Comparative Politics Concepts

Front 1

Scientific Method

Back 1

Process of using systematic and rigorous procedures to evaluate theories by testing empirical hypotheses derived from them

Hint 1

Significant because it is central to the study of comparative politics but it is also difficult. Studying humans and their choices is much more complicated than studying something with a set of laws.

Front 2

Theory

Back 2

A set of logically consistent statements that generate abstract explanations of a general category of outcomes: a model of the causal processes that produce our world

Hint 2

Test hypotheses derived from theories, cannot directly test theories because they refer to abstract objects.
Basis of comparative politics experiments.

Front 3

Observational vs. Experimental Data

Back 3

Observational Data is data that is directly observed from humans/nature acting on its own.
Experimental Data is data collected from intervening in the world to observe an outcome of an experiment.

Hint 3

Experiments give capacity to control for confounding variables.

Front 4

Confounding Variable

Back 4

A variable that is systematically related to the independent and dependent variable
A difference between the treatment and control groups that affects the response variable.

Hint 4

Often very difficult to determine what the confounding variable is, but if we do not control for the confounder, the measurement of association will be biased. When the confounder is controlled for, the original association may grow stronger or weaker.

Front 5

Correlation vs. Causation

Back 5

Correlation: The departure of two variables from independence- association/relationships
Correlation does not equal causation.

Hint 5

x may cause y or y may cause x.
x and y may be joint effects of a common cause. A third variable z could cause association to appear between two variables.

Front 6

Endogeneity

Back 6

X causes y but is not independent of it. x <----> y

Front 7

Omitted Variable Bias

Back 7

If the confounder is not controlled for, the measurement of the association will be biased and the direction/magnitude of the bias will no be predictable.
-Spurious correlation: When the original association disappears when the confounder is controlled for.

Front 8

Most Similar Research Design

Back 8

a common approach of the comparative method that selects cases that are alike in a number of ways but differ on a key question under examination

Front 9

Theory of Political Culture

Back 9

Multiple Theoretical Conceptions of Political Culture:
-Civic Culture
-Modern vs. traditional culture
-Religion

Front 10

Civic Culture

Back 10

Does democracy require a civic culture? Or does democracy--> civic culture.
-Political efficacy
-interpersonal trust
-civic engagement
-associational life

Front 11

Modern vs. Traditional Cultures.

Back 11

-Traditional values versus secular-rational values
-Survival values versus self-expressive values

Hint 11

Endogenous Culture:
Economic development--> secular-rational and self-expressive cultures.
Shift from agratian to industrial society produces shift from traditional to secular-rational values. Industrial society to post industrial society produces shift from suvival to self expressive values.

Front 12

Fish, Islam and Authoritarianism

Back 12

Does islam lead to authoritarianism?
Fish states that democracy is prevented from forming due to the oppression of women.

Hint 12

The advancement of women has not been shown to create democracy, however.
Women did not have rights in US, still a democracy.

Front 13

Institutions

Back 13

The formal and informal "rules of the game"
-university is an institution because it imposes a large set of rules

Hint 13

Deliberate human artifacts-tools designed to achieve some goal

Front 14

Institutional Theories

Back 14

Origins-why do political systems have different institutions
Institutional consequences: what are the consequences of changing the rules of the game

Hint 14

Endogeneity:
Political institutions--> political outcomes
Causes of institutions affect both

Front 15

How to Build a Democratic Iraq

Back 15

-Institutional Engineering
-Construct a federal system, but not along ethnic lines.
-weak president mixed with prime minister
-multimember districts

Hint 15

-will these institutions works/should they be imposed by external actors.

Front 16

Rationality

Back 16

-Political culture: Actors are rational if they possess a complete and transitive preference ordering over a set of outcomes.
- If an actor prefers a to b and b to c, then she must prefer a to c.

Hint 16

Rational actors seek to alter instituos to create new distributive outcomes--institutions are endogenous.

Front 17

The State

Back 17

Organizations that enjoy a preponderance of control over power resources and therefore claim and exercise priority over households, extended kinship groups, religious organizations, business enterprises, and all other forms of social organization within substantial territories.

Hint 17

State capacity is different from this definition: ability of the state to achieve its objectives.
Despotic power vs. infrastructural power

Front 18

Infrastructural and Despotic Power

Back 18

Infrastructural power: capacity of the state to implement its decisions and elicit compliance from the population.
Despotic Power: power to make decisions without consultation with non-state actors

Hint 18

low infra + desp = feudal
high infra + low desp. = bureaucratic
high desp. + low infra = imperial
High desp. + high infra = authoritarian

Front 19

Principal Agent Problem

Back 19

-Dilemma of infrastructural power
-Ruler delegates authority to subordinates that might have goals that differ--exploit relationship--loss of delegated authority--lower levels of infrastructural power

Hint 19

faithfulness/loyalness of agents

Front 20

Public Goods

Back 20

Goods that can be consumed by everyone, even if those that did not contribute to the cost of their supply.
non excludability and non rivalry

Hint 20

-Free Rider Problem: Rational members of the group have little inceive to contribute to the costs of supplying a public good because all members of the gorup can enjoy its benefits.
Function of state is to provide public goods and use coercion to defeat free rider problem

Front 21

The Military Revolution

Back 21

1450-1650
Taxation--infrastructural power--state building
Handheld guns
organize large number of people
cost of war--bureaucracy

Front 22

Predation and Bargaining as Strategies of State Building

Back 22

Predation: confiscation through violence. as you invest more, you can take more..diminishing returns
Bargaining: greater aspect to capital, give more in return--public goods

Hint 22

bargains with merchants and nobilities.
States mix predation and bargaining

Front 23

Development

Back 23

Development as growth in income, structural change, and elevated capacity

Front 24

Market vs. State-Led Development

Back 24

Market: -If economy is based primarily on markets, you get rapid economic growth
-decentralized decision making, everyone makes up their own mind--invisible hand.
States: Active and interventionist state can make economies better than the would be on their own. Developmental state based on high infra power/motivations to develop can produce outcomes superior to those created by markets.

Hint 24

Misconceptualized debate: no markets without political prerequisites.

Front 25

Developmental vs. Predatory State

Back 25

Developmental state based on high infrastructural power and urgent motivations to develop can produce outcomes uperior to those created by markets.
Other states do not wish to develop their economies and prefer to act predatorily.

Front 26

Inclusive vs. extractive economic institutions.

Back 26

Inclusive: broad opportunities for ordinary people to make investments that maximize returns to their talent and skill
Extractive institutions are designed to extract incomes and wealth from one subset of society to benefit a smaller subset of society

Hint 26

Inclusive is more congruent to modern state, extractive aligns with premodern systems.

Front 27

Capitalism

Back 27

A system of profit making enterprises with heavy investment in fixed capital and a rational organization of free labor which is orientated to the market purchases of the private consumer.

Hint 27

Originated from infrastructurally powerful states whose rulers have determined that optimal resource extraction strategy favors bargaining over predation.
-Private property
-Decentralized economic organizations

Front 28

Regime

Back 28

Set of rules and procedures that determine who gains access to government offices and how power holders can treat non-powerholders.

Hint 28

Dictatorship and democracy are types

Front 29

Procedural Definitions of Democracy

Back 29

-Institutions and rules of the regime, quality of rule
Observable indicators of democracy:
-election of chief executive
-election of legislature
-more than one party competes in elections
-alternation of power between parties

Front 30

Condorcet's Paradox and Condorcet Winner

Back 30

-Problem of majority rule- a group composed of entirely rational individuals (with complete and transitive preference orderings) does not necessarily have collectively rational preferences. No clear winner. Individual rationality does not ensure group rationality.

Hint 30

Majority rule is not necessarily incompatible with intransitive group preferences.
Majority rule cannot ensure a Condorcet winner-the option that defeats every other option

Front 31

Preference Orderings and Utility Functions

Back 31

Utility function is nothing more than a numberical representation of a preference ordering that follows the rule that if u(a)>u(b) then a>b. if you prefer a over b then your utility function must assign a higher number to a than b.

Front 32

Single Peaked Preference Ordering

Back 32

If utility declines in either direction as we move from the ideal point than there is a single peaked utility function representing a single peaked preference ordering.

Hint 32

Intuiton is that most idividuals prefer outcomes that are closer to their ideal point than outcomes that are farther away.
Sometimes this intuition is wrong-people either prefer hot coffee or iced coffee-not lukewarm coffee.
Centrist and leftist members have single peaked po. rightest does not. -prefers an option that is farther away from ideal point to the option that is closer to it. If rightest does have singlepeaked uf, all three voters have spuf.

Front 33

The Median Voter Theorem

Back 33

Centrist voter is a member of all three winning coalitions.
Voters must have single peaked preferences, vote sincerely, and the number of votes must be odd.
Median voter is a condorcet winner

Hint 33

Parties have incentive to get as close as possible to the position of the median voter. Deviation from that posititon will incur electoral loss.

Front 34

Sincere vs. strategic voting

Back 34

sincere vote is a vote for one's most preferred option. strategic vote is one for a less-preferred option out of the calculation that this will produce a more preferred outcome.

Hint 34

We don't always know if voters will vote sincerely. Affects median voter theorem.

Front 35

Arrow's Impossibility Theorem

Back 35

To guarantee group transitivity and hence stable outcomes, one principle of fairness must be sacrificed.
-non-dictatorship
-universal admissibility
-independence
Unamity and Independence as non-controversial assumptions.
--> impossibility theorem. Must sacrifice non-dictatorship/universal admissibility

Front 36

Presidential vs. Parliamentary Systems

Back 36

Presidential system: population at large votes for chief executive and legislature is a separate branch of gov..
Parliamentary: voters select members of parliaments which then select a head of gov/chief executive--prime minister.

Hint 36

Presidential systems are more prone to breakdown than parliamentary systems.
-consensus systems are less prone to breakdown in ethnically heterogeneous societies.
-presidential systems are more likely to be selected in poorer, larger countries colonized by a power other than britain.

Front 37

Varieties of Electoral Systems

Back 37

Majoritarian: territorially-based districts/constitutencies -single member districts and multi-member districts.
Proportional Rep.: Allocation of seats is proportional to number of votes parties receive. Open list/closed list

Hint 37

-hybrid systems combine features of both
-there are opportunities for strategic actors to manipulate electoral rules to achieve political objectives.

Front 38

consociational democracy

Back 38

Use formal mechanisms to coordinate power sharing among diverse groups, including minority groups.

Hint 38

Grand coalition gov. that guarantee participation by parties representing all ethnic groups

Front 39

Political Parties and Party Systems

Back 39

an organization comprising a group of officials or office seekers and a group of citizens dedicated to keeping officials in office and helping office seekers gain office by voting for party members or working on political campaigns to elect party members.

Hint 39

party systems
-nonpartisan democracy
-single party system
-one party dominant system
-two party system
-multi party system

Front 40

Reinforcing and Cross Cutting Social Cleavages

Back 40

Politicial competition and clusterings of preference orderings oftern emerge among cleavages and divide voters. individuals have attributes that place them on different locations along cleavages

Hint 40

reinforced attributes-correlated with one another
cross cutting attributes- uncorrelated with one another

Front 41

Types of Dictatorships

Back 41

-monarchy: rely on kin networks to obtain/retain power
-military: rule is often by committee of highest-ranking officers. have interest in protecting military as corporate body.
civilian: do not have immediate access to support coalition/institutionalized basis of rule--> dominant-party dictatorships or personalistic dictatorship

Hint 41

-dom. party: single party dominates access to politcal office and control over policy
-personalistic: individual retains control over policy decisions/selection of regime personnel.

Front 42

Cult of Personality

Back 42

Heads of civilian dictatorships will try to create a personality cult-present highly exaggerated sense of personal virtues to obtain loyalty.

Hint 42

Play an important functional role in maintaining power

Front 43

Preference Falsification

Back 43

-Citizens falsify preferences for fear of repression.

Hint 43

dictator does not know his true level of support and the sources of opposition to him

Front 44

Transition Matrix of Regimes

Back 44

Front 45

endogeneous and exogenous modernization theory

Back 45

endo: wealth is directly causing democracy
Exo: rising income causes probability of death of democracy to decrease. Doesnt cause regime to become democratic, but causes it to stay democratic.

Hint 45

Boix and stoke- endogenous effect is present, but not constant

Front 46

sample selection bias

Back 46

non random sample for a study/statistical observation

Hint 46

boix and stokes began in the 19th century, not 1950.

Front 47

rentier state

Back 47

resource-rich economies in which substantial export revenues accrue directly to state.

Front 48

youll

Back 48

be fine