This essay argues towards the conclusion that Robert Nozick’s ‘experience machine’ thought experiment does not successfully challenge hedonism as a theory of rational action. It will first explore the concept of hedonism and what would be required to mount a successful challenge to it. It will then outline the ‘experience machine’ thought experiment and assess the conclusions Nozick draws. Referring to epistemological objections raised by Woolard and Hewitt alongside methodological objections raised by De Brigard and Weijers, and analysing possible responses, it concludes that the challenge it poses to hedonism is unsuccessful.
Theories of rational action and Hedonism
Firstly, this essay will examine the idea of hedonism as a theory of rational …show more content…
He describes a machine which can stimulate the brain so that any desired experience can be given to those who plug in. Subjects could select from a huge list of options and they would feel like these experiences were really happening to them, unaware of their previous existence. Plugging in would be for life but every two years, time would be spent unplugged selecting the next two years’ experiences. Others could also plug into the machine so it wouldn’t be necessary to stay unplugged to for their benefit. Nozick poses the question to his readers ‘Would you plug in? What else can matter to us, other than how our lives feel from the inside?’ (Nozick, 1974, …show more content…
Hewitt argues that ‘in the actual world seeing certain things besides pleasure as ends in themselves may best serve hedonistic ends’ (Hewitt, 2010, p.331) and thus casts doubt on whether these apparent anti-hedonistic intuitions provide evidence against hedonism as a theory of rational action. She argues for the possibility that whilst only pleasure has ‘objective, intrinsic value’, we are disposed to ‘desire many things besides pleasure as ends in themselves’ (Hewitt, 2010, p.332). This disposition comes about because of the benefits in regarding some things, other than happiness, as valuable in their own right because they are usually instrumentally valuable in achieving hedonistic ends. It becomes more efficient to perceive them as intrinsically valuable rather than weighing up each situation, as the occasions when they are not instrumental in achieving pleasure are
Theories of rational action and Hedonism
Firstly, this essay will examine the idea of hedonism as a theory of rational …show more content…
He describes a machine which can stimulate the brain so that any desired experience can be given to those who plug in. Subjects could select from a huge list of options and they would feel like these experiences were really happening to them, unaware of their previous existence. Plugging in would be for life but every two years, time would be spent unplugged selecting the next two years’ experiences. Others could also plug into the machine so it wouldn’t be necessary to stay unplugged to for their benefit. Nozick poses the question to his readers ‘Would you plug in? What else can matter to us, other than how our lives feel from the inside?’ (Nozick, 1974, …show more content…
Hewitt argues that ‘in the actual world seeing certain things besides pleasure as ends in themselves may best serve hedonistic ends’ (Hewitt, 2010, p.331) and thus casts doubt on whether these apparent anti-hedonistic intuitions provide evidence against hedonism as a theory of rational action. She argues for the possibility that whilst only pleasure has ‘objective, intrinsic value’, we are disposed to ‘desire many things besides pleasure as ends in themselves’ (Hewitt, 2010, p.332). This disposition comes about because of the benefits in regarding some things, other than happiness, as valuable in their own right because they are usually instrumentally valuable in achieving hedonistic ends. It becomes more efficient to perceive them as intrinsically valuable rather than weighing up each situation, as the occasions when they are not instrumental in achieving pleasure are