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39 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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EPC What is the classification? MEANS |
- facially discriminatory? - facially neutral, but discriminatory impact? if facially neutral, must show discriminatory purpose behind the law |
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EPC What is the appropriate level of scrutiny? ENDS Strict Scrutiny |
discriminatory law is upheld if: -it is necessary to achieve a compelling gov't interest -burden of proof- gov't: classification serves compelling gov't interest and classification necessary to serve interest -classification has to be "narrowly tailored to further" - animus is never a permissible gov't motive |
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EPC Intermediate Scrutiny |
To uphold the discriminatory law: gov't must show 1. that the classification serves an important state interest and 2. that the classification is at least substantially related to serving that interest |
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EPC Rational Basis |
Challenger has the burden to show that the classification is not rationally related to any conceivable, legitimate gov't purpose under ANY plausible view of the facts. -highly deferential test. Law almost always upheld under this test. |
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Korematsu |
All de jure racial discrimination subject to the most searching scrutiny only pressing public necessity of the highest order can justify racial discrimination invalid if the purpose is racial animus. Korematsu - both under inclusive (germans/italians) and over inclusive (US citizens and children) |
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US v. Carolene Products (FN 4) |
- Rigorous judicial review of economical/ commercial legislation is inappropriate - Articulated two-tier approach: RB Heightened Scrutiny (strict, and intermediate added later) FN4: Much rigorous judicial scrutiny: -legislation restricts political processes that would normally result in the repeal of undesirable legislation (voting, right to assemble, etc.) -actions/ legislation directed at particular religious/national/racial minorities or discrete and insular minorities. |
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NYC Transit Authority v. Beazer (1979) |
means: law prohibited hiring of anybody using narcotics -- even methadone to treat heroin addiction end: public safety interest in keeping narcotics users from working for NYCTA fit: OK, but over inclusive (could have done individual personnel screenings) and under inclusive (what about alcoholics?) rule const. because based on concerns of personnel policy that do not implicate concerns that the EPC is intended to protect-- not directed against any class of persons characterized by some unpopular trait -- unlikely to create bias of ruling majority. |
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New Orleans V. Dukes (1976) |
RB review means: eradicated vendor pushcarts that had been around for less than 8 years end: wanted the French Quarter to look nice Fit: OK - judiciary cannot assess the merits of the law if the law conceivably relates to what the law is trying to do. - as long as it's not completely arbitrary, it's okay rsbl that State thought the newer businesses less likely to build up substantial reliance interests in continued operation - not necessary to eradicate all evils that it is trying to ameliorate. - legislatures may implement programs step by step and defer complete elimination of evils to future regulation
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Railway Express Agency v. New York (1949) |
means: law prohibits advertising on vehicles except on company's own vehicle end: eliminate distractions on the streets fit: under-inclusive (why allow vehicle owners to advertise?), BUT it doesn't matter. - no requirement that the law has to eradicate all evils ("half-steps are OK") - not EP claim, but if it were, it would be subject to rational basis review - here court found it was rationally related to legitimate state interest - law upheld as promoting public safety - the state might have perceived some difference among the ads - it doesn't matter if gov't failed to deal with even greater distractions to motorists |
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US Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz (1980) |
Means: Law enacted to reduce costs and make the social security and railroad benefit program financially viable. Classified RR workers based on yrs of service & retirement status. Some people received windfall, but others got less. End: Prevent the retirement fund program from going bankrupt Fit: OK. Congress needs just a RB for it's social and economic legislation |
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US Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno (1973) |
here, exception to the RB low level of scrutiny Food Stamp Act excluded every household that has unrelated individuals living in same residence declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. means: for any given household, those that are not related cannot get food stamps, but those that are can get food stamps. Based entirely on relatedness. ends: conceivably to ameliorate fraud (more likely to occur where there are unrelated adults) - stated purpose of the law was to exclude hippies fit: poor: - court does not buy that the ends was to ameliorate fraud. Plus, there are whole sections of the act devoted to preventing fraud. - majority realizes that the amendment intends to discriminate against hippie communes. Congress may not pass bills designed to harm a politically unpopular group, regardless of the reason. |
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Modern Equal Protection and Race: Loving v. Virginia (1967) |
Anti-miscegenation laws declared unconst. by SCOTUS. court did both EPC and DPC analysis: 1. EPC: classifying interracial couples - just because this applies to whites and blacks, doesn't mean it's free and clear of invidious discrimination 2. SDP: involves the right to marry, which is a fundamental right. |
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Modern EP and Race: Palmore v. Sidoti (1984) |
Facts: white couple divorce, mother remarries to black man. Lower ct. grants white father custody of child-- child would suffer social stigmatization because of mother's relationship with a black man. - SCOTUS said lower cts. decision unconst. gave mother custody - Ct. found this was a classification based on race/ subject to SS and no compelling gov't interest here. -argued compelling gov't interest: protect from private prejudice. Ct rejects this argument. - Flipside of Plessy: (court there said they were keeping the peace by separating races) here, SCOTUS held that the child could be integrated into interracial society. - VERY difficult to find a compelling gov't interest that is narrowly tailored with race |
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Facially Discriminatory Classifications v. As Applied Yick Wo v. Hopkins - (1886) |
First case where SCOTUS held that a rule that's facially race-neutral, but administered in a prejudicial manner infringes EPC of 14th Am. Means: ordinance required laundry businesses in wooden buildings to apply for waiver. end: fire considerations Fit: Although not facially discriminatory, law as applied had a discriminating effect on Chinese and violated the EPC of 14th. - statistical info about unequal administration of the law was enough to show the discriminatory intent. (Only 1 of 200 applications for Chinese granted, virtually all non-Chinese granted) |
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De jure v. Def facto discrimination (discriminatory purpose v. discriminatory effect) Washington v. Davis (1976) |
means: police dept's recruiting procedures had a written test end: prevent official discrimination on the basis of race. (written tests are more impartial) Fit: ok. even though some blacks can't pass the test. Law or other official acts that have racially disproportionate impacts did not automatically become constitutional violations. Recruiting procedures did not have discriminatory intent and were racially neutral measures of employment qualification. - NEED TO SHOW INTENT TO DISCRIMINATE. (disproportionately burdening different racial groups is not enough to make the court apply SS. |
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Washington v. Davis Takeaway |
SS applies when: - facial classification by race - racially discriminatory intent shown by plaintiff (Tick wo has this, Washington- Pl couldn't show discriminatory intent) Court requires PURPOSEFUL DISCRIMINATION in order for SS to apply - doesn't need to be express - racially disproportionate impact alone is not enough (washington v. davis), but is relevant to determine if there has been intentional discrimination (Yick Wo??) |
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Feeney Test |
Feeney test: purposeful discrimination is not just awareness of consequences of disparate impact. Decision maker must have selected particular State action "at least in part 'BECAUSE OF,' not merely in spite of its adverse effects upon an identifiable group" |
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Personnel Administrator of MA v. Feeney (1977) |
Law gave hiring preference to veterans over non-veterans. Pl claimed it discriminated against women. Although there was a disproportionate impact on women, the law was not passed because of this disparate impact. The law was passed to help veterans re-enter society. Decision maker did not choose the State action because of disparate impact on women. A gender neutral statute that has a disparate impact on one gender does not violate EPC of 14th if it does not have a discriminatory purpose and if it does not actually classify one gender. |
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Affirmative Action (Generally) |
- benign gov discrimination/ reverse discrimination/ race-specific classifications that benefit racial minorities - doctrinal questions: should "benign" gov uses of suspect classifications be subject to same rigorous judicial review as ill-intentioned gov discrimination? Based on history of its adoption, does the 14th Am. protect blacks in a special way? (should aff action benefiting blacks be subject to less searching review than hispanics?) Should aff action by state and local gov be scrutinized more rigorously than fed gov? Which, if any gov purposes are compelling enough to allow the benign use of racial classifications? |
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Affirmative Action (Generally) |
Court ruled that ALL racial classifications are subject to SS. Why? - history shows us that racial classifications are especially likely to reflect a desire to subordinate a racial group and so must be examined closely -racial minority groups are especially likely to be disadvantaged in the political process (politics is likely to fail them) so courts must strictly scrutinize results of political processes (laws, etc.) - race is simply an irrelevant basis to draw distinctions between people, therefore immoral for gov to use it. |
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Affirmative Action Regents of University of Cali v. Bakke (1978) |
Med school set aside spots for minorities court struck down quota system quota system not okay plurality opinion: 4 -- believed title VI of CRA forbade schools from receiving federal funds from taking any race into account at all in their admissions process (not okay) 4 -- all aspects of the med school admissions standards pass the less-searching-judicial-scrutiny than SS (okay) 1 -- intermediate position, but did not like the quota system |
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Univ. Michigan Cases Grutter v. Bollinger (2003) |
Law school's affirmative action program. - only take race into account and admit on case by case basis - court held colleges and uni's have compelling interest in creating a diverse student body and race can be used as one factor (among many) to benefit minorities and enhance diversity. - diversity-driven purpose, among many other factors, is permitted |
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Univ. of Michigan Cases Gratz v. Bollinger (2003) |
Undergrad admissions policy granted 20 points to anyone who is a minority. - court held the program was not sufficiently "narrowly tailored" to meet SS for gov racial classifications - system did not look at each candidate individually -- not narrowly tailored |
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Univ. of Michigan Cases Takeaways |
Grutter/Gratz 1. deference to state (uni) on whether there is a compelling state interest education benefits of a diverse student body is a compelling state interest "racial balancing" not a permissible interest 2. Narrow tailoring restricts how state institutions of higher ed may pursue diversity: - no quotas: "outright racial balancing" - race can be a "plus," but race cannot insulate applicant from competition |
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Parents Involved v. Seattle School District (2007) |
court rejected diversity as a compelling interest in the context of elementary and high schools. fails for two reasons: 1. need judicial finding of de jure segregation. in Seattle, there was no history of de jure segregation. In Louisville, the court had lifted an injunction requiring desegregation, so it was as if there was no history of de jure segregation. 2. also, the affirmative action was not narrowly tailored enough. it was just about proportionality. There was no plus factors or individual determinations. has something to do with state action discrimination. If only societal discrimination, court cannot do anything to remedy discrimination. |
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Sex/ Gender Classification
Myra Bradwell v. Illinois (1873) |
Woman asserted right to a license to practice law in Illinois by virtue of her status as a US citizen. Court did not agree that the right to practice law is one of the privileges and immunities protected by the 14th Am. Court noted the importance of maintaining the "respective sphere of man and woman," with women performing the duties of motherhood and wife in accordance with "the law of the Creator" |
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Art. V Constitutional Amendments 19th Am. Proposed Equal Rights Amendment Major Doctrinal Questions |
19th Am: right of citizens to vote cannot be denied or abridged on account of sex.
Proposed Equal Rights Amendment: equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the US or by any state on account of sex. Doctrinal questions: -appropriate level of scrutiny of for gender classifications? - what gov interests are sufficiently important to support the use of gender classifications? - how to prove that a gender classification is used by the gov? - how should gender classifications benefitting women be treated? - may gov take account of actual physical differences between men and women? |
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Gender EPC |
Reed v. Reed: use Rational basis (but the court says must rest upon the sound ground of difference of having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the law) Frontiero v. Richardson: use SS (kind of) Craig v. Boren: Establishes IS, maybe there's an intermediate scrutiny? not quite SS, but more than RB. VMI: applies intermediate scrutiny |
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Gender EPC Reed v. Reed (1971) |
- first case to hold sex discrimination violates EPC - man and woman each seek to be appointed administrator of estate - Idaho probate rule: "males must be preferred to females" -RB review, but statute still struck down. - end: probably administrative convenience of having men over women (judges have to do less work) and men were superior, better accounting skills, etc. - fit: bad: not rationally related to a government interest at all. (court couldn't merit the argument that men would be better at administering an estate over women) Std of review: Classification must be rsbl, not arbitrary, and must rest upon the sound ground of difference of having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the law. |
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Gender EPC Frontiero v. Richardson - 1973 |
Fed statute required female service-member to prove that her male spouse was dependent. KIND OF SS: struck down. Violated 5th Am. DPC (bc it was a federal statute) -At this point, court was really trying to figure out what standard of review to apply, RB or SS? - in this case, apply SS: fn4: discrete and insular minority; long/unfortunate history of sex discrimination -although sex characteristics are highly visible and immutable, frequently bear no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society. the court, especially Brennan found a lot of similarities between gender and race |
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Gender EPC Craig v. Boren (1976) |
ESTABLISHED INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY FOR SEX means: OK law allowed women to buy low alcohol drinks but men couldn't until they were 21. end: help traffic safety fit: violated EPC sure, it is possible that this affects traffic safety, but gender isn't substantially related because the statistical difference found between 2 genders in drunk driving was tiny. |
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Gender EPC Craig v. Boren/ Intermediate Scrutiny Test |
IS: to withstand const. challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve IMPORTANT GOV OBJECTIVES and MUST BE SUBSTANTIALLY RELATED TO THOSE OBJECTIVES Since Craig, SCOTUS on many occasions reaffirmed and applied IS for gender classifications |
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Gender EPC US v. VMI (1996) |
-court declared unconstitutional exclusion of women by VA Military Institute - VA established a womens version, but it was still insufficient and did not excuse VMI's gender discrimination -- women still denied access to opportunities -justifications cannot rely on over broad generalizations about the different talents, capabilities, or preferences of males and females. VMI's exclusion was based entirely on gender stereotypes - For intermediate scrutiny, gov has the burden of proof and the gov justification must be: - must be "exceedingly persuasive" - cannot be post hoc, must be genuine - cannot rely on over broad generalizations |
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Gender EPC US v. VMI (1996) Summary of rules |
- For intermediate scrutiny, gov has the burden of proof and the gov justification must be: - must be "exceedingly persuasive" - cannot be post hoc, must be genuine - cannot rely on over broad generalizations |
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Gender EPC Michael M. v Superior Court (1981) |
Intermediate Scrutiny: upheld Means: state statutory rape law that punished men for having sex with a woman who was underage, but not for females under 18 End: prevent illegitimate teen pregnancy Fit: fine, because females, due to biological factors bear a more significant burden of pregnancy and it's right to punish men, who have it easier, more harshly Hard to square with VMI: all male court, decision probably based on gender stereotypes. Court also weighed the fact that women bears a larger risk of harm of pregnancy and punishing men more harshly only to try to even the playing field. YOUNG MEN AND WOMEN ARE NOT SIMILARLY SITUATED (biological factors) |
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Gender EPC Nguyen v. INS (2001) |
-when US citizen mother gives birth to child abroad, child is given citizenship w/o hassle -when US citizen father's child is born abroad, have to go through steps to get child US citizenship P argued this was gender discrimination Two arguments for the statute: 1. ensure actual partnership (but DNA testing is so easy) 2. assumption mother would have a stronger bond with child (too general, too broad an assumption) Yet, the court UPHELD the law here WHY>>>? |
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City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center (1985) |
RATIONAL BASIS PLUS - city rejected plant to build a group home for intellectually disabled pursuant to a muni zoning ordinance - stated reasons: too many people would live there, local property owners opposed it, kids from nearby school might harass residents, site is on a flood plain Mental retardation only RB review. Why? Even though intellectually disabled people have real and immutable differences: - prejudice is not widespread - national and state legislatures have passed protections - the intellectually disabled as a group are not politically powerless However, the zoning ordinance still struck down under RB review: - the city had not barred apt buildings, hospitals, frat houses, etc. from the area - restriction is an irrational prejudice against intellectually disabled - completely arbitrary - !! odd because usually they can do things step by step so under inclusiveness doesn't matter - while the ct. declined to grant the intellectually disabled the status of a "quasi - suspect class" it nevertheless found that the "rational relation" test for legislative action provided sufficient protection against invidious discrimination |
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What determines a suspect class? |
- history of purposeful discrimination - Whether the discrimination is unfair because it is tied to an immutable characteristic - Whether the group acts political power, like a discrete and insular minority - whether the characteristic in question is irrelevant and not appropriate sounds for legislation |
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Levels of Scrutiny for Different Classifications |
SS: F, R, NO/A Fundamental rights, religion, national origin/ ancestry IS: NC, G Non marital children, gender RB: D, W, A, SO mental or physical disability (RB +?) wealth (if case concerned about discrimination against the poor - uses constitutional provision other than EPC to strike down) age: ex: driver's license sexual orientation (RB+?) Unclear: alienage: (state = stricter scrutiny); federal (RB). political process v. other contexts |
