Firstly, Feldman’s responds to the Epicurean conclusion to the problem of death, which is nothing can be intrinsically bad for an individual, unless that person were alive to …show more content…
I do agree that the hypothetical comparisons of world1 and world3 is a good example of avoiding the asymmetry problem. However, If X were born in a different time span, they would no longer remain the same person. Rather, X would become an different individual known as (Y). Problematically, X could never exist in world3. Arguable, throughout X’s lifespan, there will have been necessary factors (persons/events) that were involved in constructing the overall identity of X’s personhood. In effect, it would be an error to refer to X in possible-world1 as the same individual in possible-world3, unless those necessary factors still occurred. However, those determinant factors that occurred in the time span of world1 are unlikely to occur in world3, which then problematizes the hypothetical example. Consequently, the pre-natal thought experiment does not work, and it makes possible-world3 too distant, rather near. Therefore, the issue of identity limits the ability to temporally place X in different hypothetical scenario’s, and doesn't allow the example to fully