In response to the above critique, this section will explore how Nagel might defend his argument. It does not suffice to examine moral luck in hypothetical situations. Moral luck is only applicable under real circumstances and to give it a suppositious critique is degrading to Nagel’s original argument. It is also important to clarify the term “luck,” and what it means when something is affected by luck. Lastly, if we accept the critique then it is crucial we consider how to apply judgment without involving factors of luck.
Regarding circumstantial luck, even if we weigh what someone would have done in our moral assessments, we still must account for the actual circumstance. Context is required to form moral judgments; otherwise they are only …show more content…
When critiquing the concept of moral luck, we often take “luck” to mean something similar to “spontaneous” or “by accident.” Taken this way, we can easily refute moral luck because we are unwilling to accept that everything we do and everything we are is the result of spontaneity. However, it seems that Nagel’s usage of the term luck is more accurately defined as a lack of control. If we reexamine Nagel’s argument with this in mind, then moral luck becomes a more coherent notion. This becomes clearer when we revisit constitutional luck. It seems queer to say our identity is shaped by accident, but it’s much more reasonable to say that our identity is not a matter within our own …show more content…
The problem of moral luck, as Nagel argues, is that many, if not all, of our actions are out of our control yet we continue to assign moral judgment. After thorough analysis of both sides of the argument, I concede that Nagel’s argument needs refinement before it can be accepted. I take special care when I use the word refinement because I do believe Nagel has made a strong case for the existence of moral luck. Whether we can derive moral judgments from moral luck is where I disagree. This relationship must be explicitly defined before we can start making claims about how luck ought to weigh into moral assessment. Further, we must only consider scenarios in which a moral judgment is actually made. This excludes many of Nagel’s examples where blame is assigned but no connection is drawn between blame and
Regarding circumstantial luck, even if we weigh what someone would have done in our moral assessments, we still must account for the actual circumstance. Context is required to form moral judgments; otherwise they are only …show more content…
When critiquing the concept of moral luck, we often take “luck” to mean something similar to “spontaneous” or “by accident.” Taken this way, we can easily refute moral luck because we are unwilling to accept that everything we do and everything we are is the result of spontaneity. However, it seems that Nagel’s usage of the term luck is more accurately defined as a lack of control. If we reexamine Nagel’s argument with this in mind, then moral luck becomes a more coherent notion. This becomes clearer when we revisit constitutional luck. It seems queer to say our identity is shaped by accident, but it’s much more reasonable to say that our identity is not a matter within our own …show more content…
The problem of moral luck, as Nagel argues, is that many, if not all, of our actions are out of our control yet we continue to assign moral judgment. After thorough analysis of both sides of the argument, I concede that Nagel’s argument needs refinement before it can be accepted. I take special care when I use the word refinement because I do believe Nagel has made a strong case for the existence of moral luck. Whether we can derive moral judgments from moral luck is where I disagree. This relationship must be explicitly defined before we can start making claims about how luck ought to weigh into moral assessment. Further, we must only consider scenarios in which a moral judgment is actually made. This excludes many of Nagel’s examples where blame is assigned but no connection is drawn between blame and