We all want to belong. We all want to feel part of something important. In his book The Patriotism of Despair, Serguei Alex Oushakine examines the magnification of this desire amid ideological turmoil in post-Soviet Russia. Drawing from interviews conducted during his fieldwork in Barnaul from 2001 to 2003 and scholarship published in the Altai region, Oushakine uncovers post-Soviet Russian nationalism as grounded in a pessimistic discourse of loss. Although he concentrates on how traumatic stories have produced a national narrative of despair in Russia, satellite states also experienced loss and uncertainty with the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. Thus I am left with the question: How have Ukraine and East Germany experienced the ‘patriotism
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Oushakine calls this process the ‘patriotism of despair’. In this paper, I have unpacked his argument in order to see how nationalism emerged from similar narratives in Ukraine and East Germany. As Oushakine assumed in his introduction, his conclusions are indeed applicable to regions beyond Barnaul. In Ukraine, I found such traumatic narratives to be historical rather than contemporary; nevertheless, nationalist opposition leaders used these narratives to build support for an independent Ukraine before the official referendum in 1991. President Petro Poroshenko should continue to employ these historical narratives of despair to build nationalism in his ethnically diverse state. In East Germany, I found that the process occurred much faster than in Russia or Ukraine; nevertheless, the decision to re-embrace East German culture and practices after the opening of the border must have stemmed partially from the sense of loss and despair experienced from 1989 to around 1992. Because nationalism appears to be necessary for state survival, understanding the different ways it can emerge from stories of loss and despair informs our analysis of the strength and longevity of political
Oushakine calls this process the ‘patriotism of despair’. In this paper, I have unpacked his argument in order to see how nationalism emerged from similar narratives in Ukraine and East Germany. As Oushakine assumed in his introduction, his conclusions are indeed applicable to regions beyond Barnaul. In Ukraine, I found such traumatic narratives to be historical rather than contemporary; nevertheless, nationalist opposition leaders used these narratives to build support for an independent Ukraine before the official referendum in 1991. President Petro Poroshenko should continue to employ these historical narratives of despair to build nationalism in his ethnically diverse state. In East Germany, I found that the process occurred much faster than in Russia or Ukraine; nevertheless, the decision to re-embrace East German culture and practices after the opening of the border must have stemmed partially from the sense of loss and despair experienced from 1989 to around 1992. Because nationalism appears to be necessary for state survival, understanding the different ways it can emerge from stories of loss and despair informs our analysis of the strength and longevity of political