Chapter 3
Bargaining theory of foreign policy cooperation
Foreign policy adjustment is an indistinguishable part of every cooperation process (both formal and informal). Consequently, in order to theoretically model the strategic interaction between a supplier country and a recipient country I partially draw on bargaining theory of international cooperation (Fearon 1998). The theory is built on two main propositions. The first proposition states that regardless of the domain (e.g. arms control, trade, finances etc.) all the cooperation processes share the same strategic structure and consists of two stages: bargaining and enforcement. During the first stage states discuss and approve the terms of an agreement. In the second stage an agreement …show more content…
However, the difference is how the parameters of the theory are measured. In the “unitary actor” version of the model the benefits of cooperation and the costs of noncooperation are both measured by the military capabilities of transferred weapons. Particularly, if the recipient state decides to cooperate and adjust its foreign policy the benefits of cooperation will be equal to the amount of transferred military capabilities. In contrast, if the recipient decides not to cooperate, then the costs of noncooperation will be equal to the amount of military capabilities that were lost as the result of non-compliance.
In turn, in the “non-unitary actor” version of the model I assume that states’ cost-benefit analysis differs according to the domestic regime type. While benefits of cooperation are measured by the amount of received military capabilities, the costs come from the domestic institutions. Consequently, a similar level of military capabilities may have different impact on recipients’ susceptibility to external influence. In this case the domestic regime type defines the threshold that should be passed in order to induce …show more content…
The “unitary actor” model
There are two actors: Supplier and Recipient. Supplier pursues several goals that may be mutually complementing. These goals might include gaining economic profit, contributing to world stability and increasing political influence (Sanjian 1991). Supplier associates arms transfers with influence and, consequently, expects that in return for arms deliveries recipient will make concessions in its foreign policy.
Arms relations between these two actors start when either Supplier provides arms for Recipient as military aid, or when Recipient purchases arms from Supplier (Johnson 2015). In the U.S. case since transfer of arms directly contributes to the ability of Recipient to wage wars, the decision to authorize the deal is made on a case-by-case basis (Willardson 2013). When costs exceed benefits Supplier rejects arms deal. This happens when increase in Recipient’s military capability threatens Supplier’s security. In turn, application gets approved when a deal is found to be lucrative. The deal is profitable when it strengthens Supplier’s position in the international system (political dimension), brings substantial amount of revenues (economic dimension), or meets both criteria. However, since political dimension comes first (Smith, Humm, and Fontanel 1985), in every deal it is expected that Recipient will comply with certain demands of Supplier. These demands, for example, may be in the form of regulations for the use of weapons or in the form
Bargaining theory of foreign policy cooperation
Foreign policy adjustment is an indistinguishable part of every cooperation process (both formal and informal). Consequently, in order to theoretically model the strategic interaction between a supplier country and a recipient country I partially draw on bargaining theory of international cooperation (Fearon 1998). The theory is built on two main propositions. The first proposition states that regardless of the domain (e.g. arms control, trade, finances etc.) all the cooperation processes share the same strategic structure and consists of two stages: bargaining and enforcement. During the first stage states discuss and approve the terms of an agreement. In the second stage an agreement …show more content…
However, the difference is how the parameters of the theory are measured. In the “unitary actor” version of the model the benefits of cooperation and the costs of noncooperation are both measured by the military capabilities of transferred weapons. Particularly, if the recipient state decides to cooperate and adjust its foreign policy the benefits of cooperation will be equal to the amount of transferred military capabilities. In contrast, if the recipient decides not to cooperate, then the costs of noncooperation will be equal to the amount of military capabilities that were lost as the result of non-compliance.
In turn, in the “non-unitary actor” version of the model I assume that states’ cost-benefit analysis differs according to the domestic regime type. While benefits of cooperation are measured by the amount of received military capabilities, the costs come from the domestic institutions. Consequently, a similar level of military capabilities may have different impact on recipients’ susceptibility to external influence. In this case the domestic regime type defines the threshold that should be passed in order to induce …show more content…
The “unitary actor” model
There are two actors: Supplier and Recipient. Supplier pursues several goals that may be mutually complementing. These goals might include gaining economic profit, contributing to world stability and increasing political influence (Sanjian 1991). Supplier associates arms transfers with influence and, consequently, expects that in return for arms deliveries recipient will make concessions in its foreign policy.
Arms relations between these two actors start when either Supplier provides arms for Recipient as military aid, or when Recipient purchases arms from Supplier (Johnson 2015). In the U.S. case since transfer of arms directly contributes to the ability of Recipient to wage wars, the decision to authorize the deal is made on a case-by-case basis (Willardson 2013). When costs exceed benefits Supplier rejects arms deal. This happens when increase in Recipient’s military capability threatens Supplier’s security. In turn, application gets approved when a deal is found to be lucrative. The deal is profitable when it strengthens Supplier’s position in the international system (political dimension), brings substantial amount of revenues (economic dimension), or meets both criteria. However, since political dimension comes first (Smith, Humm, and Fontanel 1985), in every deal it is expected that Recipient will comply with certain demands of Supplier. These demands, for example, may be in the form of regulations for the use of weapons or in the form