In December of 2001, Argentina fell into political and civil chaos; there were riots, protests, and looting in the streets. Within a day, the nation’s principal minister of finance resigned, followed by the nation’s president shortly thereafter. In an effort to resolve the nation’s financial woes, a “hastily assembled interim government immediately defaulted on $155 billion of Argentina’s foreign debt, the largest debt default in history.” (MacEwan 2002) The economic fallout left the country with more than 50% of its population unemployed, and a poverty rate above 60% in urban areas. The “Argentine Great Depression” (1998–2002 Argentine great depression, para. 1) wasn’t the result of a single project failure or a single bad decision made by the IMF, but it was the result of a system of failures made over the course of a decade, and the most significant failures between 1998 and 2002.
The adopted economic policies of Argentina in the 1990s were developed under the direct supervision of the IMF (MacEwan 2002, Failure under the Direction of the IMF, para. 2). Up until the country fell into recession in the late 1990s, it had been one of the success stories of the IMF 's conservative economic policies.
The Buenos Aires government privatized state enterprises, liberalized foreign trade, and investment, and tightened government fiscal and monetary policy. (MacEwan 2002, From Good to Bad to Ugly, para. 1)
In 1991 the Argentine peso was pegged at parity with the US dollar in what…