Due to the agent’s state of bereavement, they would desire to donate a sum of money towards a charity organization that battles cancer. Insofar the agent desires to end the suffering and death that is caused by cancer. However, MacAskill refutes this idea, and proposes that the agent ought to use their grief toward ending suffering on a grand scale, regardless of dilemma caused it. this is because we ought to be focused on ending an avoidable premature death, and/or suffering. He our reason for donating to a certain charity is because we are swayed by our emotions to donate towards a specific charity due to a personal experience/hardship. As MacAskill quotes, “it seems arbitrary to raise money for one specific cause of death rather than any other. If that family member had died of a different illness, it would have been no less tragic” (42). Significantly, the emotional response should not be the leading motivation for out attempt to try and make the world a better place. This is because we wouldn't be as effective in doing so, rather we ought to aim at being efficient with the resources we wish to donate since we ought to desire at relieving suffering and avoidable deaths. In effect, the ought to be set on creating greatest effects with the limited resources they have (every dollar that can potentially benefit someone). Therefore, MacAskill argues it is wrong to donate valuable …show more content…
An example to demonstrate this, is that there are two groups of people we can help with the resources at hand. There is group A, whom we are partial toward. Then there is group B. However, group B is a larger group of individuals. MacAskill would assert we ought to give the resources towards the larger group of individuals since it will generate a larger surplus of QALY’s. Yet in doing so would require that we disregard the partial attraction to group A. MacAskill would further argue that it is necessary we are impartial to the situation, and hold everyone in equal value. In effect, in trying to be an effective altruist, it requires we repress subjective values are irrelevant to the situation that will relieve suffering. In effect, in becoming an effective altruist, our subjective values must be considered irrelevant to situations that aim to effectively and efficiently relieve suffering. If we were to act on behalf of our values and help group A, we have done the wrong action and let many suffer or potentially die. This is because we chose to do the lesser good, which would be morally impermissible. This is because we would be privileging a certain group of individuals, which would mean we are treating group B unfairly. Since there is an irrelevant factor of experience that weighs on the agent’s decision of who