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26 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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Utilitarianism (esp. as applicable to these 2units) |
- always maximize the good for the greatest number of people - no action is in principle always forbidden • Animal rights: Singer:moral patients are beings that can feel pain. Moral patients need to beaddressed with moral concern. Sentians – whether a being can feel pain • Abortion: Thomson:greatest good for greatest number of people. Utilitarian shuffle. |
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Deontology (esp. as applicable to these 2 units) |
- right (justice) comes before the good - duty : imperfect and perfect - **rights · Animal rights: Regan:moral patient is a being that are the subject of a life. To say a being is amoral patient doesn’t mean that patient has rights. · Abortion: Warren: Argument:· Only persons have a right to life Fetusesare not persons Therefore,fetuses don’t have a right to life Abortionis morally permissible · Infants don’t have a right to life so theninfanticide is morally · Warren’s case rests on the idea that the infantsare not a direct threat to the mother health · If a person like being poses a threat to thelife of an actual person that person can end the life of the person like being · There has to be a good reason · Warren argues that if the fetus poses a directthreat to the life of the mother than abortion is morally permissible · If the fetus doesn’t pose a threat to themothers health, abortion is not morally permissible. |
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Natural Law Theory (esp. as applicable to these 2units) |
- there are some actions that are intrinsically wrong - grounded in objective features of our human nature - principles in natural law is fixed · Animal rights: Tardiff.What kind of thing a being is. You should treat things according to the kind ofnatures that they have. · Abortion: Pruss– has to do with rights. Potential for fetus to become human. |
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Proportionality arguments |
· it’s only permissible to kill animals for foodwith we have a proportionally serious reason for doing so. |
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Capacities accounts |
· The diff between plants and animals is notdegree but rather a difference in kind. The capacities of plants and animalsare so different that they are just a different kind of thing. The same goesbetween humans and animals · Regan and singer believe animals and humans arenot a different kind but of a different degree. |
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Ontology/nature accounts |
· Tardiff. What kind of thing a being is. You shouldtreat things according to the kind of natures that they have. |
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Moral Agents |
· Beings that can make choices of moralsignificance |
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Moral Patients |
Singer: moral patients are beings thatcan feel pain Regan:moral patient is a being that are the subject of a life |
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Arguments for personhood |
· Pruss: personhood is an essential property. Atany point you exist, you are a person. |
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Right to life |
· Warren – only persons have right to life · Thomson – right to life doesn’t mean right to body · Pruss – if have right to life when 40, then havesame right when a fetus |
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Right to use of bodies |
· Thomson” the right of bodily integrity outweighsthe right for someon to use your body |
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Doctrine of double effect |
· Can be drawn out of his teachings (Aquinas)· Where it comes from: · It’s wrong to do something that’s intrinsicallyevil for the sake of another consequence · It’s okay sometimes to perform an action thatwill have bad consequences if you do it for the sake of good consequences · Definition: · Where some act A that an agent can perform hasat least two effects, a good one and a bad one, it is morally permissible toperform A if and only if · (a) the bad effect is not intended as the goalof the act · (b) the act is not bad in itself (independent ofcausing a bad effect) · (c) the bad effect is not intended as the meansto the good effect · (d) the agent has a proportionately seriousmoral reason for performing the act · Where some act A that an agent can perform has 2effects, a good and a bad, is morally permissible to perform A if and only ifA.) the bad effect is not intended as the goal of the act B.) the act is notbad in itself C.) the bad effect is not intended as the means to the goodeffect D.) the agent has proportionately serious moral reason to perform in theact |
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Infanticide |
· Not permissible because infants are valuable toother people, don’t cause harm to mother, highly personlike. |
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Personal Identity (ontological) |
· Organism formed unique from mother or father. Geneticallydistinct. Individual organism: “bob” vs. alex. Something that existed at time Aand not at time B, without having ceased to exist in between is beyond reach ofargument. “if an organism that once existed has never died, then it stillexists” |
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(1) The difference between animal rights and animalwelfare views |
· Animal welfare: should be treated better, butdon’t have the same rights as humans. Welfarists say it’s wrong in practice andnot necessarily principle. * should have bigger cages · Animal rights: animals have moral rights. Alsohave trump cards (Regan). Use of nonhuman animals and scientific research iswrong in principle not simply occasionally wrong in practice. * animals shouldn’thave cages at all |
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(2) The answers each of the authors we’ve read inthese 2 units give to this question: Whatmakes a being an object of moral concern? |
· Singer: beings that can feel pain · Regan: beings that are the subject of a life · Tardiff: should treat things according to thekinds of natures that they have. · Warren: 5 criteria: consciousness, reasoning,self-motivated activity, capacity to communicate, presence of self-concepts orself-awareness)· Thomson: capacities view. Neautral. Never commitsone way or another. · Pruss: if an organism never died, then it stillexists |
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(3) Be able to give Singer, Regan, Tardiff, andWarren’s arguments or reasons for answering (2) in the ways that they do. |
Singer: · If moral equality depends on equality ofabilities · Those with lesser abilities have lesser moralstanding · If those with lesser abilities have lesser moralstanding · Then people with down syndrome have lesserstanding · It is false that people with down syndrome havelesser standing · Therefore, it is false that it is false thatthose with lesser abilities have lesser moral standing Regan: · The right of bodily integrity disallowsphysically assaulting someones body simply on the grounds that someone willbenefit from the result can’t be the possession of rationality. Must lower thebar to include animals as moral patients, so they have rights too. Tardiff: · It is only morally permissible to kill animalsfor food if we have a proportionally serious reason for doing so. · We have a proportionally serious reason forkilling animals for food only if there isn’t a better way of achieving our ends · There is a better way · Therefore, we don’t have a morally proportionatereason so it’s not morally permissible Warren: · Only persons have a right to life · Fetuses are not persons · Therefore fetuses don’t have a right to life · Abortion is morally permissible. |
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(4) Singers’ charge of speciesism, and theanalogy he employs to illustrate it. |
· A prejudice that favors one’s own species overevery other. · Using an infant human being in replacement foranimal testing. Would the experiment be willing to use an orphan human infantin order so save many lives? If experimenter isn’t prepared to use an orphanthen his readiness to use nonhumans is simply discrimination. Adult mammals arenot only aware of what is happening to them, they are more self directing andas far as we can tell, and are at least as sensible to pain than a human infant · (801-802, 809) the suffering we inflict onanimals while they’re alive is perhaps a clearer indication of our speciesismanimals are treated like machines and any innovation that results in a higherconversion ratio is viable to be adopted. Our practice of rearing and killingother animals in order to eat them is a clear instance of the sacrifice of themost important interest of other beings in order to satisfy trivial interestsof our own. To avoid speciesism we must stop this practice, and each of us hasa moral obligation to do so. |
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(5) Regan’s understanding of what rights are, andwhy humans and animals have them. |
· What does it mean for a person or being to havea right? Regan says it’s what we are prohibited toward toing to other beings,for example, bodily integrity. Rights are the trump cards that trump over allothers. despite consequences one side being more prevalent if it disrespectsones rights, a trump card can be played. Example of baseball players allneeding micky mantle’s organs. World would be a better place with 3 healthybaseball players. |
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(6) Tardiff’s argument for vegetarianism (plus,what is he borrowing from Aquinas). |
· The best way for achieving our ends is one thatprovides sufficient nutrition and causes the least harm · Both vegetarianism and omnivorism providessufficient nutrition · Vegetarianism only causes harm to plants · Omnivorism causes harm to both plants andanimals · Animals are more valuable than plants · Borrowing the ontology view and double effect,what kind of thing a being is. · The idea that animals are higher in thehierarchy of things than plants. |
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(7) The relevance of the doctrine of double effectto the issues we have been discussing. (natural law) |
· Can be drawn out of Aquinas’ teachings · Where it comes from: · It’s wrong to do something that’s intrinsicallyevil for the sake of another consequence · It’s okay sometimes to perform an action thatwill have bad consequences if you do it for the sake of good consequences · Definition: · Where some act A that an agent can perform hasat least two effects, a good one and a bad one, it is morally permissible toperform A if and only if · (a) the bad effect is not intended as the goalof the act · (b) the act is not bad in itself (independent ofcausing a bad effect) · (c) the bad effect is not intended as the meansto the good effect · (d) the agent has a proportionately seriousmoral reason for performing the act |
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(8) Warren’s argument for the permissibility ofabortion. |
· Only persons have a right to life · Fetuses are not persons · Therefore fetuses don’t have a right to life · Abortion is morally permissible |
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(9) Warren’s arguments against Infanticide. |
· Only persons have a right to life · Infants are not persons · Therefore infants don’t have a right to life · Infanticide is morally permissible · Infanticide is wrong because: - Infantsare valuable to other person - Infantsare not a direct threat to mothers life(only one that applies to both fetus andinfant properly. Saying all fetuses are direct threats to the mother, but infantsare not) - Infantsare highly personlike |
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(10) Jarvis Thompson and the Violinist thoughtexperiment. (711) |
· Conclusion: Having a right to life does notentail having a right to use someone’s body. Waking up to find that you havebeen surgically attached to a famous violinist so that he can live. Somepregnancies are not wanted by the mother. So she doesn’t have to give up theuse of her body. |
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(11) Pruss’ argument against abortion |
· (1) I was once a fetus · (2) If I was once a fetus, then it would be justas wrong to kill me then as it would be to kill me now · (3) If it was wrong to kill me when I was afetus, then it would be wrong to kill anyone when he or she is a fetus. · (Go into details about premises and argumentsfor them, choose one you really like) |
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(12) The role of questions of personhood inarguments about abortion. What moral theory do you think is most compelling? |
· by putting value to personhood you differentiatebetween what is and what is not a person. Putting boundaries on what’s morallypermissible to do that that specific subject given the circumstance. |
