This case is between Joseph Gupton and Village Key & Saw Shop, Inc. In this case it delineates that Gupton had owned a locksmith-alarm business. However, in 1989, the business started to go downward due to financial problems, so Village Key decided to buy the business from Gupton. They took over the bills and accounts and signed a promissory note. Gupton decided to work for Village Key and had signed a non-compete agreement. This non-compete agreement included that Gupton cannot engage in competition with the employer within the territory for a period of five years after his termination as an employee for Village Key. The issue arose when Gupton did leave this job in 1992. Although he did not bribe or solicit any of the customers, some customers
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At first Gupton and Village Key was entered into a nonjury trial on September 1, 1993. Here the trial judge based their decision on a 1990 amendment section 542.33 even though the non-compete agreement was in 1989. The trial jury ruled in favor of Gupton, but declined to enjoin Gupton engaging in competing business against Village Key. This injunction banned Gupton from using any trade secrets that he gained from his employment at Village Key. However the nonjury judges also stated that this injunction doesn’t include those customers that had left Village Key to go to Gupton without any soliciting. The court did not forbid Gupton in engaging in competition with Village Key. In petition to the Fifth District Court of Appeal they found that the 1990 amendment shouldn’t be taken into account because the parties entered into their contract in 1989 and the amendment should be applied prospectively not retrospectively. However, the district court noted that the trial court only applied the 1990 amendment because no one had brought the pre-1990 version upfront. It is also important to note that under the 1989 statue the court’s authority was limited regarding non-compete agreements, they could only authorize a non-compete agreement based on timeliness and geographical limitations. The district court reversed and remanded the trial court because the trial jury’s decision did not stop Gupton from entering into competition with Village Key. The Supreme Court of Florida agrees with the Fifth District that the 1990 statue should be applied prospectively not retrospectively and ruled in favor of Village
At first Gupton and Village Key was entered into a nonjury trial on September 1, 1993. Here the trial judge based their decision on a 1990 amendment section 542.33 even though the non-compete agreement was in 1989. The trial jury ruled in favor of Gupton, but declined to enjoin Gupton engaging in competing business against Village Key. This injunction banned Gupton from using any trade secrets that he gained from his employment at Village Key. However the nonjury judges also stated that this injunction doesn’t include those customers that had left Village Key to go to Gupton without any soliciting. The court did not forbid Gupton in engaging in competition with Village Key. In petition to the Fifth District Court of Appeal they found that the 1990 amendment shouldn’t be taken into account because the parties entered into their contract in 1989 and the amendment should be applied prospectively not retrospectively. However, the district court noted that the trial court only applied the 1990 amendment because no one had brought the pre-1990 version upfront. It is also important to note that under the 1989 statue the court’s authority was limited regarding non-compete agreements, they could only authorize a non-compete agreement based on timeliness and geographical limitations. The district court reversed and remanded the trial court because the trial jury’s decision did not stop Gupton from entering into competition with Village Key. The Supreme Court of Florida agrees with the Fifth District that the 1990 statue should be applied prospectively not retrospectively and ruled in favor of Village