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86 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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Cases involving Involuntary Hospitalization
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• Addington v Texas (1979) (std of proof)
•O'Connor v. Donaldson (due process; dangerousness) • Lake v. Cameron (least restrictive alternative) |
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Procedural Due Process Cases
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• Addington v. Texas (1979)
• In re Parham (1979) • Vitek v. Jones (1980) • Lessard v. Schmidt (1972) • Baxtrom v. Herold (1966) |
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Voluntary Hospitalization Cases
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• Zinermon v. Burch (competency to consent)
(case out of Florida) |
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Lake v. Cameron
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• DC Cir 1966
• Judge Bazelon • LEAST RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVE) • "deprivation of liberty solely because of dangers to the ill persons themselves should not go beyond what is necessary for their protection.) |
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O'Connor v. Donaldson
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• US 1975
• Donaldson held in state hospital, never shown to be dangerous (wasn't required when initially committed) • State cannot confine without more, a non-dangerous, mentally ill person who is capable of surviving safety in freedom by himself or with the help of family or friends." |
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Addington v. Texas
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• US 1979
• Constitutional Minimum for Std of Proof for involuntary hospitalization • Clear and Convincing |
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Matthews v. Eldridge Analysis
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1. private interest affected by government action
2. risk of erroneous deprivation of interest 3. governments interest |
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Lessard v. Schmidt
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DC 1972 (former Landmark Case)
• High water mark for protection of liberty interests • Due process safeguards for civil commitment (jury trial, no hearsay evidence, privilege to remain silent, std: beyond reasonable doubt, notice, and attorney) |
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Vitek v. Jones
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US 1980
• transfer of incarcerated prisoner to a mental hospital involving stigma & subject to mandatory treatment requires Written Notice & and Hearing with extensive procedural safeguards |
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Baxtrom v. Herold
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US 1966
• application for civil commitment upon expiration of a criminal sentence → US Sup Court found statute unconstitutional because statute allowed for civil commitment upon expiration of sentence without jury review (as required for non-criminals) |
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Confidentiality / Privilege / Privacy cases
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• In re Lifshutz (privilege)
• Doe v. Roe (confidentiality) • Jaffee v. Redmond (psychotherapist - patient privilege) |
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Exceptions to Confidentiality / Privilege
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• Whalen v. Roe (police powers versus confidentiality)
• Commonwealth v. Kobrin (limitations in fraud investigations) |
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Confidentiality / Privilege - Reporting Statutes and case law
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• State v. Andring (reporting acts override federal confidentiality law)
• People v. Stritzinger (degree of reporting required) |
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In re Lifschutz
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• 1970 California Supreme Court
• The patient, not the doctor, owns the privilege |
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Doe v. Roe
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• NY trial court 1977
• psychiatrist published a book - name changed - about the fantasies of the patient • Rejected doctor's argument that the patient consented orally to the disclosures |
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Jaffee v Redmond
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US 1996
• Applies the psychotherapist - patient privilege to FRE 501 which is "...the privilege of a witness shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts...." |
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Confidentiality v. Privilege
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Confidentiality = Clinicians Obligation to keep private
Privilege = Patients Right to bar the clinician.... |
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Whalen v. Roe
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US 1977
• Involved NY states investigations in prescription fraud, and statute requiring copies of C II Rx • statute was challenged by NY physicians and patients • US Sup Ct → Statute not unconstitutional. Reasonable exercise of police power. Does not infringe on practice of medicine |
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Commonwealth v. Kobrin
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Mass Supreme Court 1985
• In Medicare fraud case, psychiatrist refused disclose of ALL records • Court upheld privilege as to ALL records, but required psychiatrist to disclose to grand jury: appts, fees, dxs, somatic treatments, tx plans |
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Duty to Warn / Protect Cases
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Tarasoff
Lipari v. Sears (Duty to detain) Jablonski v. US (foreseeable victim) Naidu v. Laird (driving case) Peck v. Counseling Service (victim may be property) |
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Right to Mental Health Treatment Cases
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• Donaldson v. O'Connor (issues of constitutional right to treatment)
• Youngberg v. Romeo (professional judgment) • Rouse v. Cameron (based on statute, not constitution) • Wyatt v. Stickney (consent decree, minimal hospitalization standards) |
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Right to Refuse Mental Health Treatment Cases - Proxy decision making
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• Rogers v. Commissioner (judicial model)
• Rennie v. Klein (professional model) • Application of the President and Directors of Georgetown College • Washington v. Harper (prisoners) |
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Right to Refuse Mental health Treatment CAses - Substituted Judgment
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• In re Guardianship of Richard Roe III
• Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikowitz |
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Dillon v. Legg
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California 1968
• Foreseeability test in tort cases for emotional injury • Located near the scene & direct emotional impact • NOTE - California abandoned this test and went back to a zone of danger test |
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Injury at Work - before Worker's Compensation - what is the "unholy trinity"
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• Contributory negligence
• Assumption of the Risk • Fellow-servent rule |
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Carter v. General Motors
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Michigan Supreme Court 1960
• Emotional disabilities are compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act regardless of whether the cause of such emotional disability is a direct physical injury, a mental shock, or sustained pressure. |
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Strategies to Assess Malingering
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1. Recall v. Recognition
2. The Floor Tests - i.e. Rey II memory 3. Symptom Validity Test (SVT); others - TOMM, Recognition Memory Tests - Faces and Words (RMF & RMW), "dead or alive" test; "coin in the hand" test |
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Harassment Cases
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• Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson (harassment defined)
• Harris v. Forklift Systems (hostile work environment) • Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services (same - sex harassment) |
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Sexual Harassment Claims based on ....
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Civil Rights Act of 1964 - (Title VII) - forbids discrimination on the basis of gender
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Types of Sexual Harassment Claims
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1. Quid-pro-quo
2. Hostile/Abusive work environment |
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Elements of Quid pro quo sexual harassment claims
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1. Supervisory relationship
2. Employer knowledge 3. condition of / adverse effect on employment |
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Elements of Hostile / Abusive Work Environment Claim
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1. Interference with job performance, or intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment
2. must have sexual / gender discriminatory quality |
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Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson
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US 1986 (defines harassment)
• Hostile claims are actionable • Conduct must be severe & pervasive so as to "alter conditions of employment & create an abusive working environment." • voluntary conduct by putative victim is not a defense • Test is whether advances were "unwelcome" |
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Harris v. Fork Lift Systems
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1993
• Reasonable Person Test • Victim must perceive environment to be "abusive" for it to be "altered." • Ψ damages not required for claim → Harm not required for claim • Totality of the circumstances |
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Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services
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US 98
• sex discrimination consisting of same sex harassment is actionable. • Need not be motivated by sexual desires |
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Lipari v. Sears
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US district Court - Nebraska 1980
• patient was a VA outpatient who bought a shotgun from Sears, dropped out of treatment, shot Lipari at a nightclub • motion to dismiss b/c no known foreseeable victims under a Tarasoff standard • although there were no "known" victims, and thus no duty to warn "at large" there, may have been a duty to detain. Plaintiff, as a member of "public at large" may have been a foreseeable victim |
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Peck v. Counseling Services
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Vt 1985
• Crime was Arson → burned a barn down • Since arson was violent - should be included under a Tarasoff duty |
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Jablonski v. US
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US 9th cir. 1983
• VA case • extension of Tarasoff because patient made no concrete or specific threats against the victim - but court held not error for jury to find foreseeability. • Warn versus "warn enough." |
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Naidu v. Laird
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Delaware 1988
• driving case. Alcoholic driver. • Delaware's Tarasoff statute now precludes this |
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Death Penalty Cases
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• Penry v. Lynaugh US 1989 (MR)
• Atkins v. Virginia 2002 (MR) • Roper v. Simmons (2005) (juveniles) • Estelle v. Smith (1981) (procedural due process) • Barefoot v. Estelle (1983) (hypothetical questions) • Ake v. Oklahoma (1985) Free psych experts • Payne v. Tennessee (1991) • Ring v. Arizona (2002) |
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Penry v. Lynaugh
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US 1989 (overruled by Atkins in 2002)
• execution of mentally retarded defendant not necessarily cruel and unusual punishment. • Mental capacity was simply one mitigating factor |
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Atkins v. Virginia
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US 2002
• Executions of mentally retarded criminals are cruel and unusual - prohibited by 8th amendment |
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Definition of Mental Retardation
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3 prongs
1. Intellectual dificit 2. adapative fxn deficit 3. onset during a developmental disability |
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Psychiatric testimony in Death Penalty Cases
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AMA Policy - council on Ethics and Judicial Action - psychiatrists testimony at trial as to relevant medical evidence does not constitute physician participation in an execution
(contrast that with AMA position on competence to be executed) |
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Estelle v. Smith
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US 1981 • Death Penalty Case
• defendant's 5th amendment right against self-incrimination and 6th amendment right to counsel in death penalty case violated when interviewed for competency to stand trial by Dr. Grigson |
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Barefoot v. Estelle
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US 1983 • Death Penalty Case
• Dr. Grigson case. He didn't examine defendant. • hypothetical questions on future dangerousness → "100 & absolute chance" Barefoot was a continuing threat to society. |
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Ake v. Oklahoma
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US 1985 • Death Penalty Case
• Right to free psychiatric assistance |
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Payne v. Tennessee
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US 1991• Death Penalty Case
• Victim Impact Statements - do not violate 8th amendment • → hypothetically, Ψ could be called to testify on psych impact on victim's family • case overturned Booth v. Maryland • Victim impact statements - not allowed in all states |
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Ring v. Arizona
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US 2002 • Death Penalty Case
• 6th Amendment • Aggravating factors to be determined by Jury |
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Ford v. Wainright
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US 1986 • Death Penalty • Competency to be executed
• 8th amendment prohibits execution of "insane" person |
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6 reasons Court found Defendant must be Competent to be executed
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1. incompetent might be unable to provide last minute info to counsel
2. madness is punishment itself 3. incompetent person cannot make peace with God 4. execution of insane → no deterrent effect 5. miserable spectacle of extreme inhumanity and cruelty 6. can't exact retribution from an incompetent person |
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Competency to be executed: AMA vs. AAPL
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AMA - unethical
AAPL - guidelines do not prohibit psychiatrists doing competency to be executed evaluations |
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State v. Perry
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Louisiana Sup Ct 1992 • Death Penalty
• Cannot forcibly Medicate for purposes of obtaining competency to be executed. But see Singleton v. Norris (8th cir 2003) |
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Panetti v. Quarterman
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US 2007 • Death Penalty
• Procedure for evaluating competency to be executed • no hearing was held → court remanded for a hearing |
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Jurek v. Texas
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US 1976 • Death Penalty • Sentencing phase
• Allowed jury to consider future dangerousness at sentencing phase → thus opening door for Ψ testimony at sentencing |
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Juvenile Execution Cases
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1. Thompson v. Oklahoma (1988) Unconstitutional when defendant ≤ 15 at time of crime
2. Stanford v. Kentucky & Wilkins v. Missouri (1989) • both defendants age 17. Court upheld death penalty 3. Roper v. Simmons (2005) |
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Gregg v. Georgia
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US 1976 • Death Penalty
• Death penalty is not per se unconstitutional |
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Furman v. Georgia
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US 1972 • Death Penalty
• Georgia's death penalty statute at that time was unconstitutional because it gave unconfined discretion to the judge or jury |
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Singleton v. Norris
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8th Circuit 2003 • Death Penalty • Forced Medication Case
• Forced meds under a Harper standard does not violate 8th amendment once an execution date is set; and ban against execution of insane not violated when competency gained through appropriate medical care. |
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Models of Consent
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1. Implied
2. Presumed 3. Substituted (vicarious decision maker) 4. Informed: required by the standard of care 5. Emergency (consent not required) |
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Vicarious decision making models
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1. Best interest - determined by decision maker
2. substituted judgment - what the currently incompetent person would want |
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Kaimowitz v. Michigan Dept of Mental Health (1973)
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• Informed Consent in Prison Research
• Impossible to obtain truly informed consent in Prison Population |
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Rennie v. Klein
Treatment Driven Model |
Treatment Refusal Case • 1979
Court mandated: 1.written consent forms; 2. patient advocates to serve as "informal counsel", and 3. informal review by an independent psychiatrist before forced medication may be given |
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Rennie v Klein (on appeal to 3rd circuit)
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1983
Court found 1. constitutional right to refuse 2. Due process rights adequately protected by right of appeal to the medical director; and 3. deference to professional judgment in Youngberg v. Romeo was considered |
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Case examples as models of Treatment Driven right to refuse
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Rennie v. Klein (professional model)
Rogers v. Commissioner (judicial model)(Mass Sup Court) Washington v. Harper |
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Case examples of Rights driven model of right to refuse / substituted judgment model
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• Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz (profoundly retarded - tx of leukemia. Hosp didn't want to treat. Judge said the family is "too close to be objective.")
• In re Guardianship of Richard Roe III (family is an inadequate decision maker → case established substituted decision model for antipsychotics) |
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Rogers v. Commissioner
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Mass 1983
• Involuntarily committed individual is competent to make treatment decisions until the patient is adjudicated incompetent by a judge, who then decides, using substituted judgment, whether the patient would have consented if competent |
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Forced Medications in Criminal Context
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• Washington v. Harper
• Riggins v. Nevada • Sell v. US |
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Washington v. Harper
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Competent prisoner's refusal of medications
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Riggins v. Nevada
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Criminal • Pre-trial
• Riggins was forced to take Mellaril during his insanity trial. He wanted to refuse it. State had burden of establishing the need for Mellaril |
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Sell v. US
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Criteria:
1. May override tx refusal by assessment of incompetence to consent or dangerousness 2. Treaters can use involuntary tx if treatment: • is medically appropriate • is unlikely to undermine trial fairness • is the least intrusive alternative • must further governmental trial-related interests |
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Rouse v. Cameron
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DC Circuit 1966 - Right to Treatment Case - based on NGRI statute
• Found NGRI on a misdeameanor; filed habeus • Judge Bazelon - the hospital need not show the treatment will cure or improve condition, but only that there is a bona fide effort to do so • Concept of Individualized Treatment Plans • continuing failure to provide suitable and adequate treatment cannot be justified by lack of staff or facilities |
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Donaldson v. O'Connor
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5th Circ 1974 • Right to Treatment • Issue of Constitutional right to treatment - under 14th amendment
• Donaldson was civilly committed • Quid pro quo theory → supports provision of treatment in exchange for loss of freedom |
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Youngberg v. Romeo
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US 1982 • Right to Treatment • Professional Judgment • 14th amendment required:
1. reasonably safe conditions of confinement; 2. freedom from unreasonable body restraints; and 3. such minimally adequate training as reasonable may be required to accomplish the first two. • Court should not "second guess" the expert administrators • no liability unless administrators decision is such a "substantial departure" |
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Wyatt v. Stickney
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US 1971 • Right to Treatment • consent degree, minimal hospital standards
• Case started due to anticipated lay-offs at the state hospital • Three fundamental areas: 1. humane psychological and physical environment; 2. Qualified staff in sufficient numbers; and 3. Individualized Treatment Plans |
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ERISA Cases
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Corcoran v. United Healthcare 1992
Dukes v. United Healthcare 1995 New York State BC/BS v. Travelers 1995 Pegram v. Hendrich 2000 Rush Prudential v. Moran 2002 Aetna v Davila 2004 |
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Corcoran v. United Healthcare
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ERISA • 1992
negligence in medical decision making that occurs in handling of benefits are pre-empted by ERISA |
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Dukes v. United Healthcare
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ERISA • 1995
• MD ordered blood test, HMO didn't do it → pre-eclampsia → still born • Claim regarding the quality of the services the HOM provided. The HMO provided, arranged for or supervised the medical care. • Therefore, not automatically pre-empted by ERISA |
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New York State BC/BS v. Travelers
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ERISA • 1995
Surcharges did not related to ERISA, and there for not pre-empted |
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Pegram v. Hendrich
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ERISA 2000
• MDs with financial incentives from MCO create no fiduciary duty to implicate ERISA • such MDs, however, have a duty to disclose the financial incentive |
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Rush Prudential v. Moran
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ERISA 2002
• State law regulating insurance allowing for independent review of decisions was not pre-empted by the ERISA savings clause → therefore suit allowed |
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Aetna v. Davila
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ERISA 2004
• decisions by MCOs about what kind of care to pay for must be regarded as eligibility or benefit determinations, not treatment decisions. • Places utilization review decisions back under the ERISA shield from liability |
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Cases involving Competency to stand trial
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Dusky (6th and 14th-counsel, confrontation, evidence)
Godinez v. Moran - 1993 - guilty plea - still Dusky Wilson v. US 1968 - Amnesia not a bar Cooper v. Oklahoma 1996 - Burden of proof Riggins v. Nevada - can't medicate without more Sell v. US Jackson v. Indiana 1972 - Restore - reasonable period |
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Colorado v. Connelly
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US 1986 • Competency to Confess
• Voluntary confession is one made without intimidation, coercion, or deception. • to not be voluntary - must be some evidence of police coercion in eliciting it. (defendant confessed by walking up to police because auditory hallucinations told him to do so.) |
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FRE 601
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"Every person is competent to be a witness"
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Elements of Competency of Fact Witnesses to Testify
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1. ability to observe an event
2. ability to remember the event 3. ability to communicate memory of the event 4. ability to distinguish truth from falsehood 5. an understanding what it means to tell the truth under oath. |
