Unit A July 09

Front 1

An organisation is proposing to move from a health and safety management system based on the Health and Safety Executive’s HSG65 model to one that aligns itself with BS OHSAS 18001. Outline the possible advantages and disadvantages of such a change

Back 1

Those candidates who structured their answers in two parts, advantages and disadvantages, did best. As advantages, they realised that a move to OHSAS 18001 would facilitate easier integration with BS EN ISO 14001 and ISO 9001:2000 to produce an integrated management system and outlined further advantages such as publicity value; improved customer perception; international recognition; a clearer standard for benchmarking and commitment to continual improvement. Marks were also available for recognising that external registration and independent external assessment would be available and that a more prescriptive system is easier to assess.
Examples of possible disadvantages could have included the fact that HSG65, unlike OHSAS 18001, is the system recognised and used by the enforcement authorities in the UK and they are likely to audit an organisation against this standard, as much of the published guidance in the UK refers directly to HSG65 and not OHSAS 18001. Other marks were available for referring to the direct on-costs of changing a system; how time consuming the model can be; the cost of external registration; the likelihood of increased paper work to satisfy assessors and the fact that the model may be too sophisticated for small to medium sized enterprises. Additionally, since the 18001 system is often used alongside the other ISO standards of 9001 and 14001, there is a possibility that those auditing it may not be health and safety specialists.

Front 2

For a range of internal and external information sources outline how each source contributes to hazard identification or risk assessment.

Back 2

Internal Sources - Accident reports; Sickness absence records; Maintenance records; Monitoring results = Noise Dust Lighting Atmospheric, etc; Job descriptions; Staff turnover; Training records. External Sources - HSE (Health and Safety Executive); Insurance companies; World Health Organisation; Legislation including: EU Directives UK Acts and Regulations; Trade associations; Approved Codes of Practice HSE Guidance Notes

Front 3

(a) Outline the specific requirements for emergency planning and procedures in the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999.

Back 3

Under the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations an employer is required to have appropriate procedures in place which are to be followed in the event of serious and imminent danger to employees. The objective of the procedures should be to enable employees, in the event of an emergency, to stop work and proceed to a place of safety, without further guidance or instruction where necessary and to prevent re-entry to the areas where the danger still exists. Information on the emergency procedures must be provided to the employees and a sufficient number of persons must be nominated to implement the procedures so far as they relate to evacuation from the premises. The nominated persons should have received sufficient experience and training to enable them to carry out the evacuation procedures properly. Finally, the employer should arrange the necessary contacts with external emergency services particularly with respect to first aid, emergency medical care and rescue work. This part of the question was poorly answered with few candidates showing a working knowledge of the specific requirements in the Regulations. There were many who had not read the question with sufficient care and described the requirements of the COMAH Regulations rather than those of MHSWR as required.

Front 4

(b) As part of the on-site emergency planning process a large manufacturing site intends to provide information to the external emergency services.
Outline the types of information that the site should consider providing to the ambulance service.

Back 4

outline types of information such as the location of the site and its various access points; details of the main hazards on site such as fire, explosion or toxic release; details of any hazardous chemicals used and stored; the number of personnel on site both in daytime and at night; plans showing the layout of the site; the location of any emergency control centre; the identity and contact details of key personnel; details of any specific medical conditions of employees and particularly information relating to those known to be vulnerable; and any other information necessary to enable the ambulance service to carry out a risk assessment for its own personnel. Answers to this part of the question were to a better standard with most able to refer to a range of information though a few did provide lists rather than the detail required for an outline and as such were unable to be awarded the full range of marks which were available.

Front 5

(a) Outline the main defences available to a defendant who, in a civil case, is being sued in an action for common law negligence.

Back 5

No duty was owed by defendant to claimant; no breach of duty (forseeablity/reasonableness); breach did not lead to damage; remoteness of damage; volenti non fit injuria; contributory negligence

Front 6

(b) Outline the factors which will be considered when determining the level of damages paid to a successful claimant.

Back 6

Degree of disability; loss of earnings prior to trial; loss of future income and/or opportunities; degree of pain and suffering involved; medical costs & expenses; cost of special adaptations; cost of care; and the loss of amenity; contributory negligence might result in a reduction of damages awarded if proved

Front 7

Outline the issues that should be considered when planning a health and safety inspection programme. (10)
Information on the specific workplace conditions or behaviours that might be covered in an inspection is not required.

Back 7

Candidates who structured their responses around the four key words of who, what, where and when did best. This led them to outline factors such as the composition and competence of the inspection team; the specific areas of the workplace to be inspected; the frequency and timings of the inspections which may have to be more frequent in higher risk areas with a decision being made as to whether the inspections would take place at peak working times or during slow periods; the method of carrying out the inspections and whether check lists should be prepared and if so by whom; the possible need to provide personal protective equipment for the inspection team; the involvement of the workforce with consultation on the proposed programme; the need to obtain senior management support and commitment for the inspection programme; consulting previous inspection reports and researching applicable legislation and standards; and deciding on procedures to be followed after the inspection to ensure appropriate remedial action is taken.

Front 8

(a) Outline the legal criteria that must be satisfied to obtain a conviction under the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007.

Back 8

Individual acting at ‘controlling mind’ level within an organisation = identified; large organisations with diffuse management structures = difficult; cumulative management failings insufficient to meet specified legal criteria. P&O European Ferries (Dover) Ltd 1991 – Herald of Free Enterprise (6 March 1987). Corporate killing - identification of management arrangements falling far below those that should be reasonably expected and which resulted in death. R V Jackson Transport (Ossett) 1996

Front 9

(b) Identify the bodies responsible for investigating and prosecuting offences under the Act. (2)
(c) Outline the penalties that may be imposed following conviction.

Back 9

England and Wales = prosecuted by the Crown Prosecution Service; Northern Ireland = Public Prosecution Service; Scotland = Procurator Fiscal. If found guilty of an offence under the Act = liable to an unlimited fine; courts may require the organisation to take steps to address the failures which caused the fatal injury and will shortly also have the power to impose a publicity order requiring the organisation to publicise details of the conviction and finean organisation found guilty of an offence under the Act will be liable to an unlimited fine. Additionally, courts may require the organisation to take steps to address the failures which caused the fatal injury and will shortly also have the power to impose a publicity order requiring the organisation to publicise details of the conviction and fine.

Front 10

(a) The results of accident ratio studies are often depicted as a triangle.
(i) Explain how raw data is treated to convert it into the type of results which are normally shown in an accident ratio study. (3) (ii) Explain why the outcomes are often depicted as a triangle. (2) (iii) Explain the reasons why, in practice, the ratios of accident outcomes in an organisation always follow a similar pattern. (4) (iv) Explain the implications of accident ratio studies for accident and incident investigation arrangements and resourcing.

Back 10

explained that raw data is classified by the severity of the outcome such as for example, major injury, minor injury, property damage and near misses. The numerical ratios of the severity outcomes are calculated to give “1” as the outcome of highest severity.
A triangle is used to represent the relative increase in numbers with lower severity outcomes.
There are a number of reasons why the ratios of outcomes in an organisation follow a similar pattern. Whilst many, but not all, low severity incidents have the potential to cause higher severity injuries, the probabilities dictate that most incidents do not result in a high severity outcome. The actual outcome for any one incident is dictated in part, by local circumstances and in part by the incident itself. In addition to the ‘probability’ factor, there is a tendency to invest more resources to prevent those incidents which are perceived as having a high severity outcome.
The implications of accident ratio studies for accident and incident investigation arrangements and resourcing are that all accidents and incidents should be investigated and the resources applied should be based on the potential loss rather than the actual loss. It is important to investigate near misses, property damage and minor injuries which are often overlooked because of a lack of serious outcome since near misses often have identical root causes to serious incidents and can reveal management system failures before serious incidents occur.

Front 11

(b) A business has undertaken a study of the different types of accidents and incidents reported in a 12 month period. The results are shown below as raw numbers. (refer to data). Outline the conclusions that might be drawn from this data when compared with the results of published accident ratio studies.

Back 11

the ratio between major and lost time accidents seems credible and could be an indication of reasonable reporting rates for both type of accident. The ratio between lost time accidents and first aid cases is too low and there is a likelihood that first aid cases are being under-reported. Property damage incidents also look to be under reported. While there seem to be more near miss reports, the ratio is in fact lower than in other published studies and they are probably substantially under reported.

Front 12

(a) An organisation has decided to introduce a permit-to-work system for maintenance and engineering work at a manufacturing plant which operates continuously over three shifts.
Outline the key issues that will need to be addressed in introducing and maintaining an effective permit-to-work system in these circumstances.

Back 12

Clear definition of the jobs &areas where permits will be required; consideration of the operation of the system where contractors are involved; develop PTW procedure that defines how the system will operate; permit format and multi-copy documentation system should encompass issues such as job description, hazard identification, specification of risk control measures, time limits and authorising, receiving and cancellation signatures and the allocation of a unique reference number; arrangements for the return of permits and record keeping; arrangements for the display of multiple live permits; arrangements for communication between shifts; identify training needs for, and the delivery of training to, persons authorising or receiving permits and those working in areas where permits may be required; provision of supporting arrangements and equipment for safe working such as lock-off, isolation or gas testing facilities; and arrangements for routine monitoring and auditing the effectiveness of the system.

Front 13

(b) A year after the introduction of the permit-to-work system an audit of permit-to-work records shows that many permits-to-work have not been completed correctly or have not been signed back.
Outline possible reasons why the permit-to-work system is not being properly adhered to.

Back 13

Permit issuers and receivers are not competent = training, experience and qualifications; lack of routine monitoring or auditing of the system; poor level of supervision; perception = production seen as having the greater importance; and violations have become routine; permit system seems too complex & difficult to understand; potential hazards of maintenance and engineering work are not fully identified; or understood and the required controls are not fully understood by the permit issuer; difficulties that arise in organising controls before the start of the work to be carried out; lack of effective communication between shifts; person responsible for issuing permits is not always available.

Front 14

A large warehousing and distribution facility uses contractors for many of its maintenance activities. Contractors make up approximately 5% of the total workforce but an analysis of the accident statistics for the previous two years has shown that accidents to contractor personnel, or arising from work undertaken by contractors, account for 20% of the lost-time accidents on site.
(a) Assuming that the accident statistics are correctly recorded, outline possible reasons for the disproportionate number of accidents involving contract work.

Back 14

for instance, maintenance work might be more complex, higher risk, harder to control satisfactorily and with fewer well-established work methods than other warehousing and distribution activities; a lack of established procedures and training for the management of third parties including inadequate contractor selection and the provision of information from the client to contract employees; poor planning and risk assessment and poor communication and coordination between the parties affected by the contract work; inadequate supervision of contractor employees either by the client or by the contractor; staff turnover and a lack of contract worker competence and the effect of contractual or financial pressures on the contractor.

Front 15

(b) Describe the key organisational and procedural measures that should be in place to provide effective control of the risks from contract work.

Back 15

the selection of a competent contractor by obtaining evidence of past performance, safety management arrangements, the adequacy of resources and risk control proposals; the provision of adequate information to the contractor prior to the work starting on the nature of the work to be carried out and the known hazards and site safety rules with an induction briefing to be given to all contract personnel before admittance to site; the preparation of job specific risk assessments and method statements and arrangements for their co-ordination and review; the appointment of a client representative with contractor management responsibility; arrangements for on-going communication; for active and reactive monitoring of performance and for job completion and hand over including a safety performance review.

Front 16

A train driver has passed a stop signal resulting in a collision with another train. Investigation of the incident concluded that the driver had seen the signal gantry but had not perceived the relevant signal correctly. There had been a number of previous similar incidents at this signal gantry, although the driver was not aware of this.
The driver concerned was inexperienced and had received no local route training or information. The signal was hard to see being partly obscured by a bridge on approach and affected by strong sunlight. In addition, the arrangement of the lights on the signal was a non-typical formation. The driver had approached the signal with no expectation from previous signals that it would be on ‘stop’.
(a) With reference to a relevant model of perception, give practical reasons why the driver may not have perceived the signal correctly.

Back 16

on a relevant model of perception such as Hale and Hale where perception may be affected by sensory input and expectation. This should have led them to give practical reasons for his error such as the colour of the signal being mistaken either because it was affected by strong sunlight or the driver’s colour vision was defective; the signal itself could have been defective; the driver may have read the wrong signal because of its unusual formation; the signal was visible for a short time only and its perception would have needed the full attention of the driver; the driver’s expectation from previous signal positions may have influenced his perception; and finally his perception may have been dulled by the effects of alcohol, drugs or fatigue.

Front 17

(b) Outline the steps that could be taken to reduce the likelihood of a recurrence of this incident.

Back 17

to re-design and re-locate the signal and replace unusual signal formations, consulting with drivers during this process. Longer term actions would centre on driver recruitment and selection processes involving pre-employment screening for example for vision and physical capability and the provision of training to include local route information, unusual signal formations, information on signals which have been passed at danger on previous occasions with an assessment being made of the driver’s competence before he is allowed to become operational. Other measures would include ongoing supervision and competence assessment together with a programme of health surveillance; the avoidance of driver fatigue by the provision of breaks and the organisation of shift work; the introduction of an alcohol and substance policy; modifying the design of cab glazing to minimise the effect of glare or reflections; the use of automatic train protection or warning systems and the introduction of procedures to encourage the reporting of similar incidents and to ensure prompt action is taken by management following the receipt of such a report.

Front 18

A factory site includes a two-storey warehouse used for storing packaging materials and redundant equipment including some damaged wooden racking. The building is falling into a state of disrepair and there is a large hole in the floorboards on the upper floor. Signs with “Danger – no entry” have been placed on the ground floor, adjacent to two staircases, and the electricity supply to the building has been disconnected. The security company, supervising the site by means of regular visits, has reported signs of unlawful entry into the warehouse and it appears that some of the racking has been removed.
Outline the possible breaches of civil statute law AND criminal statute law that this situation may present AND, in EACH case, explain the relevant duty AND identify the duty holder

Back 18

The most relevant civil statute law relating to the scenario is contained in the Occupiers’ Liability Acts of 1957 and 1984 or the Occupiers Liability (Scotland) Act 1960. Under the 1957 Act, the occupier of premises owes a duty to ensure the safety of lawful visitors to the premises in respect of dangers arising from the state of the premises or things done or omitted to be done in them. The security staff would be considered lawful visitors and the erection of signs might not be considered a sufficient precautionary measure given the state of the building.
Under the 1984 Act the occupier owes a similar duty to persons other than lawful visitors. To be in breach of this duty, the occupier should know of the risk and have reasonable grounds to believe that persons may be placed at risk and the risks are those against which the occupier may reasonably be expected to offer some protection. In this case the employer has been advised of unlawful entry into the building and, apart from erecting notices has done little else to meet obligations under the Act.
Under criminal law, candidates should have considered legislation which imposes a duty on the owner of the premises and the respective employers in respect of the safety of the security company employees, any of the factory’s own employees who may enter the warehouse and any potential trespassers such as children. Relevant legislation that could have been explored in the context of the scenario would have included sections 2-4 of the Health and Safety at Work Act; duties in the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations relating to risk assessments, health and safety arrangements and arrangements for employers sharing worksites or employees working in host employer’s undertakings; and duties under the Workplace (Health, Safety and Welfare) Regulations relating to maintenance of the workplace, lighting, the condition of floors and the prevention of falls.