Apparent Authority Case Study

Given the circumstances, it was unreasonable, for the detectives to believe that Johnson had the apparent authority to lawfully consent as a third party to the detective’s warrantless search. A third party has the apparent authority to consent to a warrantless search if the circumstances leads a detective to reasonably, albeit mistakenly, believe that the third party “has actual authority over the place or thing to be searched.” Hubert, 312 S.W.3d at 561. The state has the burden of proving that the third party had apparent authority. Id. at 561. Further, an objective standard is employed to determine whether the third party had apparent authority. Limon v. State, 340 S.W.3d 753, 756 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). More specifically, the court asks if “the facts available to the officer at the moment warrant[s] a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the consenting party had authority over the premises.” Id.
The apparent authority doctrine was implemented as a tool of sorts for law enforcement officers, lessening stringent burdens and barriers to their ability to do their job. Riordan v. State, 905 S.W.2d 765, 771 (Tex. App.—Austin 1995, no pet.). However, apparent authority cannot exist when the circumstances are ambiguous. Id.. In ambiguous situations, an officer must inquire further with the third …show more content…
Like Riordan, Johnson represented herself to the detectives as a neighbor of the homeowner. See 905 S.W.2d at 768; (C.R. 10-11, Order ¶ 10). Additionally, as in Riordan and Corral, Johnson informed the detective’s that Archer only authorized her to use his home for limited purposes. See Corral, 339 F. Supp.2d at 795-96; Riordan, 905 S.W.2d at 772; (C.R. 11, Order ¶ 10). Also, like Corral, Johnson did not have any knowledge of when the homeowner, Archer, would return. See 339 F. Supp.2d at 796; (C.R. 11, Order ¶