In order to understand why we separate the legislative, executive and judicial powers in the Australian …show more content…
Charles de Montesquieu was the first to demonstrate the separation of powers in his work L’Esprit des Lois (the Spirit of the Laws) in 1748, he introduced the theory of the separation of powers as a baseline principle (Bondy, 1896). Legal power is separated between those who make laws, those who apply the laws and those who adjudicate on matters of compliance of law. The Judiciary also ensures that the laws are consistent with the powers given to the legislature or executive in accordance with the Constitution. This principle ensures that we are ruled by laws and not the exercise of unchecked executive power. The phrase “power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely” has become a truism as the concentration of powers in one branch is prone to errors (Civilization of the Political System, …show more content…
Australia’s parliamentary system is categorised as a fusion as opposed to a separation of powers as the executive branch is answerable and part of the legislative branch. Each branch of government should work within their areas of responsibility so they act like checks and balances on each other with 100 years of stable government testifying to its effectiveness. A fourth way which holds the governmental branches accountable is the citizens of the country, they form a check and balance system. Citizens are able to judge a government come election time but Parliament holds governments responsible for their actions in-between elections (Fenna, 2014).
Australia uses a liberal system of government which implies that there is a need to have limits of the power of governments as indicated by (Fenna, 2014). Another form of checks and balances has been the implementation of constrained parliamentarism. Another form of checks and balances has been established with Parliament seeing the need for different institutions such as the Auditor General’s office, Freedom of Information, Integrity commissions and the Ombudsman to reformed upper houses (Fenna,