Philosophy (Intro) Final

Front 1

Theism

Back 1

Belief that a god exists

Front 2

Atheism

Back 2

Belief that a not-god exists (a god does not exist)

Front 3

Agnostic

Back 3

Someone who withholds belief regarding a god's existance

Front 4

Omnipotent

Back 4

All powerful

Front 5

Omnibenevolent

Back 5

All good

Front 6

Omniscient

Back 6

All knowing

Front 7

Evil

Back 7

REALLY bad things

Front 8

The theistic problem of evil

Back 8

Given God's existence and the kind of thing God is, why is there evil in the world?

Front 9

The atheistic problem of evil

Back 9

Given a purely naturalistic framework, WHAT is evil?

Front 10

Mackie: What is the traditional theist committed to?

Back 10

1. God is omnipotent
2. God is omnibenevolent
3. Evil exists

Front 11

Mackie: The argument from evil

Back 11

If any two theistic commitments were true, the third would be false. The theologian must adhere to but cannot consistently adhere to all three.

Front 12

Mackie: Adequate solution for the argument from evil

Back 12

You can give up any one commitment, and the other two can be true. (Evil obviously exists, though).

Front 13

Mackie: Inadequate solutions for the argument from evil (1) and Mackie's response

Back 13

1. Good cannot exist without evil (like there can't be tall people without short people)

But then God is no longer opposed to evil and can't be omnibenevolent

Front 14

Mackie: Inadequate solutions for the argument from evil (2) and Mackie's response

Back 14

Evil is necessary as a means to good/God has to bring about evil in order to cause good because the two have a causal relation.

This constricts what God can do to what is causally possible, so he can't be omnipotent

Front 15

Mackie: Inadequate solutions for the argument from evil (3) and Mackie's response

Back 15

The universe is better with some evil in it than it could be with no evil in it

This also changes God's attitude towards evil. He seems to want some evils so that he can have goods like sympathy. Can't be omnibenevolent.

Front 16

Mackie: Inadequate solutions for the argument from evil (4) and Mackie's response

Back 16

Evil is due to human free will

It seems that God could create a world where if there is a choice between two actions, he would make it so that people always choose the right one. Either he couldn't, or he didn't want to.

Front 17

Plantinga: Moral evil

Back 17

Evils that result from human free will

Front 18

Plantinga: Natural evil

Back 18

All other evils (natural disasters, accidents, etc)

Front 19

Free will defense

Back 19

What God's reasons for allowing evil might have been. Tries to demonstrate that God's existence is logically possible while still acknowledging evil, but makes no claim that rational beings are able to understand God's reasons.

Front 20

Free will theodicy

Back 20

What God's reasons for allowing evil actually were. Tries to make a framework that makes God's existence probable, and seeks to give an account of His reasons.

Front 21

Plantinga's problem with Mackie's second premise

Back 21

The wrong definition of "omnipotence" is used. It should be "If God can omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good, then God can create any state of affairs 'x' such that 'God creates x' is consistent"

Front 22

Plantinga's problem with Mackie's 6th premise

Back 22

Plantinga reworked Mackie's argument to read "If God is all good and the proposition 'God creates free men created by God always do what is right' is consistent, then any free man created by God will always do what is right"

Plantinga says that the proposition is NOT consistent, because we have no reason to suppose this is true. If God made free men do the right thing, they wouldn't have free will.

Front 23

Rowe's original argument from evil for atheism

Back 23

P1- There exists pointless/gratuitous evils that don't bring about a greater good

P2- If God existed, these wouldn't exist

C- God does not exist

Front 24

Rowe's defense of premise 1

Back 24

Admits he cannot convince us that there are gratuitous (purposeless) evils, but we have really good reason to think there are some. Not all evils can be explained away by saying they prevent more evil, or bring about some good (the angle Plantinga fought for)

Front 25

Rowe's defense of premise 2

Back 25

Rowe thinks everyone would accept this ("If God existed, gratuitous evils wouldn't exist")

Front 26

Responses to Rowe: The direct approach

Back 26

Explain away the gratuitous evils as not being actually gratuitous and having a purpose. (Rowe says this is doomed)

Front 27

Responses to Rowe: The indirect approach (the Moorean Shift)

Back 27

P1- God exists
P2- If God existed, then no pointless/gratuitous/purposeless evils would exist
C- No pointless/gratuitous/purposeless evils exist

Start out with the assumption that God exists, and use Rowe's argument against him

Front 28

Unfriendly Atheism

Back 28

No theist's belief is justified (Mackie)

Front 29

Friendly Atheism

Back 29

Some theist beliefs might be justified (Rowe)

Front 30

Indifferent Atheism

Back 30

Has no view about the rationality of a theist's justification

Front 31

Rowe's revised argument from evil for atheism

Back 31

P1- For some evils we know of we are not able to identify a plausible God justifying reason (GJR) to permit those evils

P2- If we aren't able to identify a GRJ to permit these evils, they probably isn't one

P3- Probably, there are pointless evils

P4- God's existence is incompatible with pointless evils

P5- Probably, God does not exist

Front 32

Rowe: Noseeum inferences

Back 32

If you don't see them (reasons to explain away seemingly gratuitous evils) they probably aren't there

Front 33

Rowe: The keys case

Back 33

If you look in your purse for keys and don't find them, they keys probably aren't in your purse

Front 34

Rowe: The pointless evil case

Back 34

If you don't see the reasons behind pointless evils, there probably are no reasons

Front 35

Rowe: The spider case

Back 35

Just because you don't see a spider when you look out your car door, doesn't mean there aren't any spiders in the entire garage. Begs the question, how hard do we have to look for reasons for gratuitous evils?

Front 36

Bergman: Skeptical theism (about the SKEPTICAL part)

Back 36

We should be skeptical regarding our ability to detect GJR since we will often not see a GJR even if it is there. We should not conclude that they do not exist given our lack of detecting them. (Thinks everyone, including Rowe, would agree.)

Front 37

Bergman: Skeptical theism (about the THEISM part)

Back 37

Belief in the existence of the traditional conception of God

Front 38

Response to Bergman: Tooley's Argument

(And Bergman's response to Tooley)

Back 38

Because we are bad at detecting GJR, we might think that when we encounter suffering, we should allow it to occur.

Bergman: Rarely is it ever appropriate to permit suffering

Front 39

Response to Bergman: Blue Crow case

(And Bergman's response)

Back 39

If you are a crow-researcher and neither you nor anyone else has ever seen a blue crow, you don't infer the existence of a blue crow. If we don't see GJR, we shouldn't infer that they exist.

Bergman: GJR are not like blue crows, they are not the kinds of things we would see if they were there

Front 40

Response to Bergman: Skeptical theism leads to inappropriate theism

(And Bergman's response)

Back 40

The implications are unacceptable. Once you embrace skepticism, all sorts of stuff gets thrown around. Skepticism brings about the worry that once you embrace it, it is hard to stop and would interfere with theism.

Bergman: Evidence for God's reasons and for God's existence are entirely separate and mutually exclusive