As academics look at events to see the repercussions, what they were really about from the approach of the scholar sometimes they find contradicting ideas about a single event, which allows for further debate. To properly support the idea of the state analysis being the ideal idea for the Treaty of Dunkirk, and for the concentration of Security and Strategy, using the analyses of John Baylis, Cees Wiebes and Bert Zeeman, and Sean Greenwood to support the state analysis and show the different types of conclusions that are witnessed from the same treaty based off of their ideological approach.
Starting with John Baylis, he noticed that treaty had been postponed off until 1947 because of Churchill’s rejection of anything corroborating in Western …show more content…
This scholars conclusion drawn from the treaty led to the belief of the treaty to have 3 main goals along with 2 short-term goals. The long-term being to underpin socialist parties and prevent a French-Socialist alignment, the uncertainty of Germany and the USSR posing a major threat, and there was no long-term consideration at stake meaning that the treaty was not consciously intended to be the basis for an anti-Soviet policy even if it slowly led that way. The two short-term goals were French rapprochement with Britain instead of the Soviet and the Support for non-communist parties in the French government. Greenwood is approaching the Treaty of Dunkirk as one that while trying to secure a Western alliance was also under the worries that the Soviet’s would get concerned over this new alliance would become a new and volatile threat in response. While in reality the US and USSR kept each other in line throughout the Cold War, there was always a possibility that was only the cause because of the International System was very clearly East and West or Communist and Democratic separating the two poles. However, if the Western Alliance had been able to rise to a Third Power then that would have been 2 Democratic poles against 1 Communist pole. The Soviets would have had a bit of pull in the French government as at this point they …show more content…
The differences are the main goals, how each viewed the Treaty and it’s importance coordinates to how best to analyze this Treaty, while Baylis saw State, always for the State; Wiebes and Zeeman were looking the confrontation this could have caused, to see the repercussions in the International System; and Greenwood saw Britain knowingly make the Soviet’s uncomfortable with this and still continued to move forward, because this alliance was what was best for the State to progress. At the end of the day they all approach from very clear and strong perspectives, but Greenwood’s stands to reason with the most defense. Greenwood pointed out that Britain was aware of how the Soviet’s would acknowledge the Western Alliance as a target against them, he analyzed how exactly Britain took into account the international system but decided to protect the state was the important aspect now. States were fragile coming out of the war and Britain had decided to make sure that this treaty was best to allow some sense of security on the home front. This demonstrates how Britain and France focused on what would help them, how exactly they could meet what they needed in a secure
Starting with John Baylis, he noticed that treaty had been postponed off until 1947 because of Churchill’s rejection of anything corroborating in Western …show more content…
This scholars conclusion drawn from the treaty led to the belief of the treaty to have 3 main goals along with 2 short-term goals. The long-term being to underpin socialist parties and prevent a French-Socialist alignment, the uncertainty of Germany and the USSR posing a major threat, and there was no long-term consideration at stake meaning that the treaty was not consciously intended to be the basis for an anti-Soviet policy even if it slowly led that way. The two short-term goals were French rapprochement with Britain instead of the Soviet and the Support for non-communist parties in the French government. Greenwood is approaching the Treaty of Dunkirk as one that while trying to secure a Western alliance was also under the worries that the Soviet’s would get concerned over this new alliance would become a new and volatile threat in response. While in reality the US and USSR kept each other in line throughout the Cold War, there was always a possibility that was only the cause because of the International System was very clearly East and West or Communist and Democratic separating the two poles. However, if the Western Alliance had been able to rise to a Third Power then that would have been 2 Democratic poles against 1 Communist pole. The Soviets would have had a bit of pull in the French government as at this point they …show more content…
The differences are the main goals, how each viewed the Treaty and it’s importance coordinates to how best to analyze this Treaty, while Baylis saw State, always for the State; Wiebes and Zeeman were looking the confrontation this could have caused, to see the repercussions in the International System; and Greenwood saw Britain knowingly make the Soviet’s uncomfortable with this and still continued to move forward, because this alliance was what was best for the State to progress. At the end of the day they all approach from very clear and strong perspectives, but Greenwood’s stands to reason with the most defense. Greenwood pointed out that Britain was aware of how the Soviet’s would acknowledge the Western Alliance as a target against them, he analyzed how exactly Britain took into account the international system but decided to protect the state was the important aspect now. States were fragile coming out of the war and Britain had decided to make sure that this treaty was best to allow some sense of security on the home front. This demonstrates how Britain and France focused on what would help them, how exactly they could meet what they needed in a secure