I Promise David Hume

According to David Hume, the moral rule which obligates us to fulfill our promises cannot be the product of natural law, firstly, because promises could not conceivably exist prior to human society and “conventions,” and, secondly, because even if this was conceivable, in such a state there could not be any obligation attached to promises (516). (*Detail what I'm going to explicate, and what I'm going to evaluate and argue) Hume claims that in order for promises to be natural they must stem from “some act of the mind attending to these words, I promise,” and that from this mental act obligation must arise. He proceeds to rule out “resolution” as a potential act of the mind, because simply resolving to do something does not morally bind you …show more content…
However, this does not provide a satisfactory explanation of where obligation comes from because Hume holds that morality is grounded in human sentiment. When an obligation is generated by a promise being made, it should be that it is the result of a new sentiment. According to Hume, however, we have neither the ability to will the production of new sentiments nor to alter existing ones. If promises create self-imposed obligations, but obligations stem from sentiments which cannot be self-imposed, then the basis for the obligation to fulfill promises cannot be natural, or the result of some mental act …show more content…
However, this way of speaking is a convenient way of justifying why we hold those who do not follow through on their promises accountable. The obligation is not generated through an act of will, but instead because of our collective interest in preserving the institution of promise-keeping, both for the sake of our individual well-being and for the sake of productive, fruitful communal life in society. It may seem as though Hume contradicts himself in discussing the role of the will and the expression of a promise in creating obligation. How can obligation be dependent on these if it does not stem from an act of the mind? It seems as though Hume's answer would have to be that, while no obligation exists until an assertion of “I promise” is made and (in most cases) accompanied by the intention to perform the action, the obligation could not arise if social conventions had not dictated that that is how promises are to be made. The words “I promise” would be vacant in the absence of a shared understanding of the commitment that that phrase implicates, and so the corresponding obligation must be dependent on the prior existence of certain