Above, I have established that accountability through oversight is key to maintaining the democratic principles of Australian society. Yet, oversight did not become an incorporated function of the AIC until the late 70’s and early 80’s. This can be attributed to the early Australian agencies which were primarily developed under the instructions of Great Britain (Andrew 1989): Inheriting a culture of secrecy. Moreover, as the agencies of the AIC were born from the necessity of war, they developed a culture which saw parliament as being inherently separate to the affairs of intelligence and security (Weller 2010, 488). Due to the unknown and highly secretive nature, and culture, of the AIC there was little to no push from the media, academics,
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Widely recognised as the foundation of oversight mechanisms in Australia: The first Royal Commission on Intelligence and Security was established by Gough Whitlam in 1974, following the Murphy Raids. Hope reported his findings in 1977. Overall the commission was positive in its review of the intelligence community, and recommended the establishment of a legislative body which would guide and oversee the intelligence community, and establish distinct functions for each agency. This body was the ONA, the functions of which would serve to interject accountability into the cycle of intelligence. A second commission conducted by Hope was established in 1984 to assess the effectiveness of the previous …show more content…
Weller argues that the Hope commissions were “exercises in the public legitimation of the activities of the intelligence agencies, and a basis for expanding their powers rather than restricting them (Weller 2010, 493-494).” This assessment is not entirely accurate of Hope’s conclusions. Through establishing mechanisms for oversight and accountability, Hope founded a more efficient intelligence community: By separating intelligence functions to dedicated agencies. Hope’s choice to pursue oversight internally matches my assessment that oversight is just as much a matter of culture, as it is a literal
Widely recognised as the foundation of oversight mechanisms in Australia: The first Royal Commission on Intelligence and Security was established by Gough Whitlam in 1974, following the Murphy Raids. Hope reported his findings in 1977. Overall the commission was positive in its review of the intelligence community, and recommended the establishment of a legislative body which would guide and oversee the intelligence community, and establish distinct functions for each agency. This body was the ONA, the functions of which would serve to interject accountability into the cycle of intelligence. A second commission conducted by Hope was established in 1984 to assess the effectiveness of the previous …show more content…
Weller argues that the Hope commissions were “exercises in the public legitimation of the activities of the intelligence agencies, and a basis for expanding their powers rather than restricting them (Weller 2010, 493-494).” This assessment is not entirely accurate of Hope’s conclusions. Through establishing mechanisms for oversight and accountability, Hope founded a more efficient intelligence community: By separating intelligence functions to dedicated agencies. Hope’s choice to pursue oversight internally matches my assessment that oversight is just as much a matter of culture, as it is a literal