).

2. Precludes chaos.

Front 5

Why is the IBE evidence for the PSR?

Back 5

Without the PSR, scientific reasoning collapses because, for any observation, there would be no presumption of an explanation for it, if a thing not having an explanation were as likely as it having an explanation.

So, we need a principle according to which there being no explanation is at least highly unlikely.

Front 6

Why is precluding chaos evidence for the PSR?

Back 6

Why don’t we see widespread chaos, like bricks inexplicably coming into existence?

Best explanation: PSR, because then they simply can't absent some explanation.

But without it, the possibility of this happening would be impossible to rule out.

Front 7

Isn't preclusion of chaos bad evidence because co-location is impossible anyway?

Back 7

Problem of co-location: the relevant spaces are already occupied.

1. Inexplicable beginnings needn’t involve co-location (they could involve a inexplicable and chaotic gain or loss of certain physical properties).

- Doesn't rule out a chaos of inexplicable non-spatial/physical beings beginning (non-spatial beings aren’t located, so would need PSR to rule this out).

Front 8

Objection: Preclusion of chaos isn't good evidence as the laws of physics would preclude it.

Back 8

1. Physical laws are merely descriptive (abstract objects).

2. If the PSR were false, then there could just be brute, unexplained exceptions to the laws of physics.

3. Merely relocates the problem: for why don’t a whole host of laws themselves chaotically come into being without explanation?

Front 9

What is the Aristotelian-causal account of modality?

Back 9

A non-actual SOF, S, is possible iff either:

1) S is actual.

2) Something exists with a causal power of bringing about S (or a chain of exercises of causal power leading to S).

Front 10

What is the advantage of the Aristotelian-causal account of modality?

Back 10

Reduces metaphysical possibility to causal possibility.

Some primitive modality remains: some things being able to bring other things about by their causal powers.

But, this primitive modality we understand well - we're very familiar with causal powers (e.g. me for speaking).

Plausibly entails a version of the PSR (every contingent SOF has a causal explanation).

Front 11

Why must all contingent facts be explained by a necessary being?

Back 11

Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact (BCCF): the conjunction of all contingently true propositions.

According to the PSR, the BCCF has an explanation.

Its explanation cannot be a thing (circular), so the explanation must be a necessary thing.

Front 12

What are the types of causal principle (CP)?

Back 12

Local CP: every localised contingent item (substance, event, etc.) has a cause (restricted).

Global CP: every contingent item has a cause (unrestricted).

Front 13

Why should we hold to a global CP, rather than merely a local CP?

Back 13

Local CPs are restricted in an ad hoc manner - if we restrict CPs to a local phenomenon we can't rule out an infinite chain of global aggregates of entities coming into existence uncaused.

A brick comes into existence in mid air at T0 + 1ms; there was no cause at T0, but at T0 + 1/2 ms the particles of the brick were caused by a set of earlier particles. At T0 + 1/3 ms the earlier particles were caused by yet an earlier set, out to infinitum.

Though each individual event has an explanation (satisfying the local CP), the chain as a whole has no explanation, so either an event or chain comes into being ex nihilo - neither solves the problem (so to rule this out we need a global causal principle).

Front 14

Objection: If CP applies to all contingent, concrete SOF - if SOF c causes SOF e, we can form a third SOF: c1, from c's causing e. But, if c is contingent, so is c1 - generates a viscous regress (always need another SOF to explain the previous). Thus, the truth of CP leads to a vicious regress, so is false.

Back 14

c1 is not a further state of affairs; instead, it's the sum of c and e - there's no numerically distinct state of affairs of c's causing e (c1).

So you don't need a further SOF that would generate a vicious regress.Or, we could simply identify c's causing e with c's causal activity.

Or, we could simply identify c's causing e with c's causal activity.