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40 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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Skidmore |
LOW DEFERENCE FOR STATUTORY INTERP. - Skidmore and 6 others sued Swift & Co. to recover overtime pay for "waiting time." -Administrative bulletin said waiting time did not constitute time worked. Lower court deferred to bulletin and denied P's claim - Courts can take reports, recommendations, briefs, bulletins, opinions, etc. of administrators into account, but may not be deserving of much consideration -4 Skidmore factors (thoroughness, validity, consistency, catch-all) |
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Chevron |
HIGH DEFERENCE FOR STATUTORY INTERP. -Clean Air Act required states to develop air pollution plans including permits for "stationary sources of pollution," but didn't define the term -EPA interp. as entire plant=stationary source -In absence of clear congressional intent, courts must accept the reasonable interp. of the agency -Court tried to shift power in interpreting ambiguous terms away from courts and toward agencies |
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Christensen |
DEFERENCE FOR STATUTORY INTERP. - Deputy sheriffs accepted comp time instead of cash. County then asked agency if it could schedule employees to take their comp. time. Administrator said yes, if prior agreement specific such. County then implemented such a policy -Sheriffs claimed the policy violated the FLSA -Administrator's (informal) opinion letter was given no weight in determining the statutory construction -In deciding between Chevron II and Skidmore, look to how the agency reached its determination--> Battle-tested? Formal or informal? |
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Mead |
DEFERENCE FOR STATUTORY INTERP. -Imports "day planners" which have different tariffs than "calendars" or "diaries" -Customs issued a ruling letter, never published, explaining its classification ("bound diaries") of Mead's items -Custom's ruling does not qualify for Chevron deference -Look to implicit or explicit authority delegated from Congress to give the agency's rulings the force of law (in addition to considering formality) |
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Barnhart v. Walton |
DEFERENCE FOR STATUTORY INTERP. - Walton was denied SSDI benefits because his "inability to engage in substantial gainful activity" lasted 11 months, instead of 12.--> when does "expected to last" apply? -SSA's interpretation fell within its lawful interpretive authority -5 Factor Test: (1) Kind of interpretation- broad or narrow; (2) Administrative complexity; (3) Administrative importance; (4) Agency's expertise involved; (5) Carefulness of consideration |
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Kent v. Dulles |
CLEAR STATEMENT PRINCIPLE: EXCEPTION TO HIGH-LEVEL DEFERENCE -Appealing denial of passport applications by Secretary of State, per statutory authority, based on communist affiliations -The right to travel is, at a minimum, a significant liberty interest, so the Court will assume against restricting such liberty interest unless Congress has made a clear and specific statement authorizing such a regulation |
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Scenic Hudson (I) |
HARD LOOK: QUESTIONS OF FACT - FPC granted Consolidated Edison license to construct hydroelectric plant without considering less-expensive and more environmentally-friendly alternatives, as required by the Federal Power Act -Court stated the FPC did not adequately consider the SHPC's gas turbine alternative, but only provided "a scanty, less than 10-page, discussion of why the gas turbine would not work" |
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Scenic Hudson (II) |
HARD LOOK: QUESTIONS OF FACT -FPC findings of fact are binding on a reviewing court, so long as they are supported by substantial evidence -Courts cannot simply substitute their judgment on facts for that of the FPC |
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Hard Look |
-Applies to INFORMAL adjudication and rule-making (policy determination/fact-finding) -Applies to § 706 arbitrary and capricious -Applies to § 553 notice-and-comment and "concise, general statement to the basis of the purpose" requirements -Consider: reputation of the agency and the type of issue (statutory interp. vs. policy/fact-finding) |
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Overton Park |
-Secretary approved funding for highway to run through park. -Must show (1) no feasible and prudent alternative; and (2) exercised all possible care to minimize harm to the park -A final determination of an agency will generally be reviewable by some court--> strong presumption UNLESS (1) Congress has clearly and explicitly precluded judicial review; (2) Congress has committed the decision to agency discretion - 6 APA standards may apply to determination of fact or policy choice--> arbitrary and capricious (hard-look or narrow?) -Court does not decide due to inadequate record--> Chenery Principle |
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Holmes |
CLARITY, NOTICE, LIMITING POSSIBLE CORRUPTION - Class action brought under CRA and 14th Am. PDP against NY City Housing Authority -Massive procedural defects in the admissions policies and practices -Court found Ps were denied due process, and some system, including a transparent set of rules that allow applicants to know where they stand/criteria, must be developed |
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Fook Hong Mak |
CLARITY, NOTICE, LIMITING POSSIBLE CORRUPTION vs. INDIVIDUALIZED TREATMENT -Immigration case -P given 8-day stay transit authorization, found 6 months later; argues status should be changed to "lawfully admitted alien" -Under agency's rules, when you apply for transit authorization, you waive the claim to have status adjusted -Agency has authority to exercise discretion on an individual basis, or can apply by rule (even though this eliminates discretion) -No violation of Congressional intent to pre-commit |
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Chenery Doctrine |
A reviewing court will not supply their own justifications for an agency's determinations |
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Chenery (I) |
-SEC orders Chenerys to tender back their stock shares acquired during the course of reorganization, due to fiduciary obligation to other shareholders. -SEC based its decision entirely on mistakenly interpreted judicially imposed rules of equity. -Because SEC did not provide other justification, and the Court refuses to provide its own rationale bc Congress intended public policy decisions to be made by the agencies, as experts, case is remanded |
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Chenery (II) |
-On remand, SEC based its decision on its experience of reorganizations and issued the order under its discretionary power. -Court allowed SEC to issue ad hoc order covering specific situation, rather than promulgating a general rule with purely prospective effect -Reviewing courts should accord agencies a great deal of discretion when choosing between rule-making and adjudication |
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Arizona Grocery |
-ICC declared $0.961/2 was a reasonable rate for carriers to charge shippers. Atchison (D) then charged Arizona Grocery (P) $0.96. ICC later declared D's rate to be unreasonable and ordered it to pay P reparations based on the newly declared reasonable rates - When ICC declares a rate, it has the force of law, and should therefore be reliable. -Agencies, generally, must follow their own rules, even if those rules were not required by statute, until such time as they sufficiently explain their departure from that rule. |
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Schweiker v. Hansen |
LIMITED POSSIBILITIES OF ESTOPPEL -P was erroneously told by an SSA employee that she was ineligible for benefits. Later filed to recover benefits she'd have received if not erroneously informed. -Secretary of Health and Human Services argued that P was not legally eligible for benefits until she filed a written application, and P tried to estop the defense, as employee had violated the (purely) internal agency manual -Equitable estoppel cannot succeed against an agency/US gov. based on mere negligence -Two potential claims: (1) legal/technical error that would be nearly impossible for P to detect; or (2) error should be plainly apparent to P |
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Londoner |
WHEN IS INDIVIDUALIZED HEARING CON. REQ.? -Denver City Council, per statute, approved assessment on P's property for the costs of paving a public street - P argued denied due process due to inadequate hearing procedures -Court holds that P must be allowed to present evidence and participate in oral argument -Fairness requires individualized hearing, and Council can afford it because only a limited number of people are being affected, and affected differently |
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Bi-Metallic |
-Colorado Tax Commission and State Board of Equalization ordered 41% increase in valuation of all taxable property in Denver. P argued depravation of property without due process - Agency orders that affect vast numbers of people may be adopted without affording every interested party a direct opportunity to be heard -Impractical and arguments would be repetitive, since everyone is being equally affected |
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Londoner and Bi-Metallic Considerations |
-Legislative facts (no) vs. adjudicative facts (maybe) -Number of persons affected -Distinctiveness of the effects |
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National Petroleum Refiners |
RULEMAKING TO FACILITATE ENFORCEMENT THROUGH LATER ADJUDICATION -FTC, per FTCA, promulgated reg requiring octane rating numbers to be posted on gas pumps -P argued FTC's rule-making power was limited to non-adjudicatory investigative functions, not substantive rule-making to be used in its adjudicative function -Court holds FTC can promulgate substantive rules defining statutory standards of illegality/per se rules (more efficient, rules are fairer than case-by-case adjudications) |
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Florida East Coast Railway |
FORMAL RULE-MAKING IS NOW RARE - ICC, without formal hearing, ordered per diem rate charge on rental freight cars (Act gave authority "after hearing"). -P argued Act required formal rule-making proceedings per § 556 of APA. ICC said § 556 was not triggered, and their proceedings conformed with § 553. -APA does not require a formal hearing on the record for agency rule-making determinations, unless Congress clearly and explicitly specifies so -Key phrase: "a decision after hearing on the record"
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Nova Scotia (hot-smoked whitefish) |
§§ 706 AND 553 HARD-LOOK INFORMAL ADJUDICATION AND RULE-MAKING - FDA promulgated safety regulations for the fish-smoking industry, but failed to consider the impact of the hot-smoked whitefish industry, which could not comply with regs and still have sellable fish. -Record of the FDA's rule-making proceedings hadn't been made or certified, record was basically sketchy and flimsy. -Agency notice and comment rule-making proceedings must develop a sufficiently complete record that allows for adequate judicial review -Agency failed § 553 requirements and was arbitrary and capricious per § 706
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Vermont Yankee |
ABOLITION OF HYBRID JUDICIALLY-IMPOSED AGENCY PROCEDURES BEYOND HARD-LOOK - Atomic Energy Commission granted VY license to operate a nuclear power plant, using a licensing formula developed during Commission's rule-making proceeding, which conformed to § 553. -Court of appeals invalidated the formula and license, holding stricter procedural standards of investigation should have been used -Except in rare circumstances can a reviewing court impose more stringent procedural requirements than those required by the APA. (Courts can still apply hard-look to informal rule-making, but cannot require more hoops than APA) |
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Hoctor |
EXCEPTIONS TO NOTICE AND COMMENT RULE-MAKING -Exotic animal farm; Dept. inspector advised 6-ft tall perimeter fence, which Hoctor constructed. A year later, Dept. issued internal memo stating 8-ft perimeter fence is required. Hoctor cited for violating. -Dept. argues that this is an interpretive rule, but is applying it as a substantive rule (which would have to adhere to § 553) -IN Court (Posner) says this 8-ft. standard is not interpreting anything, since notice-and-comment rule just said "facility must be structurally sound" and height and structural soundness are unrelated |
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North American Cold Storage (putrid poultry case) |
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS -P was ordered by Chicago health officers to surrender for destruction poultry deemed unfit for human consumption/ "public health menace." - P contended entitlement to pre-deprivation notice and hearing. -Court said pre-deprivation hearing when action requires immediacy; post-deprivation hearings would be adequate because the owner could be made whole |
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Goldberg v. Kelly |
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCES - Welfare recipients of federal or New York state programs alleged deprivation of PDP by terminating benefits without pre-dep hearing concerning their eligibility for continued aid -Court held PDP requires that welfare benefits can only be terminated after a hearing at which the recipient is afforded at least minimal procedural safeguards, including opportunity to be heard on his own behalf (pre-dep and fairly formal hearing required) -Hearing must include (1) notice and reasons for proposed termination, (2) opp. to be heard, (3) oral hearing, (4) confront adverse witnesses, (5) represented by counsel (but not guaranteed), (6) impartial decision-maker, (7) decision made on basis of the record and reasoning is provided |
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Roth |
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS -Hired as assistant prof. at Wisconsin State University with one-year contract and no cause to be shown for non-renewal. Roth was not rehired and not given explanation. -Roth claimed Board of Regents violated his PDP by failing to explain. -Court found no liberty or property interest (as a non-tenured teacher upon expiration of his contract), so no due process rights could possibly be violated |
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Perry |
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS -Employed at Texas state college for 10 years, under one-year contracts. College had no formal tenure system, but the Faculty Guide indicated that tenure was assumed so long as the employment was mutually beneficial, and Board promulgated rules bestowing job tenure for employees over 7 years. -When Board voted against renewing contract without explanation, P sued, arguing implied tenure system gave him a property interest in continued employment. -Court limited the decision to the concept that an implied contract right may be denied by a state as a property right under the Con., and P must be given an opportunity to prove legitimacy of his claim. |
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Mathews v. Eldridge |
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS -SSDI benefits were terminated without evidentiary hearing. Administrative procedures included determination by committee of medical and lay members, opportunity to review evidence and submit addition, right to review, right to non-adversarial evidentiary hearing before a SSA ALJ. -Court held an evidentiary hearing prior to termination is not required to provide adequate safeguards against error. -Distinguishable from crucial welfare benefits -Three factor test to determine the nature and timing of a hearing (after finding that claimant has a property interest) (1) weight of claimant's interest, (2) government's interest in the nature and timing of the hearing, (3) difference in error rates between the procedure C seeks and procedure gov. is willing to offer |
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Procedural Due Process Requirements |
(1) State action (2) Actual or threatened imminent or immediate deprivation, by the state, of some recognizable life, liberty, or property interest (3) Establish the source of the property interest (cannot be federal law) (4) Determine the type of process that is due (nature and timing) |
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Freedom of Information Act |
9 Exemptions from Disclosure: (1) National Security, (2) Internal agency personnel rules and practice, (3) Non-disclosure statutes, (4) Trade secrets or commercial or financial information that is confidential or privileged, (5) Privileged communication within or between agencies protected by deliberative process privilege, A-C privilege, work product, (6) Clearly unwarranted invasions of privacy, (7) Information compiled for law enforcement purposes, (8) Information that concerns the supervision of financial institutions, (9) Geological information on oil-wells |
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§ 1983 |
(1) Ps=US Citizens (2) Ds= state actors (3) Under color of state law (4) Injury= federal statutory rights, Constitutional -cannot be hortatory rights or statutory rights when statute provides a detailed alternative enforcement scheme (5) Damages= Declaratory and injunctive, potentially compensatory and punitive, prevailing party may get attorney's fees (6) Defenses: qualified and absolute immunity (7) Exhaustion is NOT required |
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Heckler v. Chaney |
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY INACTION -Chaney was on death row and petitioned FDA to enforce certain drug approval regulations (drugs are supposed to be determined "safe and effective") as to the lethal injection drugs. FDA declined. -Court said agencies have discretion in enforcement -Judicial review does not allow for review of agency functions "committed to agency discretion" -Distinguishable from failing to adopt a rule, revoke a rule, or adjudicate a rule (there has been no final determination made to be reviewed) -Court will not review an agency's failure to enforce a rule UNLESS: (2) Rule itself indicates enforcement priorities (3) Agency itself can be shown to have abdicated from enforcement, as a whole (4) Agency legally thinks incorrectly that they lack enforcement authority (5) Agency fails to enforce their own rules for purposes that reflect its own corruption |
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Standing Elements |
Three Constitutional Elements: (1) P must show a distinct and palpable injury-in-fact (2) P must show a sufficient line of causation (3) Redressability Three Judicially-Made, Waivable, Pragmatic Elements: (1) Generally one cannot litigate the rights of third parties (2) Cannot litigate political questions (Baker v. Carr) (3) Generally, P must be within the zone of interest sought to be protected by the statute |
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Sierra Club v. Morton |
STANDING -P sued to enjoin Walt Disney Enterprises from developing a recreational wilderness area. P alleged standing based on adverse affect on scenery, natural and historic object, and wildlife -Court held P had failed to demonstrate that it has suffered the injuries alleged, and therefore lacked standing -Court also held that injury-in-fact can include things like adverse environmental impact, conservational affects, recreational affects, aesthetic affects, etc. BUT injury must be specific to the P/must actually feel the impact |
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Ripeness |
Two Factors: (1) Fitness of the issues for judicial resolution at that specific moment (2) Undue hardship to one of the parties if the issue is not immediately adjudicated |
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Abbott Labs v. Gardner |
RIPENESS -Per the FDC Act, the FDA required drug manufacturers to print generic names on all products. Abbott claimed regulations exceeded FDA's statutory authority. -Agency action was ripe for review because the issues presented were purely legal in nature, and further admin. proceedings would be worthless because both parties had had a full and fair opportunity to be heard -Regs affect P's day-to-day business, so P would suffer great hardship if denied -Many cases cut the other way |
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Exhaustion Exceptions |
(1) An attempt to work through the administrative process would be futile (2) § 1983 |
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McKart |
EXHAUSTION -A rare exception to exhaustion -Exempt from draft as a "sole surviving son of the family," but once mother died, Selective Service said no longer a family, so no longer exempted from service. -McKart (D) failed to pursue admin. remedies to challenge, and FTA for duty. Gov. argued D couldn't raise defense of erroneous classification at criminal trial because he failed to exhaust his admin. remedies -Court held exhaustion was not required because the question was of statutory interpretation and the burden of denial of review outweighed the interests underlying the purpose of exhaustion -Court is better-able to interpret statutes, and D's stakes were so high that it is unlikely others will be encouraged to fail to exhaust |
