In this paper I will argue that, based on the text of Philebus, virtue and true pleasures have their locations in the mixed life. Because the truth of pleasures must be measured by reason, and the practice of virtue is constituted of using reason to measure. I will start with defining true pleasures and virtue, and present the seeming incoherence in Socrates’ accounts of their location. In the second section, I will propose an interpretation of Socrates’ words and locate true pleasures and virtue in the mixed life. Finally, I will consider an objection to my interpretation and give my defense.
Definition and Seeming Incoherence
The true pleasures are the purest enjoyment, unmixed with pain (52C-53C, 66C). In other words, unlike false pleasures …show more content…
But what is the essential reason for him to add virtue to true pleasures, rather than merely intense ones? In Socrates’ later conversation with Protarchus, he says that the possession of “measure or the nature of proportion” essentially makes any mixture safe from the threat of corruption (64E). For pleasures, if they are not corrupted in the mixed life, then there is the measure of reason which secures them. Moreover, they are made true and pure because of this measure. As for merely intense pleasures, they are unlimited without the balancing or limiting of reason, therefore it is without the measure (28A,30C). From the comparison above, we may suggest that true pleasures are bound with measure, and hence they are also bound with virtue. What makes the true pleasures virtuous or good is the measure of reason, therefore, Socrates says that we should admit pleasures that “commit to virtue and follow around it” (63D). In other words, measure is one of the applications of virtue, or the …show more content…
This is a reasonable doubt, as pleasures that are good with virtue should reasonably be in a higher rank.
However, as I have suggested, virtue lies in the process of each of the five ingredients’ harmonious co-existence with each other in the mixed life. In other words, pleasures are true and pure because of the virtuous process of harmonizing by the measure. And it is this process that makes true pleasures bound with virtue. Therefore, the rank shows the reasonable order from the cause of the limiting of the unlimited to the effect of that. Even if true pleasures are in the mixed life with virtue, they are not themselves good enough to be in a higher rank.
Definition and Seeming Incoherence
The true pleasures are the purest enjoyment, unmixed with pain (52C-53C, 66C). In other words, unlike false pleasures …show more content…
But what is the essential reason for him to add virtue to true pleasures, rather than merely intense ones? In Socrates’ later conversation with Protarchus, he says that the possession of “measure or the nature of proportion” essentially makes any mixture safe from the threat of corruption (64E). For pleasures, if they are not corrupted in the mixed life, then there is the measure of reason which secures them. Moreover, they are made true and pure because of this measure. As for merely intense pleasures, they are unlimited without the balancing or limiting of reason, therefore it is without the measure (28A,30C). From the comparison above, we may suggest that true pleasures are bound with measure, and hence they are also bound with virtue. What makes the true pleasures virtuous or good is the measure of reason, therefore, Socrates says that we should admit pleasures that “commit to virtue and follow around it” (63D). In other words, measure is one of the applications of virtue, or the …show more content…
This is a reasonable doubt, as pleasures that are good with virtue should reasonably be in a higher rank.
However, as I have suggested, virtue lies in the process of each of the five ingredients’ harmonious co-existence with each other in the mixed life. In other words, pleasures are true and pure because of the virtuous process of harmonizing by the measure. And it is this process that makes true pleasures bound with virtue. Therefore, the rank shows the reasonable order from the cause of the limiting of the unlimited to the effect of that. Even if true pleasures are in the mixed life with virtue, they are not themselves good enough to be in a higher rank.