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119 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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defining properties |
things that are necessary and sufficient to determine identity |
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what is the concept that defines characteristics properties |
family resemblance |
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family resemblance |
the notion that people have knowledge of the typical features of a category of things |
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wittgenstein |
family resemblance typical features which many, but not all members of category have in common |
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if resemblance is high enough, what are we willing to do |
accept that thing as a category member |
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what produces family resemblance |
feature overlap |
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who devised the Prototype theory |
Rosch |
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prototype theory |
Rosch specify the center of a category rather than its boundaries prototypes are thought of as representing the average values on the typical feature dimensions. |
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prototype |
most typical category member |
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what is category membership determined by |
similarity to prototype distance to the prototype |
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True or false people mentally represent the average of all representations processed |
true |
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evidence consistent with prototype production |
people go from typical to less typical category members in recalling category exemplars free recall task listed in order; subcategories exist |
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evidence consistent with prototype explicit typicality judgements |
people consistently rate some exemplars more typical than others things rated for how close they are to the prototype relative to each other |
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evidence consistent with prototype sentence verification |
recognizing sentences declaring that a typical exemplar exists in a category has a lower reaction time than ones of atypical exemplars |
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evidence consistent with prototype induction |
people will accept info about a member that is close to prototype than info about a member that is more atypical, farther from prototype |
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true or false prototypes can never change even in different contexts |
false prototypes can change depending on the context |
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who found that prototypes seem to change with context |
Barsalou |
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ad hoc categories |
categories that can be formed on the fly depending on context |
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do ad hoc categories carry any family resemblance |
no, because things are not generally grouped by features but for other reasons such as financial reasons, value, etc |
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exemplar-based categorization is aka |
instance theory |
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exemplar-based categorization |
store numerous examples of each category in memory |
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how do you categorize X based on the exemplar-based categorization theory |
retrieve examples most similar to X and match X against all representations to ones in brain and find the closest match |
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why can the instance theory explain typicality results and prototype theory |
comparisons to the representations is similar to comparing to the central prototype because its likely that the new thing will be similar to multiple things in category |
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explanations of typicality results sentence verification |
measures reaction time more examples of typical shiat are in memory so retrieval of an example similar to the prototype is more likely |
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explanations of typicality results production |
if one thing is encountered more frequently than another, the first is more frequently mentions |
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explanations of typicality results picture identificaiton |
if one thing is mentioned faster than another, more than likely means that more instances of that thing are in memory than the latter |
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explanations of typicality results induction |
more examples of something will be similar to the prototype, promoting the likelihood that ppl will believe a fact about it is true of the whole category |
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true or false prototype theories dont define boundaries b/w categories |
true |
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what two things does the exemplar model allow you to do that the prototype model does not |
clean up boundaries since you have all the representations instead of just the prototype allows us to recover within category correlation |
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true or false both prototype and exemplar theories are not dependent on the notion of similarity |
false both theories are dependent on the notion of similarity |
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Collins and Quillian |
came up with study that mirrors the memory structure of items measures reaction times i.e. people are faster to say that a canary is a bird than it has skin |
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metric axiom that fails symmetry
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the similarity between 2 concepts must be the same regardless of order |
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metric axiom that fails triangle inequality |
if one concept is similar to a second, and the second is similar to a third, then the first and third must be reasonably similar; this is not the case |
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multi-dimensional geometric representation approach |
possible metric for similarity create categories based on 1+ multi-dimensional scaling |
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multi-dimensional scaling |
stretching one dimension to use and compare while shrinking, and as a result, ignoring the other |
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Homa et al. |
experiment that had varied frequencies of particular instances in training set subjects were found to initially represent exemplar storage but later on, the mind creates prototypes |
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what defines a well defined problem |
initial state goal state operators path constraints |
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how do you make an ill-defined problem a defined one |
create subgoals |
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reproductive thinking |
thinking involving the re-use of previous experience |
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productive thinkning |
thinking involving a novel restructuring of the problem |
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insight |
aspect of the gestalt approach occurs during productive thinking when the problem is suddenly restructured and the solution becomes clear |
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Kohler |
apes using tower to get banana claimed to observe insight with apes |
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Maier |
two strings experiment found it was possible to facilitate insight by "accidentally" brushing against the string |
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what can unconscious cues lead to |
problem restructuring and then insight |
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gestalt concepts are often descriptive or explanatory |
descriptive |
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true or false if you represent the initial and goal state and operators then you can search the problem state for the best solution |
true |
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when is an exhaustive search of the problem space best |
if all the elements can be represented in working memory |
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Karl Duncker |
found functional fixedness by having subjects light and hang a candle on the wall with tacks, candle, box, and matches |
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why is an exhaustive search of the problem space not a good idea |
its slow (incredible amount of possible operators) possibly inaccurate (due to functional fixedness) |
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what do people tend to rely on rather than an exhaustive search of the problem space |
heuristics |
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hill climbing |
move in the direction of goal at each decision point |
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backtracking |
take back recent moves and applying new operators use hill climbing to move back and forth between local mins |
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operator |
methods or steps used to get from one problem state to another |
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path constraints |
rules by which to abide by when solving problems |
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thorndike's hungry cats experiment was an example of |
stimulus response relationship |
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means end analysis |
the creation of a new goal (end) to enable a problem-solving operator (means) to apply in achieving the old goal |
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advantages of means end analysis |
often breaks problem into subproblems allows you to work backward from goal state |
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hill climbing is aka |
difference reduction |
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imagery, pics, diagrams |
when info overloads our mental workspace they can be useful |
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analogy |
by relating current problem to a previously encountered problem, the solver can use the same strategy |
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donnelly and mcdaniel |
found that participants instructed via analogy were better able to later make inferences than those instructed with literal accounts of scientific knowledge |
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what is the most famous case of analogy |
tumor problem of Duncker |
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Gick and Holyoak |
studied the ability of subjects to solve tumor problem after reading about an analogous problem |
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relationship between analogy and LTM |
problem solved and stored in LTM is retrieved and strategy is used again |
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why are analogies often missed |
ppl appear to be too influenced by superficial feature similarity |
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needham and begg |
presented participants with a series of training problems: one group to memorize for recall test; second group to understand solution to be able to explain it |
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significance of needham and begg experiment |
understand group solved 90% of new analogous problems while the memorize group solved 69% the understand group had a deep level of processing which leads to better storage and retrieval in LTM |
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do experts focus on deep structure chi, feltovich, glasser |
yes physics experts classify problems based on underlying principles while novices classified based on surface features |
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do experts make use of analogies novick and holyoak |
yes significant correlation between math SAT score and ability to spontaneously use analogous training problems to solve new ones |
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do experts create subgoals and break problems into parts Chase and Simon; Simon and colleagues |
yes chess experts remember pieces better by chunking configurations into tactical parts |
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do experts work backward for problems outside their domain Gick |
yes experts work backward when they cant recognize the type of problem and optimal method of solution |
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why is problem solving hard |
limited working memory for simultaneously maintaining multiple possible solutions functional fixedness mental set |
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functional fixedness |
tendency to view things in terms of their familiar use aspect of gestalt psychology |
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how to overcome functional fixedness |
novel perspective of objects -> no pre-utilization be young -> the conventional methods are not necessarily learned; no typicality of object is stored in LTM yet |
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mental set |
bias to solve problem in a way that has worked in the past |
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water jugs problem and mental set found that |
priming the same solution makes easier solutions hard to see |
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why do we suffer from mental set |
adaptive (faster and more accurate) to tackle problems using a method which has worked in the past |
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when novel solutions are necessary what should you try to do |
question the assumptions (what other operators are available) and think of all the uses of items at your disposal |
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Sternberg found that creative ppl are |
experts in their domain highly intelligent risk takers motivated by the pleasure in their work, thus work extremely hard benefit from circumstances |
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stages of creative thought (Wallas) |
preparation incubation illumination verification |
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skill |
function of practice increased likelihood of achieving a goal |
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skills are a result of |
practice |
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practice |
acquisition of extensive task relevant knowledge pattern-based retrieval rather than online computation |
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true or false as ppl become more proficient at a task they seem to use less of their brains to perform that task |
true |
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power law |
performance improves as a power fn of practice |
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Stage theory consists of what stages |
cognitive associative autonomous |
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stage theory cognitive stage |
declarative encoding perform task while rehearsing facts slow knowledge retrieval because you must retrieve specific facts and interpret them |
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stage theory associative stage |
strengthening associations among various elements/facts to produce procedures procedural knowledge is gained initial understanding errors gradually detected and eliminated |
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stage theory autonomous stage |
central cognition drops out - no longer rely on declarative knowledge procedural knowledge is retrieved via rapid pattern recognition |
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instance theory |
novices begin with general algorithm as experience is gained, specific solutions to specific problems are stored in LTM |
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the instance theory of skill acquisition is a form of what type of learing |
tactical learning |
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proceduralization |
process by which ppl switch from explicit use of declarative knowledge to direct application of procedural knowledge |
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proceduralization and the stage theory |
process by which declarative knowledge is converted to procedural |
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proceduralization and the instance theory |
transition from reliance on declarative knowledge to procedural |
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problem perception |
experts have the ability to learn to perceive problems in ways that enable more effective problem solving map surface features onto deeper principles |
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of novices and experts, who looks at surface level features and who looks at more fundamental qualities |
novices- surface level experts- fundamental qualities |
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pattern learning and memory |
experts display enhanced memory for info about problems in their domain of expertise |
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experts are more likely to remember ____ instead of individual pieces |
patterns (possibly by chunking) |
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LTM and expertise |
as people become more expert in a domain, they develop a better ability to store problem info in LTM and retrieve it |
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Chase & Ericsson |
digit span able to classify info using chunking to assist memory |
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deliberate skill |
practice that is highly motivated to learn, monitor, and correct performance |
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deliberate practice may be needed to drive necessary |
neural growth |
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transfer of skill |
theory of identical elements (thorndike)- transfer between skills if they share common elements; |
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according to the theory of identical elements what must be similar for skills to transfer |
the abstract knowledge structures |
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the control of skilled action can be said to be |
hierarchical |
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hierarchical control of skilled action |
each level begins with an input and output input- goal from higher level output- subgoal |
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outer loop processes are ____ and consist of ____ |
explicit semantic information |
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inner loop processes are |
implicit |
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associative learning |
lower levels solve computational problems previously solved by higher levels |
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No Question cued recall of typing |
people mimed typing motor suppression caused impaired results explicit knowledge may be gained by implicit knowledge consultation |
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letter placement by block showed that |
explicit memory was incomplete |
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when typing which loop governs keystrokes |
inner loop |
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monitored induced destruction |
slow down typing speed of preformed task to give explicit outer loop time to recognize what motor movements occur |
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what does monitored induced destruction affect |
performance |
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information about how the objects experts manipulate (key locations) and how experts manipulate them (hands used to type keys) is explicit or implicit |
implicit |
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in terms of mapping, 1 item in the explicit outer loop can equal |
many items in the implicit inner loop |
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true or false within word letters are typed faster than other letters |
true |
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implicit error detection |
post-error slowing reflects actual performance |
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explicit error detection |
self report reflects what the screen displays |
