Philosophy And The Human Condition

Front 1

Appearance-Reality distinction

Back 1

The way things look vs. the way things really are.

Hint 1

Visual vs. Mental

Front 2

Knowledge?

Back 2

Knowledge requires truth.

Hint 2

Requirement

Front 3

Misleading senses Argument

Back 3

-the senses sometimes decieve us
-can't distinguish when the do from when they don't
...Hence, for all we know, any particular sense experience is deceptive.

Hint 3

deception of senses

Front 4

Dream Argument

Back 4

-It is ok to take your sense experiences as veridical only if you can rule out alternative scenarios where they are deceptive.
-For every sense experience, you cannot rule out that the experience is part of a dream (in which case it is deceptive)
...Hence, it is not ok to take any sense experience as veridical.

Hint 4

Dreams aren't real

Front 5

Evil Demon Argument

Back 5

- It is ok to take you sense experiences as veridical only if you can rule out the alternative scenarios where they are deceptive.
-For every sense experience, you cannot rule out that it is produced in you by an all-powerful evil demon.

Hint 5

Evil demon produces it

Front 6

Cogito

Back 6

"I think; therefore, I am" - Descartes

Hint 6

Cogito Ergo Sum

Front 7

Dualism

Back 7

-I cannot doubt my minds existence.
-I can doubt my bodies existence.
- X=Y only if they share all proper ties.
...Hence, my body ≠ mind.

Hint 7

X ≠ Y

Front 8

A priori

Back 8

a statement is knowable a priori, iff its truth can be grasped merely by grasping it's meaning.

Hint 8

water is watery

2+2=4

Front 9

A Posteriori

Back 9

opposite of a priori

Hint 9

Tomatoes are vegetables

Front 10

Rationalism

Back 10

Some substantive facts, facts about what and how things are, are knowable a priori.

Hint 10

Reason alone, unaided by experience.

Front 11

Trademark Argument

Back 11

- I have an idea of a perfect being.
-My ideas have causes.
-There must be at least as much formal reality in the cause of an idea as there is objective reality in the idea itself (the effect).
...Hence, the cause of my idea of a perfect being must have the formal reality of a perfect being.
...Hence, a perfect being exists; God exists.

Hint 11

Ideas have causes

Front 12

Criticisms of the Trademark Argument

Back 12

-We finite beings cannot understand the divine.
-ideas must have causes (doubtable and so inadmissable)
-as much formal reality in the cause of an idea (doubtable, ASI).
-Perfectly puntual being

Hint 12

Ideas, causes, not adding up

Front 13

Empiricism

Back 13

There is no a priori knowledge of substantive facts; all substantive knowledge comes from experience.

Hint 13

No a priori knowledge of substantive facts.

Front 14

Foundationalism

Back 14

A priori knowledge is the base of the house that is perception and experience.

Hint 14

House

Front 15

Substance Dualism

Back 15

-Mind and Body are distinct substances.
-Body is material and occupies space; mind is neither.

Hint 15

Mind ≠ Body

Front 16

Coherentism

Back 16

Coherentism is a theory of epistemic justification. It implies that for a belief to be justified it must belong to a coherent system of beliefs. For a system of beliefs to be coherent, the beliefs that make up that system must "cohere" with one another

Hint 16

Bolnging to coherent system of beliefs.

Front 17

Epistemology

Back 17

An epistemological problem with a theory is an arguement that the theory has unacceptable consequences about what we KNOW.

Hint 17

unacceptable consequences about what we know.

Front 18

Metaphysics

Back 18

a metaphysical problem with a theory is an argument that the theory has unacceptable consequences about how the world is (or works) on some fundamental level.

Hint 18

problem with how the world works

Front 19

Zombie Argument

Back 19

-If cartesian dualism is true, then I cannot know that others are not zombies (have conscious lives).
-But, I can (and do) know that others have conscious lives.
...Hence, cartesian dualism is not true.

Hint 19

Conscious lives

Front 20

Mutant Argument

Back 20

-If cartesian dualism is true, then I cannot know that other's conscious lives are anything like my own.
-I can (and do) know that other's conscious lives are something like my own.
...Hence, cartesian dualism is not true.

Hint 20

Sothing like my own

Front 21

Zombie Argument II

Back 21

-If CD is true, then it is possible for me to have a microphysical duplicate... a zombie.
-If my zombie duplicate is possible, then his behavior is not caused by any conscious mental state.
-If my zombie duplicate's behavior is not caused by any conscious mental state, then my own behavior is not caused by any conscious mental state.
-If my own behavior is not caused by any conscious mental states, then my conscious mental states are causally inert.
-But, my conscious mental states are not causally inert.
...Hence, cartesian dualism is not true.

Hint 21

zombie, conscious mental states, causally inert, but not.

Front 22

Ocassionalism

Back 22

When Brain cells light up, that is an OCCASSION for God to insert a feeling.

Hint 22

God works on occassion

Front 23

Logical Behaviorism

Back 23

Mental concept can be given a priori definitions in terms of physical behavior.

Hint 23

Something is a bachelor if it is an unmarried adult male.

Front 24

Priviledged Access Problem

Back 24

- If behaviorism is true then my mental states just are my behavioral disposition.
-Others have at least as good access to my behavioral dispositions as I do.
-Then if behaviorism is true then others have at least as good access to my mental states as I do.
-But that is not the case.
...Hence, behaviorism is not true.

Hint 24

Access to my mental states based on behavior.

Front 25

Psychofunctionalism

Back 25

Mental states are to be defined as internal states of organisms- states that play specifiable roles.
-To be in pain is to be in an internal state that has such-and-such typical causes, and such-and-such typical effects. (Both internal and external)

Hint 25

such-and-such

Front 26

The Qualia Problem

Back 26

- If funtionalism is true, then all mental states have specific behavioral dispositions.
-Some mental states don't give rise to specific behavioral dispositions.
...Hence, functionalism is not true.

Hint 26

mental states - specific behavior dispositions

Front 27

Argument for Mental Causation

Back 27

-Sometimes mental events cause physical events. [mental causation]
-Only physical events can cause physical events. [causal closure of the physical]
...Hence, mental events JUST ARE physical events.

Hint 27

sometimes mental=physical
only physical=physical
...mental just are physical

Front 28

Psychophysicalism

Back 28

Mental states can be identified with physical states.

Hint 28

mental can be identified with ???

Front 29

Argument for Hard Determinism

Back 29

-Every physical event is causally determined by prior physical events.
-All human actions are physical events.
; then all human actions are causally determined by prior physical events.
-No action that is causally determined by prior physical events is free.
...Hence, no human action is free; we have no free will.

Hint 29

every physical event is causally determined...

Front 30

Argument for Incompatibilism

Back 30

-If an action is causlly necessitated by prior physical events, then it could not have been otherwise given these events.
-If an action couldn't have been otherwise (given prior physical events) then it is unfree.
...Hence, if an action if causally necessitated by prior events, then it is unfree.

Hint 30

action causally necessitated- could not have been otherwise.

Front 31

The Illusion of Free Will

Back 31

-We are usually not aware of the complex physical causes of our behavior.
-This makes it easy for us to suppose that there are no physical, deterministic causes of our behavior.

Hint 31

not aware of physical causes of our behavior.

Front 32

Indeterminism (Libertarianism)

Back 32

-Determinism is false.
-Not all physical events are causally necessitated by prior physical events.

Hint 32

2 types of physical events:
-event causation
-agent causation

Front 33

Dilemma of Determinism

Back 33

-Either an action is strictly determined by prior events OR it is undetermined.
-If it is strictly determined by prior events then it is not free.
-If it is undetermined, then it is random.
-If it is random, then it is not free.
...Hence, no action is free.

Hint 33

either determined or random... not free.

Front 34

Compatibilism

Back 34

Some actions are both causally necessitated by prior physical events and free.

Hint 34

causally necessitated and free

Front 35

Incompatibilism

Back 35

If an action is causally necessitated by prior physical events, then it is unfree.

Hint 35

if causally necessitated then unfree

Front 36

Minimartian Objection

Back 36

-If compatibilism is true, then an act is free if it is produced by the agents cognitive system.
-If an act is free if it produced by the agents cognitive system, then the agent whose cognitive system is controlled by minimartians acts freely.
-It is not the case that an agent whose cognitive system is controlled by minimartians acts freely.
...Hence compatibilism is not true.

Hint 36

Minimartiians control the agent