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54 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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institutionalization |
- routinized and predictable political and policymaking process were deemed indispensable to china’s modernization - mao’s policies had led to chaos and economic underdevelopment - guard against concentration of political power |
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indicators of institutionalization |
- regular meetings for party congress and the central committee - a routine of consultation, review, and revision by organs and constituencies for policymaking - restoration of organizational discipline in the party, government, and military - establish rules for leadership turnover and succession |
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voting in party congress |
- party delegates received strict voting instructions. - potential candidates are selected by leadership groups - the selected candidates then underwent a vetting procedure carried out by the Central Organization Department |
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institutionalization of power sharing in politburo standing committee |
- the general party secretary was only “first among equals” - reinforce collective decision making - the evolving composition of the Politburo Standing Committee - moved from military to regional representation - more emphasis on competence and expertise - the average age of the Standing Committee drops to meet the age limitation requirement |
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behavioral implications of psc members |
- Collective Leadership System - a balancing act of organizational constituency to sustain collective leadership decision - politburo members often represent expertise in different functional areas facilitate effective and rational decision making - every member on the standing committee counts - the collective leadership system inevitably generates factional politics |
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continued… implications of psc members |
- intra-party political competition- factional politics exist within the CCP, even though the party does not admit it- a patron-clientelist relationship within the faction- faction formation changes from time to time- faction organization is often informal |
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characteristics of factional politics |
- the limited nature of power cultivates a code of civility that mitigate political conflict - to weaken rivals, factions try to discredit opposition faction members- the immediate concern of faction is to protect its own base instead of ridding the other factions - the defensive orientation encourages factions to unite against the emergence of strong leaders - faction alliances shift over time (today’s enemies may be tomorrow’s friends) - decisions without consensus could almost never be enforced |
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why is institutionalization of elite politics hard to sustain? |
- the dilemma of balancing political power among political elites * the need for a strong leader, but not too strong that refuses power sharing - sustain the equilibrium of power sharing among political elites is extremely challenging |
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departure from norms in recent development |
- xi’s anti-corruption campaigns have led to the downfall of several candidates to these top positions - some discussion by party media about the retirement age is only a “recommendation” |
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incentive structures |
- cadre responsibility system - the career prospects |
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cadre responsibility system (crs) |
- motivations: improve gov efficiency & allow higher level govs to monitor and control lower level agents |
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reforms to improve crs |
- an attempt to use the performance of public officials as the key metrics in the cadre management system - passed national regulations on the evaluation of civil servants in 1993: led by the CCP Organization Department; a scoring system, ranked among cadres at the same admin level |
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performance contract |
- contents vary btw areas and over time, reflecting the priorities of the central and also local authorities - CCP continues to rely on quantitative targets - performance targets are internally ranked |
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career prospects |
- promotion (within and across gov) and rotation (transfers) are the common tactics to control local cadres - rotation = across different administrative level and different geographical locations; also reinforces control by the higher level gov |
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promotion (career prospects) |
- top-down appt system: decision mostly rests with party standing committee - voting among peers and masses - gov executives and bureau heads requires up-and-down votes by local people’s congress |
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criteria for promotion |
- faction ties (strength of factional bosses at the top) - competence (soft target, hard target, priority target with veto power) - age requirement (necessity of rejuvenation and the promotion of youth and restricting of aging officials; avoid the unregulated and disorderly promotion - local experience (rotation in appt; term limits = cadres supposed to fulfill at least 5 yr term in each position and no more than 2 terms; few served in full term, esp for positions below provincial level) |
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solutions to age dilemma |
- the communist youth league route ("army reserve" for CCP) = after serving in CYL, cadres are required to undergo reassignment to regular gov and party positions under strict and low max age limitations - temp transferred duty = cadres being assigned by their original unit (dispatching unit) to diff, external unit (receiving unit) - non-regulation promotion = promotion of cadres outside pre-defined regulatory criteria (age, ethnicity, educational experience, gender) ; open selection promotion = earned thru success in examination/interviews where field is thrown open for apps by any eligible cadre |
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bureau director |
- highest rank where open selection is permitted |
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recap: cadre promotion |
- opportunities: factional ties, job performance (fulfilling various targets) - constraints: political competitions (inter-faction and intra-faction), age, tenure uncertainty |
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implications for political behaviors |
- selective policy implementation = prioritize some policies to achieve "critical" objectives, strike for short term policy outcomes - collusion among diff levels of local govs to meet various policy tragets - cultivation of personal relationship w party/gov leaders |
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unintended consequences of post 1980 cadre management reforms 1 |
- one level down appt system * in theory = reform should increase responsiveness and allow more leeway to accommodate local circumstances * in practice = encouraged cadres to be hyper-responsive to their immediate superiors at the expense of other interests |
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unintended consequences of post 1980 cadre management reforms 2 |
- end of mass campaigns as the tool for policy implementation * reduced chaos and terror that accompanied political mobilization in policy implementation during maoist era * weakened party discipline and led cadres to believe that there is little danger in trampling citizens' rights |
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unintended consequences of post 1980 cadre management reforms 3 |
- cadre responsibility system * aims to improve gov efficiency and control local cadres * local officials focus on tasks that could be quantified (easy to be evaluated) even when they are not popular * rotation policy also creates short term horizons and undermine accountability for local cadres |
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people's congress est at level of jurisdiction |
- national; province; prefecture (municipality); county; township |
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election of people's congress deputies |
- candidates are generally nominated by ccp and social organizations - election thru delegated democracy = deputies at each level of people's congress are elected by deputies at the lower level, except the lowest level - 5 yr term w/o term limit |
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what can people's congress do? |
- convenes once a yr - approve annual gov report and budget - elect gov executives often nominated by local party committee - promulgate (national) laws and (local) regulations |
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1995 reform |
- motivations: effort to staff people's congress and gov officials of high quality - improve status of ruling communist party as an org - 2 key components: changes to party regulations, changes to law |
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changes to party regulations |
- the regulations mandate more broadly consultative and careful vetting and selection of government leaders by party committees and their org departments |
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changes to the law |
- constrained congress presidiums to nominate only as many candidates as elective offices - requirement that party candidates compete against deputy nominated candidates |
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how does ccp exercise control? |
- communist party discipline: pre-election org, org disciple, majority rules - controlled contestation: farm more contested at lower than higher levels, other practices that control contestation lack formal institutional foundation |
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organic law of villagers' committees |
- law promised self-governance - candidates pre-screened by village election commission - ministry of civil affairs is responsible for working out implementing guidelines for village elections, cooperating with civil affairs officials in the provinces and at local levels vague guidelines on how elections were to be carried out |
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4 components of the organic law of village committee |
- election - decision making - management - supervision |
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village committee is in charge of economic affairs |
- collective goods of the village (land, village enterprise, etc.) - public goods and services provision - resolve conflicts among villagers |
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implementation issues 1 |
- uneven implementation - provincial, county, and township leaders could ignore the national guidelines with impunity (organic law as "experimental") - success of implementation elections depended on supports from higher level gov |
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implementation issues 2 |
- whole concepts of open competition, one, man, one vote, the secret ballot, and electoral transparency are foreign to the chinese society - passage of the amended organic law improves procedures of elections |
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ministry of civil affairs 4 criteria for democratic elections at the village level |
1. the chairman, vice chairman, and members of village committees should be directly elected by the villagers themselves 2. the number of candidates exceeds the number of positions 3. voting should be conducted by secret ballo t4. the winning candidate receives more than half the votes |
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power of the village head and the village committee is constrained by |
- township/county gov - party branch - social forces (clans, religious orgs, and criminal gangs) |
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implications for rural governance |
- village politics is subject to capture by the pre-existing powerful local networks - village head hands are tied bc they don't have much institutional supports - mixed results on public goods and services provision - however, villagers may still feel higher political efficancy |
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mass political participation in china |
- thru official channels: channels designed by gov to address public discontent - thru unofficial channels: channels that were discouraged by gov, esp by lower level govs |
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official channels (political participation) |
- electoral institution - complaints (political orgs, trade unions, deputies to local people's congress) - courts (litigation against gov became possible since 1990s) |
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unofficial channels (political participation) |
- guanxi (political connection) and gifts in exchange for help - whipping up public opinion against leaders (big character posters, online denouncement) - strikes and slowdowns on the job - demonstrations/protest (specific issues, not general policy changes) |
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who are the petitioners? |
- petitioners are mostly citizens who received (or perceived) mis-treatment by local governments on issues concerning personal/family welfare - many are uneducated and powerless (peasants and laid off workers) |
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why do they petition? |
- view the central government as a unified, encompassing body - high confidence/trust toward upper level gov officials - local politicians respond better to upper level govs |
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what do they expect to get? |
- help from the upper level gov to pressure the local govs - not always for material compensation |
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sources of trust |
- economic performance - party indoctrination - political culture |
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political behaviors of petitioners |
- visit higher level gov and petition on an issue - petitioners typically arrive in beijing with fair amount of confidence in central authorities (center) |
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dealing with the sblv |
- stage 1: give sblv the benefit of doubt - stage 2: eroding confidence - stage 3: disillusion |
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petitioners typically turn to what they call "big ministries" as reps of the center, such as... |
- ministry of public security - central org dept - central disciplinary inspection committee - supreme people’s court - national people’s congress |
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- gov responses to petitioners |
- provincial/central gov: pressure local govs to resolve the issue; incorporate petitions into the cadre evaluation system - local govs: the carrots and sticks strategy |
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protests (social unrests) |
- social unrest as a channel of political participation: inadequate official channels to address individual grievance; improved access to info communication tech (ict)
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sources of protests |
- environment - land expropriation, demolition, and relocation - labor disputes in private and foreign-owned companies - state owned enterprise labor disputes |
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social unrests in china are very diff from the "arab spring" |
- smaller scale - protests are decentralized and localized - protesters are heterogenous, not much mobilization across groups - protests are aimed at compensation for material grievance - protesters stress that they abide by the laws, seeking supports from the media and upper level gov (rightful resistance) |
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state's responses to social unrests |
- from quelling demonstrations with force to a permissive strategy of "containment and management": allow non-violent and lowkey protests to be staged; outsource violence to nonstate actors - higher level authorities selectively intervene and punish local officials |
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central gov programs to reduce social unrests |
- alleviating inequality and hardships - heightened indoctrination - public services provision as sticks and carrots - improve public safety |
