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16 Cards in this Set

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Stroup v Conant | S Ct OR 1974 | 523
(whether failure to accurately disclose porn store intention allows landlord to rescind lease) theres plenty of evidence showing misrepresentation. contracts are invalid when entered into on the basis of falsehoods, and so are leases! this understandably hurt landlord's reputation and her relationship w/ other tenants. porn dude loses.
Brown v DuBois | Ohio 1988 | 525
(difference between removable "trade fixtures" and nonremovable "fixtures"/"permanent accessions".)
(1) the standard to determine fixture status are
(a) actual annexation to the property
(b)appropriation to use or purpose of that part of the realty with which it is connected
(c) intention of party making annexation to make the article a permanent accession- determined by (i) nature of article (ii) relation and situation of the party affixing, and (iii) purpose or use for the affixing
(2) based on these factors w
White v Molyneux | S ct GA 1847 | 529 -
(whether destruction of property by fire allows tenant not to pay rent)
(1) only an express stipulation re: nonpayment of rent in the event of casualty destruction will relieve the tenant of his duty to pay
(2) reason in equity is that the owner lost the house, so the tenant should lose the rent
(3) we will not let a careless tenant take advantage of his own negligence
Holy Properties Limited LP v Kenneth cole Productions Inc | Ct App NY 1995 | 531 -
(whether landlord had duty to mitigate damages by finding another tenant when tenant vacated after deterioration in quality) Without an express agreement (which WOULD be enforceable), the landlord has no duty to mitigate. Leases are present transfers of estates in real property, and the duty to pay rent until the term ends is fixed immediately at the execution of the lease.
Hinton v Sealander Brokerage Co | DC Ct App 2007 | 533
(whether a landlord can prevent through self-help eviction a careless abandoning tenant from retrieving her stuff and then succeed in labeling her a holdover tenant)
(1) a landlord is prohibited from exercising self-help to evict a tenant
(2) the lease is still in effect until the term ends, despite the tenants actual abandonment
(3) the landlord DOES have an obligation to conserve the property by securing it from vandals and thieves, etc (4) the tenant, having been evicted by the landlord's securing of the premises, no longer owes rent for that time period BUT the landlord doesn't owe damages because he was reasonable in securing the premises and allowing her to get the key to reclaim her stuff
Jaber v Miller | S Ct Arkans 1951 | 540
(the difference between a sublease and an assignment)
(1) (illogical but still majority) English common law rule: if all the rights for the entire term are transferred, it is an assignment regardless of form; if fewer than all rights for all term (even less an hour or a day) are transferred, it is a sublease
(2) logic: (a) assignment is transfer of all or part of a lease: landlord -> new tenant (b) sublease is acreation of a new lease realtionship: landlord -> orig tenant -> new tenant
Kendall v Ernest Pestana | S Ct CA 1985 | 545
(whether in the abscence of a provision that consent to sublet will not be unreasonably witheld, a lessor may arbitrarily/unreasonably withold consent to the assignment)
(1) the majority rule favors the landlord's right to arbitrarily deny any potential assignment he sees fit.
(2) however, the traditional view has come under attack in recent years and been replaced by the commercially reasonable objection standard
(3) we like the new minority rule better and so hold
Sterling v Taylor | S Ct CA 2007 | 556
(whether a formula including an "approximate" value is definite enough to satisfy the SoF, and whether extrinsic evidence may be introduced to clarify the approximate clause) (1) a formula CAN be definite enough so long as the parites agree on how it is to be applied
(2) here, the parties approximated different values and ended up w/ different prices so SoF is not satisfied
Brush Grocery Kart v Sure Fine Market | S Ct CO 2002 | 462
(who is responsible for casualty damage costs when purchase is underway but not complete)
(1) in absence of statutory authority, we turn to theory of equitable conversion where vendee is considered equitable owner
(2) assignment of risk in executory period varies greatly, w/ a slim majority placing risk on the vendee
(3) other states follow "massachusetts rule" depending on actual transer of title
(4) growing minority uses right of possession to determine risk allocation
(5) we like the right of possession, and now we adopt it. Since Brush didn't have possession, he also didn't have risk and is entitled to rescind.
Donnelly v Taylor | Ohio Ct 2002 | 566
(what happens when you have a latent defect that is not discoverable by reasonable inspetion, no fraud on the part of the sellers, and contract contains an 'as is' clause) The "as is" clause shifts the risk of nondisclosure/nondiscovery to the purchaser.
Reed v King | Ct App CA 1983 | 569
(whether seller must disclose site of multiple murder)
(1) the rule: seller must disclose facts materially affecting value/desirability of property which are known/accessible only to him and not the buyer
(2) multiple murder is a material fact, it is not ephemeral nonsesnse but an unusual and deeply disturbing sequence of events
(3) murder is not so common that buyers should be charged w/ tryin to discover it (4) we cannot say however that the value was affected for sure; we only say the case should make it to trial to determine that fact
Stambosky v Ackley | S Ct NY 1991 | 571
(whether nondisclosure of house's local status as 'haunted' permits recission by the buyer)
(1) when caveat emptor is blindly unfair we utilize equitable relief
(2) since buyer could not have discovered this info by the most meticulous property inspection, there is no policy reason to apply caveat emptor
(3) recission should be allowed
Caruso v Parkos | S Ct Nebraska 2002 | 579
(the components of delivery, )
(1) delivery requires grantor's intent AT THE TIME that the deed shall operate as a muniment of title to take effect presently; the deed itself must leave the control of the grantor, who has reserved no right to recall it, and has passed to the grantee (or the representative for recording); it's effective on the date of delivery (to grantee or rep) and once that happens grantor can never call it back
Caruso v Parkos | S Ct Nebraska 2002 | 579 (con't)
(whether an attorney can be an escrow agent if he represents one or more parties in the action)
(2) attorneys routinely do and can legally represent one of both parties in an action and still be escrow agent, so long as they consider themselves to be grantee's agent for purpose of filing the deed
Caruso v Parkos | S Ct Nebraska 2002 | 579 (con't)
(the components of 'undue influence,' the requirements of BFP)
(3) elements necessary for undue influence are (a) person who executed deed was subject to undue influence (b) there was opportunity to exercise undue influence (c) there was disposition to exercise undue influence (d) result was clearly the effect of sue undue influence; influence does not always rise to undue influence- undue influence negates intent, but influence itself does not
(4) BFP must be someone who purchases land for valuable consideration w/o any ntocie of suspicious circumstnaces which would put a normally prudent person on inquiry
Raub v General Income Sponsors | S Ct Iowa 1970 | 585
(whether possession of real estate by someone who has executed a warranty deed imports notice to BFP such that they should undertake further inquiry)
(1) Possession is ordinarily sufficient to put parties on inquiry as to rights of the party in possession, but the exception to this rule is when grantor of recorded deed continues to occup land for a reasonable amount of time (
2) BFPs are only responsible for what they could have discovered on reasonable investigation; because of the exception for holdover the defendants are not deprived of BFP status because even investigation wouldn't have put them on notice