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30 Cards in this Set

  • Front
  • Back

Inconsistent Tetrad

1. Mind is nonmaterial


2. Body is material


3. Mind and body interact


4. Material and nonmaterial do not react

Dualism

says 1 and 2 are true, either 3 or 4

Reducible

can be entirely explained in terms of another thing without loss of meaning

qualia

experienced sensations such as pains, tickles, emotions - the sensation itself rather than the neurological cause of it

intentionality

the feature by which our mental states are directed at, or about, or refer to, or are of objects and states of affairs in the world other than ourselves (ex. intentions, beliefs, desires, hopes, fears, love, hate)

Jackson's knowledge argument

You can know all physical facts of something, but once you actually experience it, you gain additional facts; therefore some aspects of qualia are nonphysical

Substance Dualism

believe first 3 of tetrad

interactionism

says mind and body are mad up of different kinds of stuff and they interact

neurological dependency of the mental

weakness of SD: according to SD, physical changes should not directly alter mental states but just indirectly through input. However, physical changes seemingly CAN change mental states (ex. being drunk)

no sign of non-physical causation

weakness of SD: if SD is true, the input-output circle of human behavior is not a closed loop. But body chemistry seems to suggest differently

Epiphenomenalism

most common form of PD, suggests that the mind does exist, but that it does not interact with body. Mental states are simply side effects of brain states, play no causal role

Problem of other minds

If dualism is true, we have no grounds for believing that other human beings have minds, though we assume they do

Materialism

rejects number 1 of tetrad

behaviorism

"mental states" are just shorthand ways of talking about actual and potential patterns of behavior

eliminative materialism

we must disregard current language of mental states because this conception is a false and radically misleading conception of the causes of the human behavior and the nature of cognitive ability

Identity Theory

Every mental state is identical to some physical (neurological) state - "I am sad" = neuron x fires

Leibniz's law

there cannot be separate entities that have all the same properties

Leibniz's law objection

objection to identity theory - Mind and brains have different properties, thus can't be identical

Material chauvinism objection

Identity Theory implies that only human beings can have minds, and this is not obviously true

Functionalism

Every mental state is the causal relations it bears to (1) environmental effects on the body, (2) other types of mental states, and (3) bodily behavior; MS=input+processing+output

Inverted qualia objection

objection to functionalism: we may call different colors by the same name (same function, different qualia)

Absent qualia objection

machines, "million-man machine" (same function, no qualia)

Hard Determinism

1. To be free is to have the ability to do otherwise


2. We lack the ability to do otherwise


3. Therefore, we are not free

Compatibilism

1. To be free is to have the ability to do what one wants


2. We have (at least sometimes) the ability to do what we want


3. Therefore, we are (at least sometimes) free





Indeterminism

spontaneous events at quantum level, probabilistic (not deterministic) laws

Libertarianism

1. To be free is to have the ability to do otherwise


2. We have (at least sometimes) the ability to do otherwise


3. Therefore, we are (at least sometimes) free

"ought implies can"

according to compatibilism, people can be held responsible for something they could not have not done

Hypnosis counterexample

objection to compatibilism: someone hypnotized is doing what they want to do but they are not really free

Metaphysical Freedom

free = having the ability to do otherwise

Moral Freedom

free = the ability to do what you want