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70 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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Anthony downs theory of party competition
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US, 2 parties, political space 1 dimensional, median voter theorem
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Median voter theorem
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left and right wing parties will move closer to the center so as to maximize their votes as not everyone is extreme only two parties political space is one-dimensional parties can move to any point in this one-dimensional space parties want to maximize the total number of votes voters, if voting, vote for the party closest to them in political space there's perfect information voters' preferences are fixed
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William Riker theory of coalitions
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minimal voting theory, politicians are office seekers,
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minimum voting theory
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try to create coalitions that are no larger than what is needed to win
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Mancur oslen Logic of collective action
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freerider problem, best for all to act collectively but in no ones self interest to so thus prisoners dilema
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Game theory
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Prisoners dilema, assurance game, chicken game
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PD
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one dominant theory to confess
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Chicken game
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no dominent theory hero loser or death .. eg, SU and US nuke war
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Assurance game
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no dominent theory , dam example worse when you cooperate and the other does not
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Korokobin
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Thin Thick theory
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Thin
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ere one rational
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thin2
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Expected utility - does not clarify what goals are most rational Commensurability: ability of actor to compare the utility consequences of allalternatives to each other Transitivity: if an actor prefers choice A to choice B and choice B to choice C,he should then prefer choice A to choice C; Invariance: preference btw two or more choices should not depend on how thechoice is presented or structured, so long as the outcome possibilities areconstant Cancellation: no preference pf identical aspects Dominance: an actor should never choose an option in which every feature isonly as good as the features of a competing option, and at least one feature isnot as good
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Thick 1
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self interrest
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thick 2
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wealth maximisation
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Etheredge
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governmental learning has 2 components intelligence and effectiveness
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Simon
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Bounded rationality is satificing
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Fiz and Ajz theory of reasoned action
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draw the graphy thingy
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Bennet critism of fiz and ajz
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doubts the stability of public opinion thus one of the stages of the graph
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Yetiv Group think + gulf crisis
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Conditions for GT,Symptoms, symptoms of defective decision making
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Conditions for group think
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Cohesive group of decision makers ...Structural faults of the organization...Provocative situational conflict
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Structural faults
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insulation of the group
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Structural faults
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lack of tradition of impartial leadership
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Structural faults
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lack of norms requiring methodolodical procedures
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Structural faults
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homogenieneity of memebers social background and ideology
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Provocative situational Conflict
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High stress from external threats
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Provocative situational Conflict
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low self esteem temporarily induced by recent failures, moral dilemas...
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Symptoms of Groupthink
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Over estimation, Closed mindedness, pressure towards uniformity.
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Symptoms of Groupthink- Over estimation
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Illusion of invunerability
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Symptoms of Groupthink- Over estimation
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Belief in inherent morality of the group
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Symptoms of Groupthink- closed minded ness
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Stereotyped view of rivals
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Symptoms of Groupthink- closed minded ness
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rationalising to discount any warnings of info that might question the group consensus
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Symptoms of Groupthink- Pressures towards uniformity
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Self censorship
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Symptoms of Groupthink- Pressures towards uniformity
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Illusion of unanimity
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Symptoms of Groupthink- Pressures towards uniformity
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direct pressure on members who dissent
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Symptoms of Groupthink- Pressures towards uniformity
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emergence of self appointed mind guards
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Symptoms of Defective decision making
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incomplete survey of alternatives
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Symptoms of Defective decision making
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incomplete survey of objectives
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Symptoms of Defective decision making
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failure to explore risks
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Symptoms of Defective decision making
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failure to reappraise alternatives rejected initially
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Symptoms of Defective decision making
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poor information search
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Symptoms of Defective decision making
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selective bias in processing information
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Symptoms of Defective decision making
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failure to work out contingency plans
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Non fiasco theory irving janis
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successes also take place
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Randal can Fiz and Ajz explain unethical conduct
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Intention is the weakest point in the model
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Marsh and furlong Skin not sweater
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Ontology +Epistemology
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Ontology
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theory of being, divided into two with foundationalists and antifoundationalist
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Foundationalist
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the world is real and observable and can view the world objectively
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antifoundationalist
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cannot view the world objectively as we are part of the social construct
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Epistemology
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Theory of knowledge divided into two positivists and interpretists
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Positivists
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Use qualitative data can see the world objectively
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Interpretists
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Use soft data and offer one Interpretation of the world around us focus on understanding
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Voss and Dorsy
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Perception and int relations broken up into a few XD
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Perception and beliefs
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belief = information that a person has about sth/ so; attitude= feeling (positive/ negative) about sth/ so17beliefs influence perception through their relation to expectations and interpretations(analogy)
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Procedures used to ascribe beliefs
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content analysis: information that an individual had is categorized and then analyzed to find out the individual's belief consistency => provides foundation for the analysis of the role beliefs may play in the formulation of policy positions (includes too many steps; confusing; we don't know if the information is true) operational code (series of questions; answers are provided): concept referring to beliefs of a decision maker that are used to interpret political events and influence foreign policy decision (we don't know if the statements complies with the person's beliefs) cognitive mapping: spoken or written statements of a decision maker are used to develop a map of the individual's beliefs and from this map, a policy choice is inferred (we don't know if the statement complies with the person's beliefs)
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perception and motivations
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Becoming very selective in their attention. What i want from it motivates my perception How do one's goals influence perception
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perception and bureaucratic politics
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where you stand depends on where you sit
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perception and learning
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teacher could influence your perceptoin based on their bias, etheredge
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perception and problem solving and decision making
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because we learn we adapt to our environment and modify our behavoir
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perception and personality
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individual personality is dominent left wing right wing personality : personality traits (emotions) that may affectperceptions of the policy environment (e.g. cognitive complexity; level of distrust, selfesteem...
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Holism
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system-theories => there are things that are not explainable; looking at it as a hole; government is not seen as a black hole
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Reductionism
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the system (the hole) is nothing more than the sum of the parts => looking at parts of a system rational choice S-(I)-R: maximization of Utility political psychology S-I-R
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Five assumptions of rationalism
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self-interest, subjectivism (political individualism), use of models, assumptoions of rationality, assumption of methodological individualism
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Anthony downs theory of party competition precurser
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Joseph Schumpeter: individuals are not ill-informed, fickle, easily manipulated
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Anthony downs theory of party competition precurser
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Harold Hotelling the where do the shops put themselves in the center
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Is a coalition government a good or a bad thing?
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proponents: parties which receive a minority of the popular vote should have to share power coalition government forces to compromise => better and more effective public policies opponents: coalitions undermine electoral accountability: politicians have the power to decide which party/ parties should form a government coalition: give extremist parties the opportunity to enter government coalitions = instable
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consequences of coalitions?
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1. use of proportional voting system => increase in the effective number of parties and the incidence of coalition governments 2. coalition governments are in general less durable; but: does not always mean a change in cabinet membership 3. countries in which executive power is shared have a higher voter turnout, more liberal criminal justice systems and better equal opportunity records 4. little evident that coalitions give extremist parties more opportunities 5. coalition government does give more opportunities to small centrist parties
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5 assumptions of minimal winning
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1. a winning coalition only needs a bare majority in the legislature (51/ 100) 2. politicians = office-seeking; derive utility from the possession of cabinet seat and total amount of seats = fixed 3. coalitions control membership 4. each instance of government formation is a purely isolated event 5. perfect information available ( they know exactly how many seats each party has)
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Game theory assumptions
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actors are instrumentally rational every player knows that every player is rational actors must choose between different strategies (often cooperate or defect) actors know the rules of the game actors know the outcome and pay-offs associated with each possible combination of strategies
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Resolving collective action problems
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coercion, selective incentives,priviliged groups, conditional cooperation in intermediate groups, process benefits
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symptoms of defective decision making
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Symptoms of defective decision making
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