Philosophy Exam 2

Front 1

Involves two main issues: Is a human made of only one component? If the answer is two components, do mind and matter interact, and if so, how does that interaction take place?

Back 1

Mind-Body Problem

Front 2

Claims that a human being is completely physical

Back 2

Physicalism

Front 3

Claims that a human being is both physical and mental

Back 3

Dualism

Front 4

The view that the only substances that exist are material substances but some of these substances may possess a duality of material and immaterial properties and immaterial abstract objects may also exist.

Back 4

Materialism

Front 5

A completely developed physics and chemistry could give a complete, unified description and explanation of all phenomena because the world is one physical system

Back 5

Unity of science

Front 6

The properties that are possessed only by physical objects

Back 6

Physical properties

Front 7

Something such that it would not exist if there were no sentient creatures. Or something about which the subject is in a better position to know than is anyone else, or something to which a subject has private, first-person access. They belong to the private world of inner experience.

Back 7

Mental entity

Front 8

Individual events that occur at particular times such as experiences of colors, sounds, smells, tastes, textures, pains, itches.

Back 8

Sensations

Front 9

Having a certain mental attitude toward a state of affairs by means of a proposition that can be expressed by a that-clause

Back 9

Propositional attitudes

Front 10

Intentional actions are episodes of volition by conscious selves wherein and whereby they do various actions. They are acts of the will.

Back 10

Purposings

Front 11

There are some physical substances that have only physical properties.

Back 11

Property dualism

Front 12

The brain is a physical object that has physical properties and the mind or soul is a mental substance that has mental properties.

Back 12

Substance dualism

Front 13

Properties that present themselves directly to the subject, they are psychological attributes, they are directly present to a subject because that subject simply has them immediately in his field of consciousness.

Back 13

Self-Presenting properties

Front 14

Knowing one's own mental life in a way not available to anyone else

Back 14

Private access

Front 15

A subject is incapable of being mistaken about that thing

Back 15

Incorrigible

Front 16

The simple fact of consciousness, constituted by the subjective feel or texture of experience itself.

Back 16

Knowledge argument

Front 17

Qualities such as colors, tastes, sounds, smells, and textures

Back 17

Secondary qualities

Front 18

Qualities thought to be among the properties that characterize matter--weight, shape, size, solidity, motion.

Back 18

Primary qualities

Front 19

The mind's "ofness" or "aboutness." The intrinsic, nondispositional, irreducible, feature of those states.

Back 19

Intentionality

Front 20

The vantage point that one uses to describe the world from one's own point of view.

Back 20

First-person perspective

Front 21

Words like I, here, now, there, and then.

Back 21

Indexicals

Front 22

Physicalism says that everything can be exhaustively described in an object language from ___________.

Back 22

Third-person perspective

Front 23

One's body constantly gains new parts and loses old one, and even though one's mental states come and go in rapid succession, nevertheless, the person himself remains the same because he is a mental self that is other than his body parts and mental states.

Back 23

Personal identity

Front 24

Free will

Back 24

Libertarian freedom

Front 25

When matter reaches a certain organizational complexity and structure, then matter "produces" mental states like fire produces smoke, or the structure of hydrogen and oxygen in water "produces" wetness.

Back 25

Epiphenomenalism

Front 26

One state or event causes another event to occur. It involves a state of one thing existing as an efficient cause that is prior to an effect, which is the production of a state in another thing.

Back 26

Event-event causation

Front 27

Substances are the cause

Back 27

Agent causation

Front 28

People should not multiply entities beyond what is needed to explain something

Back 28

Ockham's razor

Front 29

It is possible to provide general, reductive, nonmentalistic necessary and sufficient conditions for any mental type of state.

Back 29

Reductive physicalism

Front 30

Does not believe that such a general set of necessary and sufficient conditions exist or are necessary in order to provide physicalist treatments of mental entities.

Back 30

Nonreductive physicalism

Front 31

The view that in doing psychology from an empirical standpoint, one should describe, report and explain mental states in terms of publicly observable behaviors and not in terms of private, first-person, inner conscious states.

Back 31

Methodological behaviorism

Front 32

Mental states are identified with overt bodily behaviors or tendencies to certain behaviors, given certain stimulus inputs.

Back 32

Philosophical behaviorism

Front 33

Definitions of something solely in terms of what can be empirically tested or measured by certain tests or operations

Back 33

Operational definitions

Front 34

A general kind of thing that can be in more than one place at the same time or at the same place at different interrupted times.

Back 34

Type

Front 35

An individual, particular instance of a type.

Back 35

Token

Front 36

Types of mental states are identical to types of physical stuff or "hardware" in the brain and central nervous system

Back 36

Hardware view

Front 37

An object with different hardware states that is able to experience the same mental state as a human.

Back 37

Multiple realization

Front 38

There is no set of general conditions that can be given for identifying a general kind of mental state with a general kind of brain state.

Back 38

Token-token identity theory

Front 39

Mental states are functional states of organisms

Back 39

Functionalism

Front 40

The mind is fundamentally a computer program

Back 40

Strong artificial intelligence

Front 41

Making reference to the different inputs, outputs, and other features of the program that the computer uses to operate

Back 41

Software view

Front 42

Qualia is plural for quale, which means a specific experiential quality.

Back 42

Inverted qualia

Front 43

If unconscious machines like computers or robots are able to imitate consciousness by embodying the right functional state, then they are, in fact, in that mental state.

Back 43

Absent qualia

Front 44

Illustration from John Searle about a man locked in a room with baskets full of Chinese symbols

Back 44

Chinese room

Front 45

An inadequate theory

Back 45

Folk psychology

Front 46

If dualism is true and the mind and body are different, then why would we expect that there would be just one mind attached to one body?

Back 46

The problem of many minds

Front 47

If dualism is true, we can never know that other people have mental states because those states are private mental entities to which we have no direct access.

Back 47

Problem of other minds

Front 48

The social/political notion of freedom involved in discussions of rights, the authority of the state, and law

Back 48

Freedom of permission

Front 49

The ability of fully developed, ideally functioning persons to act as unified selves in a responsible, mature way

Back 49

Freedom of personal integrity

Front 50

That freedom that is part of human action and agency, in which the human being acts as an agent who is in some sense the originator of one's own actions and is in control of one's action.

Back 50

Freedom of moral and rational responsibility

Front 51

The view that for every event that happens, there are conditions such that, given them, nothing else could have happened.

Back 51

Determinism

Front 52

Denies the existence of free will

Back 52

Hard determinism

Front 53

Also called compatibilism, holds that freedom and determinism are compatible with each other and thus the truth of determinism does not eliminate freedom.

Back 53

Soft determinism

Front 54

If determinism is true, then every human action is causally necessitated by events that obtained prior to the action, including events that existed before the person acting was born.

Back 54

Compatibilism

Front 55

Human events are parts of causal chains of events that lead up to them in a deterministic fashion

Back 55

Happenings

Front 56

Free choice is inconceivable or impossible without determinism; a free choice is one that must be determined.

Back 56

Hard compatibilists

Front 57

It is possible though not likely that libertarianism is true, and thus free choice does not require determinism.

Back 57

Soft compatibilists

Front 58

Primarily apply the notion of freedom to bodily action.

Back 58

Classical compatibilists

Front 59

The problem with classical compatibilism is that freedom to act bodily seems to be neither necessary nor sufficient for having the type of freedom necessary to be a responsible agent.

Back 59

Contemporary or hierarchical compatibilism

Front 60

The freedom necessary for responsible action is not compatible with determinism. Real freedom requires a type of control over one's action.

Back 60

Libertarianism.

Front 61

Will to do one alternative

Back 61

Causal powers

Front 62

No event or efficient cause causes a person to act

Back 62

First or unmoved mover

Front 63

In order to have the freedom necessary for responsible agency, one must have the ability to choose or act differently from the way the agent actually does.

Back 63

Ability condition

Front 64

The agent would have done otherwise had some other condition obtained.

Back 64

Hypothetical ability

Front 65

To will to act

Back 65

Categorical ability

Front 66

If one has the ability to exert his power to do A, one also has the ability to refrain from exerting his power to do A.

Back 66

Dual ability

Front 67

Being in control of the act itself

Back 67

Control condition

Front 68

EX: the ability to speak English but not Russian

Back 68

First-order power

Front 69

EX: Developing the ability to speak Russian

Back 69

Second-order power

Front 70

All things being the same up to the act itself

Back 70

One-way ability

Front 71

A lower order desire involving specific state or events

Back 71

First-order desire

Front 72

The freedom to do what one wants, to act on one's first-order desires.

Back 72

Free action

Front 73

The act must be what one wills on the matter

Back 73

Second-order desire

Front 74

One's set of considered value judgments about what is the right, most reasonable thing to do in a given situation.

Back 74

Valuational system

Front 75

An act is free if and only if it is under the agent's own control, and it is under his own control if and only if the act was appropriately caused by the right mental states existing in the agent prior to the act.

Back 75

Causal theory of action

Front 76

Cases where the appropriate mental states do in fact cause an event to take place but in an accidental way such that the event does not count as a real action.

Back 76

Causal deviance

Front 77

If there are movers and things moved following an order to infinity.

Back 77

Intermediate movers

Front 78

Requires that an agent have a personal reason for acting before the act counts as a free one.

Back 78

Rationality condition

Front 79

That by means of which an effect is produced.

Back 79

Efficient cause

Front 80

That for the sake of which an effect is produced.

Back 80

Final cause

Front 81

A desire and a belief that doing something will satisfy the desire

Back 81

belief/desire set

Front 82

Considering various reasons for and against certain actions.

Back 82

Deliberation

Front 83

The view that one is free to choose what one will believe.

Back 83

Doxastic voluntarism

Front 84

The idea that at any moment one can directly choose to believe or not to believe a given item.

Back 84

Direct doxastic voluntarism

Front 85

The idea that one's beliefs result from processes of deliberation in which one exercises freedom at various points along the way, in what one will or will not consider, how one will look at the issue.

Back 85

Indirect doxastic voluntarism

Front 86

Weakness of will

Back 86

Akrasia

Front 87

A relation between two things, namely cause and effect

Back 87

Causation

Front 88

In free acts, persons cause acts for the sake of reasons

Back 88

Agent causation

Front 89

A person's acts are simply uncaused events that they spontaneously do by exercising their powers for the sake of reason.

Back 89

Noncausal theory of agency

Front 90

Certain quantum events are completely uncaused events and are indeterminate, random happenings.

Back 90

Quantum physics

Front 91

The view that everything that happens does so necessarily and we cannot do anything other than what we shall do.

Back 91

Fatalism

Front 92

Only what actually happens is possible

Back 92

Actualism

Front 93

What a person actually does do coincides with what a person possibly could do

Back 93

Global fatalism

Front 94

The view that there are genuine, isolated instances in our lives where our outcome is fated irrespective of our deliberations or choices.

Back 94

Local fatalism

Front 95

The view that God's determination of each person's eternal destiny is logically prior to his decree to create mankind and permit the Fall

Back 95

Supralapsarianism

Front 96

The view that God's determination is logically subsequent to his decrees to create and permit the Fall

Back 96

Infralapsarianism

Front 97

Future free acts of God's creatures

Back 97

Future contingent events

Front 98

God's knowledge of what every free creature he could create would do in every possible circumstance in which they could be placed.

Back 98

Middle knowledge

Front 99

God alone possesses immortality in himself. Still, though human beings are properly and normally to be construed as a unity of material human bodies and immaterial substantial souls, at the time of death a person enters into a temporary disembodied state that is less than complete and then receives a new resurrected body at the general resurrection.

Back 99

Traditional position on immortality

Front 100

When one dies, they are given some sort of temporal body while waiting for a final resurrected body, or their pre-death body is taken away by God at death and replaced with a corpse that is buried.

Back 100

Immediate resurrection position on immortality

Front 101

When one dies they become extinct but at the resurrection of the dead God recreates that person all over again out of nothing

Back 101

Re-creation position on immortality

Front 102

If an entity "x" at time "t" maintains absolute, strict identity with entity "y" at time "t2" then "x" and "y" stand in the identity relation to each other such that Leibniz's law of the indiscernibility of identicals holds for "x" and "y".

Back 102

Absolute, strict sense of identity

Front 103

Means that the parts of a thing are essential to it as a whole

Back 103

Mereological essentialism

Front 104

Some objects become a series of spa tiotemporal parts

Back 104

Space-time worms

Front 105

When one thing is in a weaker relation than identity.

Back 105

Genidentity

Front 106

Persons differ from physical artifacts in that persons maintain strict, absolute sameness through change.

Back 106

Absolute view of personal identity

Front 107

Despite having several different but simultaneous experiences one is united as the same person.

Back 107

Unity at a given time

Front 108

Over the years your body parts come and go, as do your mental states, but they are all aspects of the same person.

Back 108

Unity through time

Front 109

The body view and the memory view

Back 109

Empiricist views of personal identity

Front 110

The connection between various person stages that unites them as stages of the "same" person is that all the mental states of the person are connected to the "same" body.

Back 110

Body view of empiricism

Front 111

It is continuity of psychological characteristics that constitutes personal identity.

Back 111

Memory view of empiricism

Front 112

The vantage point one uses to describe the world from one's own point of view

Back 112

First-person perspective

Front 113

The point of view of an observer

Back 113

Third-person perspective

Front 114

I, Here, There, Now, Then

Back 114

Indexicals

Front 115

Words that systematically change their referents in a context-dependent way.

Back 115

Token reflexive