This is not say that freedom is not governed by laws that stem from a notion of causality. Rather, if it is governed to laws in accordance with some special kind of causality, the contents of those laws are not accessible in the sensible world in the way that scientific laws relating to fungi gr. Kant argues that it follows from this that freedom must be presupposed as a property of the will of all rational beings in order to conceive of an agent willing anything at all. He does this by explaining the connection that our own idea of freedom has to our ability to be actually free with regard to matters of practical
This is not say that freedom is not governed by laws that stem from a notion of causality. Rather, if it is governed to laws in accordance with some special kind of causality, the contents of those laws are not accessible in the sensible world in the way that scientific laws relating to fungi gr. Kant argues that it follows from this that freedom must be presupposed as a property of the will of all rational beings in order to conceive of an agent willing anything at all. He does this by explaining the connection that our own idea of freedom has to our ability to be actually free with regard to matters of practical