Philosophy Exam 3 (Set 1)

Front 1

How do we see ourselves as people?

Back 1

We see ourselves as continuing over time. WE say I'm the same person I was when I was 15. Not literally but we do see ourselves as continuing over time.

Front 2

When asked about whether A & B are identical what matters?

Back 2

When asked whether A & B are identical it matters whether you are thinking about A & B as being:
Persons
or
Human beings

Front 3

What does Locke think about A & B?

Back 3

He thinks there are times when A & B could be true in one regard but not in the other regard.

Front 4

What does Locke say about human beings?

Back 4

You think about physical substance such as living bodies of particular shapes. Being a human is being a living body of a particular shape.

Front 5

What are persons according to Locke

Back 5

For Locke, something's being a person doesn't require him/her to be a human (that is, to have a particular physical form or human DNA). Being a person is merely being an intelligent thinking being that can itself as being the same thinking being in different times and places.
Persons are intelligent thinking beings that can know itself as themselves (as thinking beings) in different times and places. When asked about persons you're thinking about thinking things. This relates to consciousness. Can have the same structure but different consciousness.

Front 6

Locke's Prince Example

Back 6

Take the prince and his soul with all his thoughts and put it in the cobbler whose soul has already departed. Is the cobbler the same as the prince? We know the prince so if I brought him to you and asked you if this was the prince you'd say no, not human being wise because physically he doesn't look like the prince. But then we talk to the cobbler and he keeps bringing up things that only the prince would know. It seems in terms of consciousness that it is the prince. If the soul with all the thoughts gets transferred then who is it? WEl it looks like the cobbler but you're convinced it's the prince.

Front 7

Personal identity is

Back 7

sameness of consciousness

Front 8

What can we do when we look back on our lives?

Back 8

You can look back and you aren't identical physically but you're still the same person. There's no problem thinking they are the same person. We worry about if when we talk to you if you will remember us

Front 9

Locke's requirements for personal identity:

Back 9

Locke's account of personal identity seems to be based on a diachronic memory - consciousness of current and past states (your continuum of past and present knowledge. CAn't be if you don't know antying but past memories you expect it will continue with it and say next week we will go to Grandma's.)

Front 10

What is locke's account of personal identity based on?

Back 10

Based on diachronic memory - consciousness of current and past states (your continuum of past and present knowledge. CAn't be if you don't know antying but past memories you expect it will continue with it and say next week we will go to Grandma's.)

Front 11

What is locke's argument for personal identity?

Back 11

Entity A @ time 1 = Entity B @ time 2 if and only if:
A & B are both persons. (Picks up on resemblance thesis which he missed in other argument. Can't say A & B (human beings) are the same as chairs).
B has mental states at time 2.
A has mental states at time 1
Some of the mental states at time 2 must be memories of some of the mental states at time 1.

Front 12

Locke on personal identity P1.

Back 12

Entity A at time 1 = entity B at time 2 if and only if:
A & B are both persons (Here he pickes up on the resemblenace thesis he missed in the other argument Now notes persons canot be compared to chairs).

Front 13

Locke on personal identity P2

Back 13

B has mental states at time 2

Front 14

LOcke on personal identity P3

Back 14

A has mental states at time 1

Front 15

Locke P 4/conclusion

Back 15

Some of the mental states at time 2 must be memories of of some of the mental states at time 1

Front 16

How can locke's principles of identity be used to justify the prince and the cobbler example?

Back 16

Take prince in Prince's body at time 1 and the cobbler at time 2. Are they the same?
Are they both persons? Yes, they are.
Does B have mental states at time 2? YEs he had thoughts.
Does A have mental states at time 2? Yeah the prince was doing his princely duties/
Do they have memories of time 1 &2? This is where you test them. Say what'd you do last week at 4:15? I was on the phone with you. What did we talk about? The penn state scandal.

Front 17

What does Locke say personal identity is independent of?

Back 17

Locke says personal identity is independent of your material physical substance. Says there's always an appeal to common sense such as legal cases. It's like PTSD. Those people aren't acting as themselves they should get treatment and not punishment. That's not him he's just stressed out. Sameness of person depends on consciousness.

Front 18

If you woke up and didn't look like yourself what does locke think?

Back 18

Locke says if you woke up and didn't look the same if you still think you are going to class at 9:30 and going to another class later in the day he says that your personal identity is independent of physical being so you are the same person even though you look different.

Front 19

For Locke what determines personal identity?

Back 19

Merely consciousness. You can be the same person regardless of your body.

Front 20

Thomas Reid

Back 20

Scottish philosopher who wrote a logical objection to Locle's argicle.

Front 21

What is Thomas Reid's logical objection to Locke's argicle?

Back 21

[When we compare the brave officer to the boy, we find that (a) both are persons, (b) the brave officer has mental states, (c) the boy has mental states, and (d) some of the officers mental states are memories of the states at the time when he was a boy. Thus, on Locke's own account, the officer is the boy who robbed the orchard. As for the brave officer and the general, on Locke's account, the general is the officer that demonstrated bravery because (a) both the brave officer and the general are persons, (b) the general has mental states, (c) the brave officer has mental states, and (d) some of the general's mental states are memories of the states at the time when he was an officer. Reid says that if it is true that the boy is identical to the officer, and the officer is identical to the general, it follows that the boy should be identical to the general (this follows by the transitivity of identity [If A = B, and B = C, then A = C]). Yet, on Locke's account the general is not the boy who stole from the orchard because despite (a) the fact that both are persons, (b) the fact that the general has mental states, and (c) the fact that the boy has mental states, it is not true that (d) some of the general's mental states are not memories of memories of states at the time when the boy existed. So, on the one hand, according to logic, the general is the boy who stole from the orchard; but on the other hand, on Locke's account, the general is not the boy who stole from the orchard.]
Boy who changed turns into the brave officer and from the brave officer into a general.
In this scenario the boy stole apples. The brave officer remembers stealing the apples and being punished. The Old general remmembers being the general and taking the standard. BUT the old general lost consciousness and does not remember stealing the apples This leads to a logical problem in so far as the boy. Locke wants to say the boy is not the same person as the old general.

Front 22

Reid: Law of transitivity

Back 22

Locke Says the boy isn't the same as the old general because the old general cannot remember the boy.

Front 23

Reid: What logical problem occurs with the boy and the general which causes Locke to draw the conclusion he does?

Back 23

P1. A=B.
P2. B=C
C. A=C
But Locke wants to claim A doesnt equal C because no memories of being a boy and stealing the apples.

Front 24

Reid points out substantitive problems

Back 24

1. Locke seems to think that consciousness = memory, but they are in fact different phenomena.
2. HE says Locke confuses evidence we have of our personal identity with what in fact establishes our personal identity.
3. Consciouness is tempory. IT's continuously changing.
4. Consciousness is sameness of consciousness. Can't be expressed in terms of particulars.

Front 25

What is the 1st substantive problem?

Back 25

Reid thinks consciousness must be distinguished from memory because he does not think they are the same. He points out that when you do something such as stub your toe, you are presently conscious of the sensation of pain that the injury causes you. When you remember the injury you can never conjure up the same type of sensation or experience the same pain the original injury caused you. This is why he believes that consciousness and memory are different. You are only conscious of what is happening here and now, you are not conscious of past things. Memory is used to remember things that happen in the past.
Locke seems to think that consciousness = memory, but they are in fact different phenomena.
(There is a change that locke has to be equating consciousness and memory. You're not really conscious of past states anymore. You do have memories of past states.
Take consciousness, you're conscious of the here and now. Conscious of what you're currently thinking. Memory is directed toward the past.
When you recall the pain it's not as painful, the sensation isn't as bad. COnsciousness is what hurts worse. When we remember pain it's memory not consciousness. So now we're looking at memory and not consciousness.)

Front 26

Second substantive problem.

Back 26

Reid says Locke confuses evidence we have of our personal identity with what in fact establishes our personal identity.

Front 27

How does the Horse example relate to the second substantive problem?

Back 27

He thinks that we have confused evidence of our identity with identity itself. For example, he talks about the horse. He gives an existential account of identity. He says that we have this horse. How do we tell if it is our horse? We go and take a look at the horse. We look for any distinguishing marks. We also look at behavior to see if it acts like our horse would act. However, the problem Reid points out is that this horse is our horse regardless of whether or not we recognize it as being our horse. The horse is our horse. Whether we recognize it or not does not change the identity of the horse. It would be strange to have memory be the basis of our identity because memories are flawed. Locke is confusing the characteristics as ascribing identity when really identity is a standalone concept and memory/markings helps us to understand identity. The horse is the same regardless. [Yes. If the horse were indeed my horse, it would be “my” horse, regardless of whether or not the standards I had to determine whether the horse were my horse suggested so.]
The horse gets stolen, how do you identfy the horse? You go look at the horse and see if there are any distinguishing marks. The identity of the horse is distinct from that whether or not we're the same person has nothing to do with what we know. He gives epistomologcal account. You think you can know that you're the same person beccause you have the same mental states at time 1 and time 2. Well that horse is the same whether or not we recognize the horse. The fact that you recognize it or not doesn't make it your horse. We look at the horse and say it looks/acts like my horse, therefore, it is my horse. Well it's definitely your horse regardless of whether or not you recognize it's your horse. Maybe you don't recognize it's your horse but it's still your horse. Deals with how we recognize the fact of the matter. It's a T/F question. We may never know for sure. Memory/recognition doesn't necessarily matter it's just a way to recognize.

Front 28

second subsantive problem as it relates to persons

Back 28

Whether or not you're the same person doesn't have to do with whether or not we think you are you. You either are or you are not. Memory is helpful because it informs you what you are. It informs you of your past. It doesn't establish you. HE says it's not contingent on if you rememeber. Reid says whether or not we're the same is a yes/no matter. This is what we use to say identical or not but whether or not you are identical is not dependent on this. Identity should have nothing to do with what's going on. Out perception doesn't matter, it either is or is not.

Front 29

Third substantive problem.

Back 29

Consciousness is fleeting. We are only conscious of things as they are actually happening. Consciousness doesn’t stay the same. We see things in blips. If identity is based on consciousness, we would really have to scrap the concept of identity altogether because we would never be the same person. WE would constantly be changing. This isn’t really what Locke wants but according to his theory this is the situation we would end up with. [What Reid contends is that if we take Locke seriously and hold that personal identity is based on consciousness (taking into consideration that consciousness is not the same as memory), then there would be no such thing as personal identity.]
Concsiousness is temporary. IT's continually changing. (We're conscious of blips. THere's no continuity. WE would never be the same person ever at the same point. We would never be the same because consciousness wasn't the same at that point and time.) If consciousness is always changing, the result for Locke's account is that there is no personal identity because consciousness by definition is the present now which is diferent from the present now. So we're never the same. Locke doesn't want this to be the true picture. He doesn't disagree that the boy is different than the brave officer. You can't keep with this. The account shouldn't have this problem of personal identity.

Front 30

Fourth substantive problem

Back 30

It's not the same exact particulars, it's only same type of consciousness. It would be similar but not the exact. When I stub my toe I get the same type of pain as I've experienced before. All I have are blips no continuity. I'm saying I'm experiencing a similar type not the particular so I won't be able to say that I'm the exact same entity just that I'm similar. There's never true continuity because consciousness can't turn backwards. We do know things look similar. I'd never get strict identity we don't want to say I'm the same type of person we want to say I AM the same person.
Consciousness sameness of consciousness cannot be expressed in particulars. (Sameness in consciousness are you talking about types of things or particulars. Even if we stubbed our toes on the same desk we each have our own stage of pain. Both Bob and I are in the same state, namely a pain state). IF i'm to be conscious of my past actions this would mean when I remember pain state I would have to relive and feel the same pain again. CAn't be expressed in particulars, they must be expressed in kinds. Conscious of states we can recall the memory of experiencing the state. I don't have to transport I just have to be conscious. DOn't have to transport I just have to be conscious. Don't have to be the same excact experience of pain vs. the particular rain of experience. If this is how it were we'd be these emotional wrecks.