The basis of Evo Morales’s MAS party stems from being an inclusive party rather than an exclusive. Within the borders of Bolivia there is a large indigenous population that resides in rural areas; by this population being excluded from society as it disables its ability to voice its opinions and concerns on a national level—driving the community away from political power. This strategy of inclusiveness embodies a populist party; according to Raul Madrid, author of Ethnic Politics in Latin America, Madrid views the MAS not as a populist party, but rather an ethnopopulist party—focusing “on the types of appeals that the [party] makes[s] rather than on their organizational structure” (Madrid 9). Furthermore, utilizing methods such as: establishing
…show more content…
Such push for this referendum comes from the high popularity Morales received in his prior elections—2005: 53.7%, 2009: 53.7%, and 2014: 65%; this popularity suggests that due to the linear trend in relation to Morales the appeal to pass the referendum should pass, allowing Morales to run again in 2019. However, the referendum that Morales and the MAS had in mind did not work in their favor. Rather in an article released by El Pais, Polls Point to Victory for ‘No’ Vote in Bolivia Re-election Referendum, polls illustrate that “the ‘no’ vote received more than 50%, while the ‘yes’ vote received between 47% and 49%.” Although there is not a huge gap between those who voted against the referendum and those who voted in favor; the overall consensus is that the majority of the population in Bolivia did not want Morales, and essentially the MAS, to re-run on the grounds that Morales has become the dominate figure in Bolivian politics resulting in fear that his rule will shift from democracy to an oligarchy. Therefore, uncertainty arises in regards to: (I) what factors led the population to shift in support; and (II) what the MAS will be after Morales’ last term as …show more content…
However, in early 2000, the MAS began to broaden its political platform; according to Madrid, the MAS began to “reach out to white and mestizos […] [avoiding] exclusionary rhetoric and to emphasize the inclusive nature of the party” therefore gaining trust amongst the MAS, whites, and mestizos (Madrid 58-59). Similar to the organizational appeal the MAS showed to indigenous organizations a similar trend is occurring but now through mestizo-dominated organizations. These alliances help foster the view towards the MAS as a party of inclusion and “an organizational base outside of the rural areas” (Madrid 60). Although the MAS has modernized its strategies to reach new audiences such as: white and mestizos, this shift towards a new support group has had more consequences such as the decline in support amongst the indigenous population, “the traditional stronghold” of the MAS (Madrid
Such push for this referendum comes from the high popularity Morales received in his prior elections—2005: 53.7%, 2009: 53.7%, and 2014: 65%; this popularity suggests that due to the linear trend in relation to Morales the appeal to pass the referendum should pass, allowing Morales to run again in 2019. However, the referendum that Morales and the MAS had in mind did not work in their favor. Rather in an article released by El Pais, Polls Point to Victory for ‘No’ Vote in Bolivia Re-election Referendum, polls illustrate that “the ‘no’ vote received more than 50%, while the ‘yes’ vote received between 47% and 49%.” Although there is not a huge gap between those who voted against the referendum and those who voted in favor; the overall consensus is that the majority of the population in Bolivia did not want Morales, and essentially the MAS, to re-run on the grounds that Morales has become the dominate figure in Bolivian politics resulting in fear that his rule will shift from democracy to an oligarchy. Therefore, uncertainty arises in regards to: (I) what factors led the population to shift in support; and (II) what the MAS will be after Morales’ last term as …show more content…
However, in early 2000, the MAS began to broaden its political platform; according to Madrid, the MAS began to “reach out to white and mestizos […] [avoiding] exclusionary rhetoric and to emphasize the inclusive nature of the party” therefore gaining trust amongst the MAS, whites, and mestizos (Madrid 58-59). Similar to the organizational appeal the MAS showed to indigenous organizations a similar trend is occurring but now through mestizo-dominated organizations. These alliances help foster the view towards the MAS as a party of inclusion and “an organizational base outside of the rural areas” (Madrid 60). Although the MAS has modernized its strategies to reach new audiences such as: white and mestizos, this shift towards a new support group has had more consequences such as the decline in support amongst the indigenous population, “the traditional stronghold” of the MAS (Madrid