Derek Parfit’s chapter “Am I Token or a Type”, in his book “Reasons and Persons”, explores the hypothetical situation of a person named Mary Smith cloning herself. Mary was beloved by her partner, who will be referred to as Derek. If Derek loved Mary prior to the cloning process, Parfit argues that Derek ought to love Mary after the cloning process as well (Parfit 295). Parfit comes to this conclusion since he posits that the original Mary and the clone of Mary, who will be referred to as Mary* are psychologically continuous (295). Tony Milligan in his article “The Duplication of Love’s Reasons” defends a viewpoint that claims that even though Mary may have been replicated, the reasons for loving her have not transferred to Mary*. Milligan’s
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Parfit’s first bad reason is that if Derek does not love Mary*, it is because Derek accepts a “Non-Reductionist View” (295). Parfit claims that identity of persons is something that he calls a further fact. For Parfit, a further fact is something that exceeds both psychology and body. This further fact he claims, would not be replicated through the duplication process. Parfit claims, in the same thought, that Derek would not love Mary* would not be Mary (295). Through claiming this, he seems to have stated the obvious and then call it an unjustified reaction to the duplication. If it is necessary to differentiate the fact that there is a Mary and Mary*, it is not an unjustified reaction to state that they are not the same person since, even in a referential name, they are not the same. One is a duplication, the other is not. His argument against the non-reductionist view is not justified since he seems to assume that two different tokens of Mary are the same when they are not. If Derek was to love Mary*, Derek would be loving Mary for different reasons that those in which he loved Mary …show more content…
Parfit’s denial of the further fact, and his false acceptance of the reductionist view provide a situation in which we cannot pick a reduction or a non-reductionist view. The lack of detail in Parfit’s scenario also provides a place of contention. Since Parfit does not specify the length of the process, it is not clear whether or not Derek will begin to feel alienated from Mary or Mary*. Parfit provides his own examples in which love does not transfer as well, including things like an obsession with body, and the simple cessation of love. Through all of these examples in which reasons for love do not transfer, love is conflated with sexual desire, or when love is lost altogether, it is much more appealing to adopt Milligan’s
Parfit’s first bad reason is that if Derek does not love Mary*, it is because Derek accepts a “Non-Reductionist View” (295). Parfit claims that identity of persons is something that he calls a further fact. For Parfit, a further fact is something that exceeds both psychology and body. This further fact he claims, would not be replicated through the duplication process. Parfit claims, in the same thought, that Derek would not love Mary* would not be Mary (295). Through claiming this, he seems to have stated the obvious and then call it an unjustified reaction to the duplication. If it is necessary to differentiate the fact that there is a Mary and Mary*, it is not an unjustified reaction to state that they are not the same person since, even in a referential name, they are not the same. One is a duplication, the other is not. His argument against the non-reductionist view is not justified since he seems to assume that two different tokens of Mary are the same when they are not. If Derek was to love Mary*, Derek would be loving Mary for different reasons that those in which he loved Mary …show more content…
Parfit’s denial of the further fact, and his false acceptance of the reductionist view provide a situation in which we cannot pick a reduction or a non-reductionist view. The lack of detail in Parfit’s scenario also provides a place of contention. Since Parfit does not specify the length of the process, it is not clear whether or not Derek will begin to feel alienated from Mary or Mary*. Parfit provides his own examples in which love does not transfer as well, including things like an obsession with body, and the simple cessation of love. Through all of these examples in which reasons for love do not transfer, love is conflated with sexual desire, or when love is lost altogether, it is much more appealing to adopt Milligan’s