This “less common form of disgust advocacy” is the belief that you could consistently say one is disgusted by certain activities, beliefs, or people because they are genuinely problematic. For example, some people could view someone who is racist as disgusting, and that could be seen as morally appropriate because of the powerful effects on judgment and motivation that it has. Kelly criticizes this view by saying even if a disgust-infused moral judgment is justified, the E&C view still provides reasoning to be suspicious of the type of influence disgust can
This “less common form of disgust advocacy” is the belief that you could consistently say one is disgusted by certain activities, beliefs, or people because they are genuinely problematic. For example, some people could view someone who is racist as disgusting, and that could be seen as morally appropriate because of the powerful effects on judgment and motivation that it has. Kelly criticizes this view by saying even if a disgust-infused moral judgment is justified, the E&C view still provides reasoning to be suspicious of the type of influence disgust can