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19 Cards in this Set

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Issues in Paulemond v. City of New York - 2006
Detention by police during the execution of a facially-valid search warrant is constitutionally permissible. Furthermore, unlike the case of a warrantless search, when a search warrant is issued by a magistrate, there is a presumption of probable cause for the detention.

In order to establish a cause of action to recover damages for false imprisonment, a plaintiff must show that 1) the defendant intended to confine, detain, or restrain him or her, 2) the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement, 3) the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement and, 4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged
Van Camp v. McAfoos - 1968
Without fault or wrongdoing, invasion of one’s person is not a tortuous wrong. Liability without fault (fault, intent, wrongdoing) is rare in tort law.
Chorak v. Naughton - 1982
For injury in employment, worker’s compensation is the employee’s exclusive remedy (worker’s compensation is a less desirable remedy than tort law, because you usually get less money).
Plaintiff must suffer a harmful or offensive contact, and the tortfeasor must have intended to cause such contact. That is, the result must be harmful or offensive contact and that the intent must be to cause harmful or offensive contact. The offensiveness must be caused by the contact.
Snyder v. Turk - 1993
“A person is subject to liability for battery when he acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact, and when a harmful contact results”
Cohen v. Smith – 1995
A person’s unconsented-to contact with another person is considered a tort.
Principle, according to Dobbs: - it is offensive if it is not consented to and the defendant knows it is not consented to.
Contact that is offensive to a reasonable sense of personal dignity – according to restatement
Leichtman v. WLW Jacor Communications, Inc. – 1994
Intangible contact (like blowing of smoke in one’s face) that is offensive and insulting can be a tort (battery). Generally, however, with intangibles, we move toward nuisance law and with tangibles, we move toward tort law.
Garratt v. Dailey – 1955
If one knows with substantial certainty that a contact or apprehension will result, he can be liable. But if he does not have that realization, he does not have the “intention” required under tort law. By substantial certainty, we do not mean “risk” or even “high risk”. Risk=negligence. Substantial certainty=SURETY… like almost as sure as we can be as human beings. It is unlikely they’ll find that the little boy had the substantial certainty required here.
Hall v. McBryde – 1996
You don’t have to intend to hit the person you actually hit. Intending to hit ANYONE and hitting ANYONE else allows transferred intent. Part One of the rule: If you intend what amounts to a tort such as battery to A, but it miscarries and harms or offends person B, then you are liable to B. As long as you intend harm or offense to one person, you don’t get off the hook because it harms someone else. Extended liability rule. Part Two of the rule: You don’t intend to cause harm or offense but merely the apprehension of harm or offense (assault), you can still be liable for a battery if you contact the person you intended to inflict apprehension on or if you contact any other person. That is, if you intend assault or battery and it hits who you intended or someone else in the form of assault or battery, then you’re liable.
What do we learn from Garratt v. Dailey and Hall v. McBryde?
Garrett and McBryde are telling us about intentional torts and that intent means either purpose to do the act necessary to do the tort or substantial certainty that the expected thing will occur. You may intend to hit one person but hit another instead, you’re still liable. This is “transferred intent” or “extended liability”. Two ways (1, you do a different tort, 2, you are the tortfeasor against a different person than you intended).
Polmatier v. Russ – 1988
An insane person can be held liable for their intentional torts. Justification, according to Dobbs: Everyone has a mental problem… the important thing is how severe. As such, you do still need to impose some liability.
White v. Muniz – 2000
Intent required for a normal person is intending the contact AND intending the contact to be harmful or offensive. An intentional tort of battery does require some proof that the tortfeasor not only intended to contact another person, but also intended that the contact be harmful or offensive to the other person.
Cullison v. Medley
b. Iminent apprehension is a necessary aspect of assault.
c. Rule: assault consists of an act intended to cause either harmful or offensive contact with another person or apprehension of such contact, and that creates in that other person’s mind a reasonable apprehension of an imminent battery.
Koffman v. Garnett
b. If there is no apprehension of bodily harm (like in this case) then there is no assault.
McCann v. WalMart Stores Inc.
d. The court is worried about a very specific issue in confinement:
i. Thought that under Maine law, you may need actual, physical restraint. Although this is a US appellate court, they are dealing with Maine law (the people involved are from different states).
1. they’re bound to follow state law.
e. But, because authority was claimed and the impression of physical force was used, that is good enough to prove “actual, physical restraint” (a phrase taken out of context from a case, anyway!).
i. The common law was already pretty settled on this, and this case was old and antiquated and this isn’t really a good idea.
Yang v. Harden
14th amendment issue. 1. An officer who is present and fails to intervene to prevent other law enforcement officers from infringing the constitutional rights of citizens is liable under SS 1983 if that officer had reason to know:
a. That excessive force was being used,
b. That a citizen has been unjustifiably arrested, or
c. That any constitutional violation has been committed by a law enforcement official.
Brown v. Muhlenberg Township
4th amendment issue. i. The fourth amendment protects “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated”.
1. the dog is an effect

we are indirectly talking about the due process clause (14th amendment) but we are really concerned with the 4th amendment.
County of Sacramento v. Lewis
14th amendment

i. The 14th amendment claim test is “shocks the conscience.” (depriving without due process of law)
ii. The 4th amendment claim test is “reasonable” – unreasonable searches and seizures (intentional interference of person or effects)
Graham v. Connor
4th amendmnet. i. The specific provisions of the fourth amendment rather than the general concept of due process provides the constitutional standard that governs “a free citizen’s claim that law enforcement officials used excessive force in the course of making an arrest, investigatory stop, or other seizure of his person”
ii. Subjective tests based on malice or good faith have no application. The test is the one specified in the fourth amendment reasonableness.
Hudson v. McMillian
8th amendment. i. Application of unreasonable force to a prisoner does not violate the eighth amendment. By its terms, that amendment is violated only by application of cruel or unusual punishment.
ii. But the test of liability is not whether the injury was minor or major