On one hand, Neustadt argues that presidents have limited formal powers and depend on Congress to achieve preferred policy goals. Thus, Neustadt claims, presidents must bargain and rely on the power of their personal reputation and public standing to persuade others for support (Neustadt, 1990, x). Presidential power is the power to persuade, as opposed to the power of command, because the President’s formal power provides no guarantee of success (Neustadt, 1990, 11) and the unilateral use of power is a last resort option that signals weakness (Neustadt, 1990, 24). On the other hand, Mayer and Howell frontally attack Neustadt’s claims and argue that the President has significant administrative power with which to pursue substantive policy
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The variety and specific character of each of these roles implies that the President must strategically decide which will likely be most effective for achieving policy goals. The outcome of this strategic decision-making should influence the decision to pursue a goal through executive or legislative means and, therefore, whether the President will pursue a unilateral or bargaining strategy. Although the institutional dynamic characterizing the relationship between the President and Congress encourages a strategy of unilateral action, there is a limit at which the strategy become ineffective (Howell, 2005, 422; Mayer, 2001). Presidential unilateral action is strategically useful up to this point, particularly in a political environment characterized by divided government (Howell 2003; Howell, 2005; Mayer, 2001; Moe and Howell, 1999a). Therefore, while presidential unilateral action – via executive orders, proclamations, agreements, national security directives, etc. – provides the President with an ability to avoid congressional collective action problems (Howell, 2003, 15), he is still subject to inter-branch …show more content…
The President does gain advantages by being able to move first and act alone (Howell, 2003, 15), and from Congress’ seeming inability to overturn executive action in certain political environments (Moe and Howell, 1999). However, the fact that any action might be challenged suggests that the point at which unilateral action is taken is the exact point at which bargaining returns as the primary source of presidential power. From this perspective, unilateral executive power appears highly ambivalent since it provides a president with an opportunity to circumvent Congress, yet it never fully frees him from having to work with them. Given this ambivalence, along with the fact that Congress retains the power to resist any unilateral action based upon their perception of its character, formal executive power, though real in the sense Howell demonstrates, appears highly symbolic and dependent on deferential treatment by the other branches. Since presidents vary their behavior in different circumstances (Mayer, 1999; Howell, 2003), it suggests that they recognize the symbolic nature of their power and the need to bargain both before and after acting. Despite this possibility, presidential unilateral actions remain an important source of their
The variety and specific character of each of these roles implies that the President must strategically decide which will likely be most effective for achieving policy goals. The outcome of this strategic decision-making should influence the decision to pursue a goal through executive or legislative means and, therefore, whether the President will pursue a unilateral or bargaining strategy. Although the institutional dynamic characterizing the relationship between the President and Congress encourages a strategy of unilateral action, there is a limit at which the strategy become ineffective (Howell, 2005, 422; Mayer, 2001). Presidential unilateral action is strategically useful up to this point, particularly in a political environment characterized by divided government (Howell 2003; Howell, 2005; Mayer, 2001; Moe and Howell, 1999a). Therefore, while presidential unilateral action – via executive orders, proclamations, agreements, national security directives, etc. – provides the President with an ability to avoid congressional collective action problems (Howell, 2003, 15), he is still subject to inter-branch …show more content…
The President does gain advantages by being able to move first and act alone (Howell, 2003, 15), and from Congress’ seeming inability to overturn executive action in certain political environments (Moe and Howell, 1999). However, the fact that any action might be challenged suggests that the point at which unilateral action is taken is the exact point at which bargaining returns as the primary source of presidential power. From this perspective, unilateral executive power appears highly ambivalent since it provides a president with an opportunity to circumvent Congress, yet it never fully frees him from having to work with them. Given this ambivalence, along with the fact that Congress retains the power to resist any unilateral action based upon their perception of its character, formal executive power, though real in the sense Howell demonstrates, appears highly symbolic and dependent on deferential treatment by the other branches. Since presidents vary their behavior in different circumstances (Mayer, 1999; Howell, 2003), it suggests that they recognize the symbolic nature of their power and the need to bargain both before and after acting. Despite this possibility, presidential unilateral actions remain an important source of their