Seemingly unrelated, Blaise Pascal’s Wager and Michael Shadlen and William Newsome’s Motion perception: Seeing and deciding are, in actuality, complementary and tie together the disciplines of philosophy and cognitive neuroscience in a thought-provoking way. In this paper, I discuss how the integration of Pascal’s Wager and Shadlen and Newsome’s research in the lateral parietal region (LIP) can reveal unique insights that are inaccessible when reviewing the texts independently. Specifically, I will explore why Pascal’s Wager is ineffective using the cognitive neuroscience model of integration-to-bound. Furthermore, I will demonstrate how Shadlen and Newsome’s interpretation of their data can be justified using the argument model from Pascal’s
…show more content…
He lays out his argument using a cost-benefit analysis where, if God indeed exists, belief in God results in infinite gains and disbelief in God results in infinite losses. Therefore, Pascal argues everyone should choose to believe in God to maximize utility and to avoid punishment from disbelief. While interesting, Pascal’s argument is problematic because he makes several presuppositions and oversights. As an example, Pascal’s Wager does not consider the possible existence of other deities. Since most deities expect exclusive belief from their followers, if the Christian God is not the real God, then Pascal’s cost-benefit analysis is inaccurate and, thus, it may not be rational to choose to believe. Here, I will not go into details to show how Pascal’s argument fails to achieve purpose (1) because the Wager can still be successful if it achieves purpose (2), its overarching goal. However, in this regard, the Wager is also unsuccessful. The integration-to-bound model from Shadlen and Newsome’s cognitive neuroscience research can be used to explain why Pascal’s Wager is not convincing for nonbelievers. The integration-to-bound decision model suggests the brain compiles evidence for or against a decision until the integration of all evidence reaches a bound that justifies a decision. Most importantly, the bound of a decision varies from …show more content…
Although grounded in empirical data, cognitive neuroscience findings can have many alternative interpretations and can be riddled with uncertainty. A case in point is Shadlen and Newsome’s investigation of the LIP. To put in context, Shadlen and Newsome designed an experiment where the neural signals from the LIP were recorded as two monkeys made decisions using their eye movement, which was tracked, in response to a visual stimulus. They found an interesting correlation from their data that supported a potential role in decision-making. However, due to a limitation of their experimental design, it is also possible that the LIP’s function could be related to planning eye movement instead. Shadlen and Newsome, however, decided to conclude that the LIP plays a role in decision-making. Although unaware themselves, Shadlen and Newsome have wagered. In fact, their rationale can be modeled using the same argument model from Pascal’s Wager to show that their choice is justified. In Shadlen and Newsome’s case, there are four possibilities: (1) claim LIP is involved in decision-making, and it is; (2) claim LIP is involved in decision-making, and it is not; (3) claim LIP is involved in planning eye movement, and it is; and (4) claim LIP is involved in planned eye movement, and it is not. To assign a value to each outcome, I will make two claims:
He lays out his argument using a cost-benefit analysis where, if God indeed exists, belief in God results in infinite gains and disbelief in God results in infinite losses. Therefore, Pascal argues everyone should choose to believe in God to maximize utility and to avoid punishment from disbelief. While interesting, Pascal’s argument is problematic because he makes several presuppositions and oversights. As an example, Pascal’s Wager does not consider the possible existence of other deities. Since most deities expect exclusive belief from their followers, if the Christian God is not the real God, then Pascal’s cost-benefit analysis is inaccurate and, thus, it may not be rational to choose to believe. Here, I will not go into details to show how Pascal’s argument fails to achieve purpose (1) because the Wager can still be successful if it achieves purpose (2), its overarching goal. However, in this regard, the Wager is also unsuccessful. The integration-to-bound model from Shadlen and Newsome’s cognitive neuroscience research can be used to explain why Pascal’s Wager is not convincing for nonbelievers. The integration-to-bound decision model suggests the brain compiles evidence for or against a decision until the integration of all evidence reaches a bound that justifies a decision. Most importantly, the bound of a decision varies from …show more content…
Although grounded in empirical data, cognitive neuroscience findings can have many alternative interpretations and can be riddled with uncertainty. A case in point is Shadlen and Newsome’s investigation of the LIP. To put in context, Shadlen and Newsome designed an experiment where the neural signals from the LIP were recorded as two monkeys made decisions using their eye movement, which was tracked, in response to a visual stimulus. They found an interesting correlation from their data that supported a potential role in decision-making. However, due to a limitation of their experimental design, it is also possible that the LIP’s function could be related to planning eye movement instead. Shadlen and Newsome, however, decided to conclude that the LIP plays a role in decision-making. Although unaware themselves, Shadlen and Newsome have wagered. In fact, their rationale can be modeled using the same argument model from Pascal’s Wager to show that their choice is justified. In Shadlen and Newsome’s case, there are four possibilities: (1) claim LIP is involved in decision-making, and it is; (2) claim LIP is involved in decision-making, and it is not; (3) claim LIP is involved in planning eye movement, and it is; and (4) claim LIP is involved in planned eye movement, and it is not. To assign a value to each outcome, I will make two claims: