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53 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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Russet |
article about Pearl harbor. Finds that economic interdepedence is the variable that best explains why a defender deters an other state from attacking a third state
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Jervis |
Security regimes 4 conditions 1 great power must want it 2 shared value of mutual peace 3 status quo 4 war must be seen as bad and costly ---------------------------- 4 paths of concert diplomacy 1 continuation 2 must want other not to expand too 3 reciprocity 4 institutionalization
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Doyle & Sambanis |
UN Peacekeeping 1st generation: force without consent 2nd generation: consent of parties 3rd generation: chapter 7 mandates peace building triangle multidimensional peacekeeping spoilers succes: combodia mutually hurting stalemate Preventive diplomacy
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Lipson |
peace operations = ambiguity makes succes difficult |
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Ripsman & Paul |
globalization can lead to peace (less interstate, more non-state actors conflict) hard globalization soft globalization
----------------------------- 5 approaches 1 commercial liberalism 2 democratic peace 3 global norms 4 global culture 5 post-modern warfare theorist
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solingen |
economic liberalization |
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Martin Shaw |
hard globalist |
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T.V. Paul |
full accommodation (UK=> US in the 20th century) limited accommodation (just institutional) (US/USSR, treaties) non accommodation (Germany) symbolic accommodation (US => India) regional accommodation (Brazil) normative (share norms) territorial (status quo) economic (interdependence) institutional (coopted through institutions, like Hungary) |
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van Evera |
cult of the offensive |
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Kupchan |
3 conditions for peaceful transition |
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T.V. Paul
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(changes within) regions - share culture - proximity
--------- Realist: bop will make peace (neorealist) regional order is part of the larger international order power transition theorist: one hegemon within in the region liberalist: kantian tripod within region, interferance can disrupt it. |
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buzan and handson |
3 conditions of anarchy in security 5 dimensions weak/strong state
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Bull |
world vs international order |
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Schachter |
international law self defense unsc defensist principle |
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Doyle |
different forms of liberalism Kant Machiavelli Schumpeter liberal states fight non-liberal states, but are peaceful to each other |
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Bruce Russet |
economic interdepence leads to peace, even open countries that are not democratic are more peaceful |
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Duffield |
International norms can be institutions constitutive functions regulative functions procedural functions constructivist |
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Adler and Barnet |
tier 1 (technology, threats, social reality, demography) tier 2 (organizations, social learning) tier 3 ( mutual trust collective identity)
security communities |
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Cashman |
What causes war? - 3 levels of analysis
PRO: Multipolarity - more actors = more possibility for cooperation, allies, mediators, slowest rate of arms race, FP attention/antagonism spread out - unpredictability and uncertainty due to large number of actors - therefore wars less likely ------------------ CON: Multipolarity - increased number of actors increases opportunity for conflict - diversity of interests -> lowered cooperation - unpredictability and uncertainty can also lead to war
PRO: Bipolarity - solid balance created (stability) - BoP
CON: Bipolarity - zero-sum = more hostilities - lacks mediators
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Waltz |
balance of power system restrains states (neo)realist |
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Kaplin |
balance of power the states restrain themselves |
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Holsti |
- change through replacement of regional topdog - change through addition of power to region dialectical change (?) - transformation: dynamic uprooted (through deep peace or conflict, introduction of democracy, economic interdependence or institutional framework) - limited change
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Booth |
disarmament vs arms control
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Holsti |
3 types of war institutionalized total wars of the new kind |
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Kydd and Walter |
TERRORISM attrition (battle of the wills) intimidation (scaring local population) provocation (fear of talks) spoiling (peace talks outbidding (becoming most strong force) |
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T.V. Paul |
WMDs - proliferation has positive and negative implications for intl order - "nuclear taboo" - norm of non-possession - proliferation occurring in conflict area (India, Pakistan, Israel) - NPT: haves and have nots - have nots okay with it because threatened by neighbours - chem/bio - cheap man's nuke - US: nukes vs chem |
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T.V. Paul |
asymmetrical conflict conditions 1 serious conflict 2 weaker sides cares more 3 dissatisfied with status quo 4 war is only option Pearl harbor
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Art |
defensive deterrence compellence swaggering
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East |
status discrepancy theory (rank disequilibrium theory) - total topdogs, total underdogs (both happy) - rank discrepant states are unhappy and likely to initiate conflict |
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Organski |
Power transition theory - challenge to BoP theory - system with hegemon + primary challenger -> frequently leads to war - rear-end collision
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Gilpin |
Theory of hegemonic war - almost the same as Organski |
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Modelski |
Long cycle theory - takes 100 years for 1 cycle - war, hegemon, hegemon de-legitimisation and deconcentration, global war |
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Wallerstein |
World economy approach - economic dimension more than military power - core, periphery, semi-periphery - important war takes place in the core4tghnvc |
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Kirshner |
everything that has to do with econ BS sanctions economic causes of war |
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Cohen |
technology and warfare RMA quality of quantity reasons for modernization form follows function form follows failure form stays because of irrationality |
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Posen |
military of doctrine part of grand strategy offensive defensive (more favorable) deterrence
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Mearsheimer |
attrition blitzkrieg limited aims static defense forward defense defense in depth (checkerboard) mobile defense
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Morgan |
general and immidiate deterrence 4 schools 1 rejection 2 minimum 3 maximum 4 warfighting
3c's |
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T.V. Paul |
complex deterrence 1 great power 2 new nuclear states 3 between nuclear and chemical states 4 non state actors 5 collective actors 6 self |
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Levy |
misperceptions
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levy |
domestic level |
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Nye |
World war 1 World war 2 |
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Baylis |
Korea war |
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Gelb and Betts |
Vietnam 1 Idealistic imperialism of American 2 Economic imperialism 3 Bureaucratic politics 4 Domestic politics (pressure) 5 Pragmatic security measures 6 Ethnicity and misperception 7 Slippery slope 8 Containment 9 Ideological anti-communism |
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Mack |
Asymmetrical conflict - guerrilla warfare |
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Paul and Hall |
international order 1 realism (BOP) 2 concert diplomacy 3 hegemonic peace 4 marxism 5 republican order 6 economic interdependence 7 liberal institutionalism
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T.V. Paul |
hard balancing (arms build up, zero sum) soft balancing (non zero sum, ad hoc, etc.) asymmetrical balancing (non-state actors) |
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waltz |
balance of power |
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walt |
states balance against threat not against power bandwagoning
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Gaddis |
symmetrical containment asymmetrical containment (Marshal Plan) |
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Jonsson and Aggestam |
Diplomacy and what is important for good diplomacy Diplomacy norms/practices, coexistence and reciprocity, open communication, commitment to peace, diplomacy immunity, pacta sunt servanda (basic agreements that must be kept - principle of civil and international law), precedence, constructive ambiguity, recognition, multilaterialism & polylateralsim (NGOs, civil society), trust, worldview |
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schumpeter |
liberal pacifism no democracy would fight war, because only military minorities would pursue war |
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Rosecrance |
appeasement |
