True opinions that have been tied down by reasoning become more stable, and therefore more valuable. It seems, then, that Socrates no longer suggests looking at virtue as something good to possess, but rather as beneficial. It will appear that this attitude towards the benefits of virtue is what is primarily new in the second part of the dialogue. Hence the main argument by which Socrates now shows that virtue is not knowledge is that, if virtue could be taught, there would be professionals who claim to teach it and take money for doing so. Virtue is a matter of possessing something which may be useful to someone else, rather than just to oneself, then one might expect it to be purchasable. It is reasonable for Socrates to assume that, if anyone is able to teach virtue, there will be those who ask and receive payment for doing so. Since it is unclear whether the supposed professional teachers of virtue actually teach it, it then becomes unlikely that virtue can be taught, and therefore that it is
True opinions that have been tied down by reasoning become more stable, and therefore more valuable. It seems, then, that Socrates no longer suggests looking at virtue as something good to possess, but rather as beneficial. It will appear that this attitude towards the benefits of virtue is what is primarily new in the second part of the dialogue. Hence the main argument by which Socrates now shows that virtue is not knowledge is that, if virtue could be taught, there would be professionals who claim to teach it and take money for doing so. Virtue is a matter of possessing something which may be useful to someone else, rather than just to oneself, then one might expect it to be purchasable. It is reasonable for Socrates to assume that, if anyone is able to teach virtue, there will be those who ask and receive payment for doing so. Since it is unclear whether the supposed professional teachers of virtue actually teach it, it then becomes unlikely that virtue can be taught, and therefore that it is