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15 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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Embodied cognition |
Cognition is shaped by metaphors that are grounded in our bodily interaction in the world |
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How the body shapes the mind |
The body plays an important role in the production of behavior. But the body also contraints and structures our cognitive capacities |
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The mind is not for thinking but for doing. Two types of Embodied Cognition |
Functionalist Embodied Cognition Radical Embodied Cognition |
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Functionalist Embodied Cognition |
The causal roles that define our mental states are not only realized by the brain. Chalmers: Cognition extends beyond 'skull and skin' and included the body and the environment. |
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The Parity principle |
A part of the world functions as a process. The environment can literally be a part of your mind But are extra cranial processes (e.g.notebook) indeed functionally similar to intra-cranial processes (e.g. memory) |
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The Complementary Principle |
Its not about the functional similarity but about the integration between internal and external processes. E.g. the notebook isnt part of his mind because it functions like his memory,but because it is systematical and reciprocal integrated with his brain during... |
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Radical Embodied Cognition |
Vs. Identity theory: Cognitive states are not identical to neural states Brain, body and environment shape and structure cognition Vs. Functionalism: cognition can't bs studied independently from its implementation Difference with functionalist embodied cognition: brain, body and environment are more than just realizers Provide bottom-up constraints on functional analysis |
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Restating the mind body problem |
Against Descartes: the mind is not unobservable entity or abstraction hidden behind public behavior. It is about being in the world. We are not reflecting on the world but we are in it. |
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Sensory motor theory |
Depends on our implicit knowledge of the sensorimotor laws that govern the relation between possible actions and incoming visual info |
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Enactivism |
Special brand of radical embodied cognition |
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Sense making |
Understanding of the environment is value-laden (opportunities and motivation) |
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3 problems for TT and Simulation theory accounts mindreading |
Argument for phenomenology (experience): interaction with others are not consciously using a theory or running a simultation Problem for computational complexity: our social interactions are smooth Frame problem: TT: how shoyld we know which theory to use ? Simulation Theory: how we know which one of the mental states of others we should simulate? |
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Alternative theory? |
Interaction Theory |
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Interaction theory |
We dont need to attribute mental states to understand others (mindreading). We understand other involves. A. Intersubjective perceptual processes (primary) B. Contextualized interaction ( secondary intersubject) |
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Example of primary intersubject? And secondary intersubject? |
Primary: perceptual capacities Secondary: - Triadic interactions: involve an object or event that becomes focus between 2 people - Social referencing: trying to obtain emotion cues from others to assist in their own assesment of uncertain situations |
