Russell’s critique comes about when Moore makes the claim, “That the assertion ‘I am morally bound to perform this action’ is identical with the assertion ‘This action will produce the greatest possible amount of good in the Universe’” and that such a claim is “demonstrably certain” (PE147). Russell mistakenly rephrases those two sentences to say, “… [W]hat we ought to do is that action, among all that are possible, which will produce the best results on the whole.” (p.330) But Moore’s is a non-heteronomous claim about coincidental states of affairs: When I do what I am morally bound to do; when I correctly perceive the good; attendant to that action is that the whole world will be better as a whole. Moore does not claim that the actor or agent in question perceives, in a consequentialist manner, that the act in question will bring about the greatest good. He only says that when one does what is good (or the morally imperative thing) then the good of the
Russell’s critique comes about when Moore makes the claim, “That the assertion ‘I am morally bound to perform this action’ is identical with the assertion ‘This action will produce the greatest possible amount of good in the Universe’” and that such a claim is “demonstrably certain” (PE147). Russell mistakenly rephrases those two sentences to say, “… [W]hat we ought to do is that action, among all that are possible, which will produce the best results on the whole.” (p.330) But Moore’s is a non-heteronomous claim about coincidental states of affairs: When I do what I am morally bound to do; when I correctly perceive the good; attendant to that action is that the whole world will be better as a whole. Moore does not claim that the actor or agent in question perceives, in a consequentialist manner, that the act in question will bring about the greatest good. He only says that when one does what is good (or the morally imperative thing) then the good of the