For example, in Australia there have been numerous cases of aboriginal men raping underage women, and not being punished to the full extent of the law, due to their status as indigenous people (Lecture). In one case, men found guilty of raping a ten year old girl were all given probations or suspended sentences, with the justification that such behavior was part of their patriarchal culture, and that that must be respected (Lecture). The protection of such harmful practices is morally ambiguous at best. Should the defense of such behavior constitute a violation of Australia’s commitment to uphold CEDAW and the CRC? In the case of the CRC, countries that have signed the treaty, are required to uphold rights in the “best interest of the child.” It is difficult to prove that allowing sexual assault to occur, justified by “indigenous rights” is within a child’s best interest. Again, in issues like this, there appear to be a hierarchy of rights, and it becomes difficult to justify which side should prevail. However because the rights of Australia’s indigenous people are threatening the safety and mental well being of the children in their tribes, in this case, the latter must be held as more important to the collective good than the former. And ultimately, that decision …show more content…
Is it acceptable to order a culture to alter their practices to conform with current legal and societal norms, or is this just a form of cultural imperialism? Take for example the case for religious slaughter. Jews and Muslims have specific rituals regarding how they are to slaughter animals before consuming them. Despite the religious groups claiming that the method of slaughter is humane, various animal rights groups have attested that such methods cause the animals unnecessary suffering (Zoethout 220). The proposed solution to prevent such suffering has been legislation requiring that the animals be stunned and rendered unconscious before they are slaughtered (Zoethout 214). There have been mixed reactions by religious leaders, with some saying that adhering to such policy violates tenets of their faith, while others have said that no religious restrictions prohibit stunning an animal prior to its death (Zoethoud 228). So is this an act of animal welfare, or a gross attack on the freedom of religion? Because the religious communities are divided as to whether they find such restrictions acceptable or not, this brings into question as to whether slaughtering restrictions is truly cultural, or, at least somewhat, individually perceived. If not all Muslims and all Jews see the