Unit A July 08

Front 1

Explain with reference to case law, the meaning of the terms ‘practicable’ and ‘reasonably practicable’ as they apply to health and safety legislation.

Back 1

Where technology or knowledge exists must be implemented; Not as high a duty as Absolute but higher duty than reasonably practicable; Cost of precautions is not a factor; Cases - Adsett vs K & L steel founders (technology not known, silica dust). Balance of cost vs risk; One factor must be grossly disproportionate to the other; Decision is reached to implement precaution or not after balancing; Duty not as strict as Absolute or practicable; Cases - Edwards vs National coal board (shoring up of roadway) NCB found liable as risk and consequences was greater than cost

Front 2

(a) Explain the difference between accident incidence rate and accident frequency rate. (2)
(b) A site is divided into a small number of large departments and the number of employees in each department is variable. You have been asked to collate details of first-aid treatment cases for the site and to present on a monthly basis, data in graphical and / or numerical format, in a way that would be helpful to site and departmental management.
Describe how you could present this data indicating clearly the types of graphical presentation you would use AND in EACH case the data it would contain.

Back 2

explaining that an accident incident rate is calculated by dividing the number of accidents occurring over a period of time by the average number of persons employed during the period with the result being multiplied by a common multiplier such as 10 000. An accident frequency rate on the other hand is calculated by dividing the number of accidents occurring during a period by the total hours worked during the period and multiplying the result by a common multiplier such as 1,000,000.
collate details firstly for the site as a whole and then for each separate department. One option would be to produce a line graph to show the total number of treatment cases each month and then indicate the trend by the use of a trend line or moving average. Using a frequency or incident rate would enable changes in employee numbers to be taken into account. A line graph could also be used to show any trend in specific causes or types of injury whilst a chart or histogram could highlight the number by site or department. Another option would be to use pie charts, bar charts or histograms to present information both for the whole site and individual departments on the cause of the injuries requiring treatment and for the site of the injuries by body part. Credit was given for other relevant analyses and presentations provided that the format was described or sketched and labelled.

Front 3

Describe the possible strengths and weaknesses of the role of the union-appointed safety representative in improving workplace health and safety standards and culture for the employees that they represent.

Back 3

The possible strengths of the role of the union-appointed safety representative in improving the standards of health and safety at the workplace would include ensuring that employee concerns which might otherwise remain unknown, are brought to the attention of management (and if necessary to an inspector from the enforcing authority), and applying pressure to ensure that the promised action on improving working conditions was taken; ensuring employee involvement in and commitment to good health and safety practices; encouraging and supporting active monitoring by exercising entitlement to carry out inspections of the workplace and ensuring employee input during the investigation of accidents and incidents; acting as a champion for health and safety and so promoting awareness and interest and encouraging the employer to set up a formal health and safety committee which will promote further consultation with the employees.
On the other hand, the appointment of a safety representative could have its weaknesses in that it could result in less direct engagement and consultation by management with the workforce on health and safety issues. The investigative role could lead to a focusing on compensation claims rather than on the introduction of control measures to prevent a recurrence and there is a danger that health and safety issues might be mixed up and confused with other employment relations issues. A representative who has not received appropriate training may fail to establish correct priorities and cause resources to be wasted while one who is ineffective or unmotivated may undermine the existing safety culture of the organisation by failing to represent the views and opinions of employees.

Front 4

A poor organisational safety culture is said to lead to higher levels of violation by employees.
(a) Explain the meaning of the term ‘violation’ and the classification of violation as ‘routine’, ‘situational’ or ‘exceptional’.

Back 4

a “violation” is a deliberate deviation from a rule, procedure, instruction or regulation. A routine violation involves continually breaking a rule or procedure to the extent that it becomes the normal way of working. This can be due to the belief that the rule no longer applies or because there is a desire to cut corners to save time. In the case of a situational violation, rules are broken due to pressures from the job such as insufficient staff for the workload, time pressures, adverse conditions or because the right equipment for the job is not available. Exceptional violations are rare and only happen when things have gone wrong and a risk is taken to solve an urgent problem or is believed to be the lesser of two evils. Many candidates provided good answers to the first part of the question though a few discussed errors rather than violations.

Front 5

(b) Outline the reasons why a poor safety culture might lead to higher levels of violation by employees.

Back 5

many offering no reasons other than production is more important than the “rules”. There were few who identified the salient point that a good or poor safety culture in an organisation is based on the common beliefs and perceptions of the staff. Good answers would have outlined that a lack of a shared perception about the importance of safety could lead to individual employees violating a rule or procedure because they are driven by their own perception of what is really important or they may be influenced by peer pressure. This negative perception that rules are not important and that production is more important – both prime factors of a poor safety culture – could lead to higher levels of violation.

Front 6

Regulation 7 of the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 requires that employers appoint persons to assist them in complying with their legal health and safety obligations.
(a) Outline the main requirements of this regulation.

Back 6

Regulation 7, most candidates outlined competence as a key requirement and then went on to refer to the appointment of one or more persons and arrangements for cooperation if two or more are appointed; the number of appointees and the time available to them in consideration of the size, risk and risk distribution in the organisation; the information on health and safety issues provided to external appointees though there would be a preference for internal appointments; the information available on temporary workers and the exemptions for partnerships where one partner is held to be sufficiently competent.

Front 7

(b) Outline the key areas of strategic involvement of the health and safety professional with respect to developing and maintaining an employers’ health and safety management system.

Back 7

formulating and developing elements of the health and safety management system such as risk assessments, safe systems of work and monitoring arrangements; developing and agreeing plans for improvement including short and long term targets; involvement in reactive monitoring such as the reporting and investigation of accidents; involvement in active monitoring such as carrying out inspections and audits; developing and agreeing a safety policy statement; developing and agreeing plans to improve the safety culture; organising and participating in review arrangements; managing relationships with enforcing bodies; advising senior management on strategic safety issues and developing and agreeing communication and consultative arrangements for health and safety with the workforce. Many candidates ignored the reference to “strategic involvement” and dealt only with general operational tasks which the appointed person might carry out.

Front 8

(a) With reference to relevant case law, explain the meaning of ‘vicarious liability’ in civil law ANDdescribe the circumstances in which an employer will have vicarious liability for the acts of employees.

Back 8

Vicarious liability arises where one party is liable for the acts of another party. An employer is liable for the acts of an employee where: the employee is acting in the course of his/her employment, the employee commits a negligent act, and a third party suffers loss or injury as a result. Liability still exists even where the employee is not following the employer’s instruction unless it is completely outside the scope of his/her employment. Relevant case law would be Lister v Romford Ice and Cold Storage Co Ltd [1957], Rose v Plenty [1976] and Smith v Crossley Brothers Ltd [1951]. Most candidates were able to give a reasonable explanation of vicarious liability and even referred to relevant case law, but in many cases without indicating the legal points which the cases illustrated.

Front 9

(b) Describe the principle of ‘strict liability’ in civil law. Illustrate your answer with ONE example of where such liability exists AND explain clearly the criteria for liability in the example you choose.

Back 9

strict liability in civil law is liability without the need to prove fault, negligence or intent. A relevant example would have been the case of Rylands v Fletcher [1868] where something else brought onto land that was not naturally there, escaped and caused mischief in circumstances where the mischief was foreseeable. Candidates, though few did, might also have referred to the Employer’s Liability (Defective Equipment) Act which places liability on the employer where an employee is injured by defective work equipment provided by the employer. The liability is strict and applies where the defect is attributed wholly or in part to a third party.

Front 10

A chemical reaction vessel is partially filled with a mixture of highly flammable liquids. It is possible that the vessel headspace may contain a concentration of vapour which, in the presence of sufficient oxygen, is capable of being ignited. A powder is then automatically fed into this vessel.
Adding the powder may sometimes cause an electrostatic spark to occur with enough energy to ignite any flammable vapour. There is therefore concern that there may be an ignition during addition of the powder.
To reduce the risk of ignition, an inert gas blanket system is used within the vessel headspace designed to keep oxygen below levels required to support combustion. In addition, a sensor system is used to monitor vessel oxygen levels. Either system may fail. If the inert gas blanketing system and the oxygen sensor fail simultaneously, oxygen levels can be high enough to support combustion.
Probability and frequency data for this system are given below. (refer to data). (a) Draw a simple fault tree AND using the above data calculate the frequency of an ignition.

Back 10

refer to diagram for answer

Front 11

(b) Describe, with justification, TWO plant OR process modifications that you would recommend to reduce the risk of an ignition in the vessel headspace.

Back 11

candidates could have included a description of any relevant modifications as knowledge of the fire and explosion part of the syllabus was not expected. Additional credit was given for selecting modifications which would make a greater contribution to reducing the overall risk based on the probability data in the fault tree. Modifications could have included replacing the powder feed with slurry in a conducting liquid; selecting and using materials with higher flashpoints to minimise the probability of a flammable atmosphere; and redesigning the nitrogen blanketing system to improve reliability.

Front 12

(a) A production process has a safety critical control system that depends on a single component to remain effective. Outline ways of reducing the likelihood of failure of this component AND describe additional ways to increase the reliability of the system.

Back 12

burning in the component before placing it in the system; planned replacement of the component before wear out; increasing its useful life by a planned programme of maintenance; and initial design of and material specification for the component together with the use of quality assurance. The reliability of the system might be increased by the use of parallel components and standby systems and redundancy; operational and detection protective systems to maintain the system within its design specification; the use of hazard analysis techniques to predict failure routes; and the monitoring, collection and use of failure data.

Front 13

(b) Describe the meaning of ‘common mode failure’ ANDoutline equipment design features which could help to minimise the probability of such failures.

Back 13

A common mode failure might be described as a type or cause of failure that could affect more than one component at a time, even when the components are supposed to be arranged to operate independently of each other. It is particularly relevant for components in parallel designed to improve reliability of a system by redundancy. Measures that could be taken to help minimise the probability of this type of failure include functional diversity where reliance is placed on safety components designed to act by different mechanisms, for example one detector for pressure and another for temperature, and one hydraulic interlock and one electrical interlock; equipment diversity where components are sourced from different manufacturers or from different manufacturing processes to avoid common manufacturing defects and vulnerabilities; isolating components from each other and from the environment so that they do not fail from common causes such as high temperature or vibration; routing cables by multiple routes so that local physical damage does not affect all components and using well known and established equipment designs where most of the failure modes will have been understood.

Front 14

Company A engaged the services of Contractor B to undertake repair work inside a storage tank. The production supervisor of Contractor A issued a permit-to-work for Contractor B’s employees to enter the tank to undertake the work. The work involved the use of flammable solvents and Contractor B’s employee was badly burned when some of the solvent was spilled from an open bucket and was ignited by an ordinary hand-lamp that had been provided for their use by Company A.
With reference to possible breaches of the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 and the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999, in this scenario, outline the company or individuals who may have committed breaches AND the specific legal requirements that may have been breached. Your answer should include relevant case law and an explanation of its relevance.

Back 14

In answering this question, those candidates that followed the signposts given in the question and structured their responses logically first referring to possible breaches by Company A, then Contractor B and finally individuals who might have been at fault gained good marks. They identified the following possible breaches of HSWA by Company A: Section 3(1) with regard to their duty to persons not in their employment; Section 4 regarding the provision of plant since they were the occupier and controller of non-domestic premises; and Section 2, and in particular Section 2(1) and 2(2)(c) in relation to the risk to its own employees. As far as possible breaches of MHSWR were concerned, candidates could have referred to the requirements of Regulation 3 regarding the completion of a risk assessment relevant to its own employees and other persons who might be at risk; of Regulation 5 regarding the provision of effective safety management arrangements for their own and other employees; of Regulation 11 as far as cooperation and coordination were concerned; and of Regulation 12 concerning the provision of instructions and information for workers in host employers’ undertakings. As for Contractor B, possible breaches under the HSWA concerned Section 2(1) and Section 2 (2) (a)-(e) regarding their duties to their own employees and Section 3(1) for putting Company A’s employees at risk. Additionally it could be argued that they had failed to comply with their duties under MHSWR namely under Regulation 3 to carry out a risk assessment; under Regulation 5 to ensure the provision of effective safety management arrangements; under Regulation 11 regarding cooperation and coordination; under Regulation 10 for failing to provide information to their employees on the hazards connected with the operation and the control measures that should be followed; and on their failure to ensure the competence and training of their employees.
There would also be a need to consider breaches of Section 7 of HSWA and Regulation14 of MHSWR with respect to the actions of the employees of Contractor B and of the production supervisor of Company A, who issued the permit to work. In their answers, candidates were required to refer to relevant case law, for example R v Associated Octel Co Ltd (1996) and R v Swan Hunter Shipbuilders (1982) but as has been noted with other questions, they were often unable to put the case law into context nor to give an explanation of its relevance. Despite the precise wording of the question, some candidates still discussed possible breaches of COSHH and PUWER for which no marks could be awarded

Front 15

You have recently reviewed the assessment and selection process for contractors used by your employer. You have discovered that contractor safety performance had previously been measured using the Annual Reportable Accident Incidence Rate.
(a) Outline the strengths and weaknesses of using the Reportable Accident Incidence Rate as a measure of the contractor’s health and safety performance.

Back 15

The strengths of using the Reportable Accident Incidence Rate as a measure of a contractor’s health and safety performance are that it is a measurable number with defined criteria; it provides an easy way of plotting trends; and it represents a category of undesirable loss events which have actually happened. The weaknesses of using this process are that it is an historic measure which cannot predict future performance; it measures the effectiveness of previous safety measures and not those currently in place; it is subject to random fluctuations and the number of accidents which have occurred may be too small to be used as a reliable performance indicator and the absence of accidents does not necessarily indicate that the working procedures that are followed are safe; the data is based on a severity threshold of the injury and not the potential seriousness of the accident; the process is unable to identify high consequence and low probability risk; and it does not reflect chronic health issues that might be present.

Front 16

(b) Safety performance had been deemed acceptable provided that the contractor’s own Reportable Accident Incidence Rate does not significantly exceed the national average for their industry as published by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE).
(i) Explain possible reasons why comparing the contractor rates with national statistics may not produce a valid conclusion as far as accident rates are concerned. (3) (ii) Outline other criteria (apart from accident rates) that should be considered as part of contractor selection.

Back 16

For part (b) (i), comparing a contractor’s own Reportable Accident Incidence Rate against the publicised national average for the industry may not lead to a valid conclusion on safety performance since the number of accidents to employees may be under reported and may not include accidents to sub-contractors; the national rates are known to be under reported and industry sectors for which national statistics are prepared are often very broad and may not be representative of the typical work which the contractor carries out.
Other criteria that should be considered as part of a contractor selection procedure include: the contractor’s previous experience with the type of work; the reputation of the contractor amongst previous or current clients; the quality and content of their health and safety policy and the systems in place for its implementation including the preparation of risk assessments and arrangements for monitoring and for consultation with the workforce; the level of training and qualifications of staff (including those with health and safety responsibilities); arrangements for the selection of sub-contractors; accident and enforcement history; membership of professional bodies; equipment maintenance and statutory examination records; and the detailed proposals (for example method statements) for the work to be carried out.
Answers to this question varied in quality with some candidates unable to provide the required depth and breadth. However, most provided good answers for part (b) (ii).

Front 17

Outline the desirable design features of controls AND displays on a control panel for a complex industrial process aimed at reducing the likelihood of human error.

Back 17

Design features of controls - keep number to a minimum; ensure sufficient number to control the state of operation; change of system state should only occur after operating a control; should require a positive action of the control with immediate feedback to the user; system restart should only occur after operating a control after a deliberate or non-intentional stop; stop function =easy to activate & override start and adjust controls; all controls = visible, positioned and ordered logically so as to follow the process & be within easy reach of the operator; labelling, shape or colour can be put to effective use to ensure controls are easily identified. The type of control should be appropriate to the degree of control required, for example a lever may be more appropriate than a knob. Recognised conventions should be followed such as up for off, green for on and clockwise to increase. Controls positioned next to their respective displays are also desirable.
Design features for displays = clearly visible and labelled & show steady state; clearly indicate change, match expectations & attract the appropriate sense such as flashing to draw visual attention; appropriate type of display for the reading, ie analogue or digital; all dials should be in similar position for “normal” operation. Markings on dials and the application of different colours can be used to indicate abnormal situations. Additional design features include shielding bulbs from strong ambient light; shielding glass dials from glare and placing displays against a panel of neutral colour. Displays kept to a minimum; safety critical displays =separated from other displays.