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29 Cards in this Set
- Front
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“If you knew how much money I've made, you'd be amazed”
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- Hippias Major by Plato
- Speaker: Hippias - Quote deals with the money he has made as a Sophist - Talks about how it is illegal to teach in Sparta - Socrates is sarcastic in saying that the one that makes the most money is the most wise - Sophists selling wisdom for money |
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“[He's] asking you not what is a fine thing, but what is the fine”
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-Hippias Major by Plato
-Speaker : Socrates - Socrates is questioning Hippias on the difference between what is fine and what is the fine -Hippias then talks about the different classes of fine from monkeys, pots and girls -Socrates questions saying a girl is considered fine and so is a pot…both are fine? |
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“Then it's not entirely necessary, as you said it was a moment ago, that whatever is true of both is also true of each, and that whatever is true of each is also true of both”
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- Hippias Major by Plato
- Speaker: Socrates - Context of Hippias explaining if people are one or two - Continuous theory of being – whatever both are, that each is as well and whatever each is both are - This quote is disproving that theory - Odd numbered and even numbered at the same time |
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“It was inevitable, hence, that philosophical thought must put to the side physis [nature] and invest an interest in another objective”
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-Origin Nature and Goals of the Sophistic Movement – Giovanni Reale
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“'Then listen,' he said, 'I assert that what's just is nothing other than what's advantageous to the stronger'”
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- Plato, The Republic
- Thrasymachus says it - Justice, he says, is nothing more than the advantage of the stronger. - a delegitimization of justice. He is saying that it does not pay to be just. - Just behavior works to the advantage of other people, not to the person who behaves justly. - Thrasymachus assumes here that justice is the unnatural restraint on our natural desire to have more. - Justice is a convention imposed on us, and it does not benefit us to adhere to it. The rational thing to do is ignore justice entirely. - Justice is defined by the ruler who has the power to make the laws in his or her own self interest - To Thrrasmachus the art of ruling permits no error - Socrates says that the Art of Ruling is done for the sake of those that it serves - Agree there are no errors - Separate Art theory by Socrates (art of profit, art of shepards) |
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“'So then,' I said, 'the medical art considers what's advantageous not for the medical art but for the body'”
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- Plato, The Republic
- Socartes says it - No art considers what is advantageous to itself but for what it is concerned with (horsemanship is for horses not for horsemanship) - Doctor not advantageous for the (stronger) doctor but for the (weaker) patient |
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“'Because you imagine that shepherds or cattlemen consider the good of the sheep or the cattle and fatten them up and take care of them looking to anything other than the good of their bosses and of themselves […]”
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- Plato, The Republic
- Thrasymachus says it - Overall metaphor for the discussion as way rulers treat people are the same the way cattlemen treat cattle - Believes whats just and justice are in fact someone else’s good - What’s advantageous for the stronger - Who obeys the rule is getting harmed - Those that serve the ruler make the ruler happy but in no way help themselves |
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Then does each of these also furnish us with some benefit that's peculiar to it and not shared by them all […]?'”
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- Plato, The Republic
- Socrates says it - Socrates believes no one desires to rule - Additional benefits by practicing the art - Talks about if there is a benefit though for doctors if they heal but they do not receive pay - Thrasymachus believes so proving no art nor any ruling function provides for its own benefits but provides for those ruled - Socrates would say that they are separate arts (making money as a doctor is the art of making money while performing the art of healing)---start of the theory of forms |
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“'[Each] one person needed to pursue one of the tasks that are involved in the city, the one to which his nature would be naturally best adapted'
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- Plato, The Republic
- Socrates says it - Talking about the founding of the just city - Just city has no use for laws - Four virtues: wisdom, courage, moderation, and justice. - Spreading those virtues out is what is best for the city |
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“'It's obvious that the same thing isn't going to put up with doing or undergoing opposite things in the same respect and in relation to the same thing at the same time, so presumably if we find that happening in the things in question, we'll know that they're not the same but more than one thing'”
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- Plato, The Republic
- Socrates says it - Discussion of how we act is it way by means of the same thing, different ways by means of different things, or act by means of the whole soul once we are aroused - Goes on to talk about how a person is standing still and moves |
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“'So if anything ever pulls it back when it's thirsty, it would be some different thing in it from the very thing that's thirsty […]?'”
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- Plato, The Republic
- Socrates says it - Same thing couldn’t be doing the opposite things in the same part of itself in relation to the same thing at the same time - Soul of someone who is thirsty stretches out to get a drink - Hydrochlroic Acid example of another part of the human pulling back the hand |
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“'Then isn't it appropriate for the reasoning part to rule, since it's wise and has forethought on behalf of the whole soul, and for the spirited part to be obedient to it and allied with it?'”
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- Plato, The Republic
- Socrates says it - Comparing man to the city - three parts of the soul. By cataloging the various human desires, he identifies a rational part of the soul that lusts after truth, a spirited part of the soul that lusts after honor, and an appetitive part of the soul that lusts after everything else, including food, drink, sex, and especially money. These three parts of the soul correspond to the three classes in the just city. The appetite, or money-loving part, is the aspect of the soul most prominent among the producing class; the spirit or honor-loving part is most prominent among the auxiliaries; and reason, or the knowledge-loving part, is dominant in the guardian |
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“'And knowledge is presumably directed at what is, to discern the way what is is?'---'Yes.'---'And we claim opinion accepts a seeming?'---'Yes.'”
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- Plato, The Republic
- Socrates speaking to Glaucon the Yes man - No room for what is knowable and what is a matter of opinion to be the same - e divides all of existence up into three classes: what is completely, what is in no way, and what both is and is not. What is completely, he tells us, is completely knowable; what is in no way is the object of ignorance; what both is and is not is the object of opinion or belief |
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“'So this is exactly what every soul pursues, for the sake of which it does everything, having a sense that it's something, but at a loss and unable to get an adequate grasp of what it is […]'”
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- Plato, The Republic
- Socrates to Adeimantus - There exists bad pleasures so what is good can also be bad - People will choose what seems to be just and beautiful and even when they aren’t still do them - Nobody is content to seek what seems good people will choose things that ARE GOOD |
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“'Then claim as well that the things that are known not only get their being-known furnished by the good, but they're also endowed by that source with their very being and their being what they are, even though the good is not being, but something over and above being, beyond it in seniority and surpassing it in power'”
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- Plato, The Republic
- Socrates to Glaucon - Comes after the sun metaphor - Form of Good is responsible for all knowledge |
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“'And if he had to compete with those who'd always been imprisoned […], wouldn't he make a laughingstock of himself, and wouldn't it be said […] that it's not worth it even to make the effort to go up'”?
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- Plato, The Republic
- Socrates to Glaucon - Cave analogy - Talks about the return of the prisoner after he has seen the sun - Sun/Good is cause for all things - Education is supposed to drag men as far from the cave as possible |
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“'Then the other virtues said to belong to a soul probably tend to be near the things belonging to the body, since they're not present in the being of the soul before they've been inculcated by habits and practice; but the virtue involving understanding, more than all, attains to being something more divine, as it seems, which never loses its power, but by the way it’s turned becomes either useful and beneficial or useless and harmful'”
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- Plato, The Republic
- Socrates to Glaucon - Talks about learning how to use the seneses - Sight is present but the ability to know what you are seeing and where to look come with education |
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“Hence, even the fool is convinced that something exists in the understanding, at least, [namely, something] than which nothing greater can be conceived”
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- St. Anslem, The Ontological Argument
- Anselm - Things can exist in the understanding but not be understood - A painter before he paints – the painting is in his understanding but is not understood until he paints - Part of his proof for God - Cannot exist alone in understand – if it existed in understanding alone than something greater CAN be conceived – it’s existence in reality - Therefore it must also exist—GOD IS REAL - Subjective to saying that something in reality is greater |
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“For if it does not exist, any land which does exist will be more excellent than it”
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- St. Anslem, The Ontological Argument
- Guialano criticism - Lost island metaphor - Needs proof that with certainty the existence of the hypothetical island the excellence must be real and undebatable - Existence is still uncertain - Anslem replies that it a greater island is inconceivable because the island exists on an assured ground of truther |
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“For if it could be conceived to not exist, it could be conceived to have a beginning and an end. But this is impossible”
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- St. Anslem, The Ontological Argument
- Anslem rejoinment - If the person conceives that something greater does not exist he would be conceiving the inconceivable - Therefore nonexistence of God is inconceivable and God must exist - Someone who says the being does not exist either does not conceive anything at all or he conceives a being that which a greater is impossible |
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“[It] seems ridiculous, when we seek for knowledge of things which are manifest, to introduce other beings, which cannot be substances of the things with which we began, since they differ from them in being”
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- Intrduction to St. Thomas Aquinas
- Thomas Aquinas in Knowledge f bodies - (Plato) Soul does not understand the corporeal things but their sepearted species - (Plato) Exists a genus of beings known as species or ideas - Aqunias proves false for two reasons – species are immaterial therefore knowledge would be excluded from among the sciences - Second – is the quote given - Granted we have knowledge of species we cannot claim to form judgments concering these sensible things |
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“[If] a sense be wanting, the knowledge of what is apprehended through that sense is also wanting
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- Thomas Aquinas
- Whether the soul understands all things through innate species - Some knowledge before we acquire knowledge - Know like the angels who have knowledge of innate species - (Plato) ma’s intellect is naturally filled with all intelligle species but being united to the body is hindered from realizing this - Aquinas responds with 2 things – 1) if soul has natural knowledge it seems impossible for soul to forget the existence of such knowledge - How can something be naturally hindered by something it naturally does (being attached to the body) - No man forgets what he knows naturally – whole is larger than the part - Quote relates to the blind person being born how he can have NO knowledge of colors which is the contrary if the soul has innate knowledge |
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"Therefore the nature of a stone or any material thing cannot be known completely and truly, except in as much as it is known as existing in the individual”
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- Thomas Aquinas
- Whether the soul can understand actually through the intelligible species of which it is possessed, without turning to the phantasms? - When we want someone to understand something we give examples so he can derive phantasms - Power of knowledge is proportioned to the thing known - IT BELONGS TO THE NATURE OF A STONE TO BE FOUND IN AN INDIVIDUAL STONE - Intellect to understand actually it must use examples to see the universal nature in every individual - Opposite of Plato who contests that the natures are apart from the individual |
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“Therefore for us to understand actually, the fact that the [intelligible] species are preserved does not suffice; we need further to make use of them in a manner befitting the things of which they are the species, which things are natures existing in individuals”
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- Thomas Aquinas
- Whether the soul can understand actually through the intelligible species of which it is possessed, without turning to the phantasms? - Species preserved in the possible intellect exist there when it does not understand them actually - See above - And therefore it is proper to know a form existing individually in corporeal matter but not as existing in the individual matter (next quote) |
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And therefore it is proper to know a form existing in corporeal matter [hint: in a Phantasm], but not as existing in this corporeal matter [hint: in this Sensible Form]”
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- Thomas Aquinas
- Whether our intellect understands corporeal and material things by abstraion from phantasms - Intellect understands material things by abstracting from phantasms - Through material things we acquire some knowledge of immaterial things - Abstracting the universal from the particular - Apple is not essential for color |
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“Therefore, the intelligible species is not what is actually understood, but that by which the intellect understands”
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- Thomas Aqunias
- Whether the intelligible species abstracted from phantasms are related to our intellect as that which is understood - Intelligible species is to the intellect what the sensible species is to the sense - Senesible species is NOT what is perceived but rather that by which the sense perceives - What is actually understood must be in something or else it would be nothing - Intellect only understands which it has received—AQUINAS SAYS FALSE - Reasons false – 1) things we understand are also objects of science therefore science would only be concerned with things already known by the soul - 2) it would lead to proving “if it seems, it is true” which is obviously false |
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“Thus the intelligible species is secondarily that which is understood; but that which is primarily understood is the thing, of which the species is the likeness” (
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- Thomas Aquinas
- Whether the intelligible species abstracted from phantasms are related to our intellect as that which is understood - Form which proceeds an act tending to something external is in the likeness of an object of the action so does which proceeds an action remainin in the agent is a likelness of the object - Ex) sight sees is the likeness of the visible thing - Heat in the heater is a likeness of the thing heated - Since intellect reflects upon itself – it understands both its own act of understand and the species by which it understands - Like is known by like - Aristotle – “a stone is not I the soul, but only the likeness of the stone” |
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“Now, because we do not know the essence of God, the proposition is not self evident to us, but needs to be demonstrated by things that are more known to us, though less known in their nature—namely, by His effects”
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- Aquinas
- Whether Existence of God is self evident - Something self evident can be self evident in 2 ways: to itself, and to itself and us - It is self evident when the predicate is included in the essence of the subject (Man is an animal) - Some cases where the essence of the predicate and the subject is unknown the proposition will be self evident in itself but not those who do not know the meaning of the predicate and subject of the proposition - “God exists” is self evident to itself but not to us because of the unknown - Reply Obj. 1 states that man naturally desires happiness AND what is naturally desired by man is naturally known by him - To know someone is approaching is not the same to see that it is Peter that is approaching even if it is Peter that is approaching |
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“When an effect is better known to us than its cause, from the effect we proceed to knowledge of the cause”
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- Aquinas
- Whether it can be demonstrated that God Exists - Demonstration can be made in two ways propter quid (through cause) and quia (through effect) - Every effect depends upon a cause - If effect exists – cause must preexist - Existence of God can be proven by seeing his effects and knowing that His effects exist |
