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104 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
- 3rd side (hint)
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What is Externalist Tracking Psychosemantics? |
Ties mental representation to connections between brain states and features of the external world.
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What is the Simple Causal Theory? |
a mental state represents whatever it is in the external environment that causes it |
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What is Indicator Semantics? |
* Proposed by Fred Dretske
* Mental states have the function to represent external things if they evolved for that purpose
* Teleological-based externalist tracking psychosemantics |
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What does it mean to be teleological? |
having to do with mental state's job or purpose |
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What theories solve the mapping problem? |
* Psychosemantics |
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What is Psychosemantics? |
Theories share claim that representational content of a mental state derives from some sort of tracking relation that obtains between the state and its environment |
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What is the Psychosemantic "Only Game in Town" Argument? |
All theories of consciousness that come anywhere close to answering the mapping problem assume an externalist tracking psychosemantics. |
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What is the Inverted Earth Problem? |
* Transported (unknowingly) to exact replicate of Earth except all colors have been inverted. * You are given contacts that invert the inverted colors making the world look the same as it's always been * Attribution to the wrong representational content to visual experiences |
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What is the Swamp Man Problem? |
* A perfect molecular duplicate of you is created in a swamp...since this duplicate has no evolutionary history, it can't have mental states that represent anything at all on Dretske's and similar views. |
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What is Representationalism? |
Representationalism claims that all conscious mental states exhibit aboutness, and that their conscious character results from their representational content. |
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What are the arguments that favor Representationalism? |
* Argument from veridicality * Argument from transparency * Argument from seeming * Accommodation of intentionality (representational content) |
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What arguments oppose Representationalism? |
* argument from nonrepresentational states * "same representational content, different experience" argument * unable to be explained physiologically
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Arguments that favor David Rosenthal's Higher-Order Thought (HOT) Theory |
* Rosenthal's reportability argument |
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Arguments that oppose David Rosenthal's Higher-Order Thought (HOT) Theory |
* Argument from the impossibility of unconscious sensory experiences * Rosenthal's reportability argument * The dog argument |
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Arguments that oppose Self-Representationlism |
* none really... |
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Arguments that favor Self-Representationlism |
* Rosenthal's reportability argument * Subjectivity of Consciousness |
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Arguments that favor Same-Order Representationalism |
* Highway hypnosis case/ Blindsight * Argument from the impossibility of unconscious sensory experiences * Too many HOTs objection |
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Arguments that oppose Same-Order Representationalism |
* The infallibility argument * Subjectivity of Consciousness |
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Subjectivity of Consciousness is also called? |
*The phenomenology of peripheral inner awareness |
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Types of Externalist Tracking Psychosemantics |
* Simple Casual theory |
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Arguments that favor Simple Casual theory |
* Easily Naturalizable |
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Arguments that favor Asymmetric Dependence theory |
* Easily Naturalizable |
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Arguments that favor Indicator Semantics |
* Solves Disjunction problem |
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Arguments that oppose Simple Casual theory |
* Disjunction problem * Swamp Man problem |
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Arguments that oppose Asymmetric Dependence theory |
* Swamp Man problem * Inverted Earth Problem |
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Arguments that oppose Indicator Semantics |
* Swamp Man problem * Argument from phenomenal duplication |
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Arguments that oppose Internalist non-tracking theory |
* Not Easily Naturalizable |
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Arguments that favor Internalist non-tracking theory |
* Solves Disjunction problem |
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Internalist non-tracking theory is also called: |
Phenomenal Representational theory |
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What is the argument from phenomenal duplication? |
Duplication of biological functions that duplicate external content
Brain in a jar believing that the everyday has not changed |
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What question is brought up with philosophical theories of mind? |
In virtue of what do mental states arise, and what makes them the particular mental states that they are? |
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What does Turing mean by "computation"? |
Computation is rule-governed symbol manipulation |
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What does Turing mean by "machine"? |
*Turing defines machine as a digital computer.
*A digital computer is any device that can be programmed with an algorithm to do computation. Algorithms are programs. |
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What is the Turing Test? |
The test involves two people and a machine, all separated from one another. One person communicates with the other and with the machine by typing questions and receiving typed answers.The interrogator's task is to determine, on the basis of those answers, which is the person and which is the machine. |
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What does Turning mean by "thinking"? |
Behaving in an intelligent manner |
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What is the asymmetric dependence theory? |
* Causation-based externalist tracking psychosemantics |
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What is the Phenomenal Representation Theory/Thesis? |
At least some phenomenal characters of a mental state (“what it's like” to be in that mental state) constitute representational content. |
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What is Mysterianism? |
Consciousness is a natural phenomenon, but humans are incapable of understanding its naturalist origins, or cognitively closed.
It seems that no amount of physical information will resolve the problem. |
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What does it mean to be cognitively closed? |
It is very likely that certain aspects of the world around us will inevitably defy our understanding. |
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What theories account for consciousness? |
- Phenomenal Representationalism |
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What theories do NOT account for consciousness? |
- Computationalism - Externalist Tracking Representationalism
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Rosenthal’s reportability argument
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If I can report M, then I have a HOT I am in M. If I can’t report M, I have no HOT. M is conscious only if I have a HOT.
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Awareness argument
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same as above but replace being able to report with being aware.
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Highway hypnosis
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When driving, you can zone out but still react to stop signs etc. You were not conscious when zoned out so you don’t have a HOT
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Blindsight
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cortically blind people can see with no visual experience. Brain damage has left them incapable of forming HOTs about those states.
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impossibility of unconscious sensory experiences
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if HOT theory is true, we can have unconscious sensory experiences but sensory experiences cannot be unconscious, so HOT theory is false
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Dog argument
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only creatures capable of HOTs are conscious
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infallibility argument
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I can seem to be in a conscious state without being in that state But it is impossible to seem to be in a conscious state without being in that state.
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Too many HOTs objection
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because our conscious experience is so rich, we would have a tremendous proliferation of HOTs. But it is doubt that we have a tremendous proliferation of HOTs so HOT theory is false.
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Unthinkable thought objection
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kind of content- sensory content can be nonconceptual content and our thoughts have only conceptual content. quantity- sensory experiences can have too much content for our thoughts to contain.
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disjunction problem
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in circumstances where a mental representation is falsely triggered, the causal theory will tend to wrongly attribute disjunctive content.
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argument of phenomenal duplication
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Duplication of biological functions that duplicate external content
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argument from veridicality
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Experience is veridical; it is accurate
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argument from transparency
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1. the only introspectible features of conscious states are representational features. 2. if there were any other features of conscious states they would be introspectible as well. C. therefore conscious states have only representational features
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Argument from seeming
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1. If your conscious state changes, then the way the world seems to be changes. 2. If your conscious state doesn’t change, then the way the world seems to be doesn’t change. 3. If the way the world seems to be changed, then your conscious state has changed. 4. If the way the world seems to be doesn’t change, then your conscious state hasn’t changed. C. So conscious states can’t change without a change in representational content
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argument from non representational mental states
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1. Some conscious states have no representational content. C. Therefore representationalism is false
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same rep. content, different experience argument
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1. Two experiences can have the exact same representational content even though they are different conscious states (what it is to be in them is different). C. Therefore there can be a change in consciousness without a change in representational content.
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inner awareness argument
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HOT theory needs a 1st order, a 2nd order to represent the content of the 1st, and a 3rd to represent the 2nd. Self-rep theory only needs 1st to represent itself and so self rep is the best explanation. Self rep. is true.
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metaphysical viability
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Ability to accommodate the subjectivity of consciousness( peripheral inner awareness)
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Argument from seeming
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1. If your conscious state changes, then the way the world seems to be changes. 2. If your conscious state doesn’t change, then the way the world seems to be doesn’t change. 3. If the way the world seems to be changed, then your conscious state has changed. 4. If the way the world seems to be doesn’t change, then your conscious state hasn’t changed. C. So conscious states can’t change without a change in representational content
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argument from non representational mental states
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1. Some conscious states have no representational content. C. Therefore representationalism is false
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same rep. content, different experience argument
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1. Two experiences can have the exact same representational content even though they are different conscious states (what it is to be in them is different). C. Therefore there can be a change in consciousness without a change in representational content.
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inner awareness argument
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HOT theory needs a 1st order, a 2nd order to represent the content of the 1st, and a 3rd to represent the 2nd. Self-rep theory only needs 1st to represent itself and so self rep is the best explanation. Self rep. is true.
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metaphysical viability |
Ability to accommodate the subjectivity of consciousness( peripheral inner awareness) |
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What reason is there to think the Turing Test is insufficient for intelligence? |
a machine can be programed with a reasonable response for every possible conversation |
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What reason is there to think the Turing Test is unnecessary for intelligence? |
those who can’t communicate due to disabilities or lack of language can be intelligent but have no way of showing it (dolphins and Stephen Hawking) |
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What is the relationship between computationalism and functionalism? |
______is the nature of mental states and defined by their function and ______ is manipulating a symbol (stimuli) by rules and then get an output (effect) |
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What are some arguments in favor of computationalism? |
1. the brain is like a computer in that neuronal signals are all-or-nothing and it can manipulate large bodies of knowledge. 2. computation and cognition can manipulate complex info and understand its meanings (sort of like ‘get the big picture’?). 3. there is really no limit to the problems a human can solve or how they can behave. computers can do a ton of stuff too. (games, conversation, logically solve problems) |
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What are some arguments against computationalism? |
Cognition involves intention, and has an aboutness to it, internal thought. A TI 84 doesn’t have intentions. meaningless symbols and manipulation. Chinese example |
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What is the difference between simulation and instantiation? |
compare a simulated hurricane on a screen to an instantiated bio exp. to study evolution. the second one has actual evolution happening, while the first doesn’t have a real hurricane happening. |
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What is the difference between the dynamical approach to cognition and the computational approach? |
computation is limited to symbols and following certain rules, while a dynamical approach is referred to like state-space evolution, where a conscious state can represent the world |
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What does a computational solution of the steam engine governor problem look like? |
a complex task is broken down to simpler tasks, one followed by another and another until it completes the whole required task. a computational device |
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What does a dynamical solution of the steam engine governor problem look like |
used differential equations of dynamical systems |
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What are the typical features of a computational solution? |
representation (symbols), computation (thinking), sequential and cyclic operation, and homuncularity ( sort of human like?)
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What is phenomenal consciousness? |
a state that is like something to be in -a state that feels some way
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How does phenomenal consciousness relate to the various thought experiments we've seen so far? |
conscious mental states lack in cases Homunculi-headed robot, Color Blind Mary, & Super sighted Fred. consciousness =>mind-body problem |
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What distinguishes reductive from nonreductive representationalism? |
reductive puts consciousness in materialistic/naturally. non-reductive claims consciousness arises from representational content.
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What is representational/intentional content? |
the aboutness of a conscious state
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What are the arguments that favor representationalism? |
all experiences have representational content and can be evaluated for accuracy (veridicality). The only introspectible features are representable features, which seem to be the the only features consciousness has (transparency). Conscious states only change with change of representational content, which is what the world seems like (seeming).
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What arguments oppose representationalism? |
2 experiences can have the same represent. content, though diff. conscious states. (what they feel like is different): moods, elation, depression, tickling, pain etc.
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What are the two theoretical dimensions of representationalism? |
1. what is it for a mental state to represent something the right way
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2. what is it for ment. state to represent something?
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Which questions do these two dimensions seek to answer? |
Is the mental state represented by another state, by itself, or by content that guides a thought/action
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2. does the mental state represent something in virtue of the relations it bears to other representational states
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Which question is answered by a representational theory of consciousness? |
representing in the right way gives a representational theory of consci.
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Which question is answered by a psychosemantics? |
what is it for a ment. state to represent something is answered by psychosemantics theory of consci.
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What are some versions of representational theories of consciousness? |
Higher order, self-representationalism, same-order representationalism
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What are some versions of psychosemantics? |
functional-role, informational semantics
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What is the higher-order representational theory? |
M is consci. just in case M non-inferentially causes a belief (unconsciously) that I am in M. a toothache causes belief ‘i’m having a toothache’ w/o really thinking that.
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What are some arguments in favor of it? |
A thought of being in M and being able to express it, explains the connection between consci. and reportability w/o consci. co-occurring w/ HOTs. Blindsight is being able to have 1st-order visual states, but no HOTS about those states so none of them are consci. Evolutionarily, HOTS enable reflection and alteration of beliefs and reasoning- theory needs to be extended tho.
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What are some arguments opposed to it? |
if true, then we can have sensory experiences that are unconscious. FALSE. brain blocks out some constant sensory input if its not important (imp. of unconsci. sensory experiences). if true, only creatures capable of HOT are consci. meaning dogs are not consci. FALSE. HOTs about sensory states can require only meager conceptual resources (dog). I can have a HOT about seeing red, then have a consci. experi. that I’m seeing red, but not actually seeing red. I could seem to be in a consci. state. FALSE. it’s impossible to seem to be in a state w/o being in state (infallibility). Conscious experience is too rich to have a HOT for each state. Too many HOTS seem improbable.
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What is the self-representational theory? |
a mental state is consci. if it is represented by itself.
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What are some arguments in favor of it? |
it avoids the infallibility objection, since impossible for you to be in a state that represents itself w/o actually being in that state. It avoids the ‘too many HOTs’. |
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What is the awareness argument for HOT theory, and how does it differ from the reportability argument? |
I need to be aware of M’s content, to have a HOT that I am in M. M’s being consci. just is M’s being targeted by a HOT. I don’t have to report it speaking or something like in the reportability argument.
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What is the unthinkable thought objection to HOT theory? |
Sensory exp. is too rich to have thoughts that capture their contents. possibly sensory is non-conceptual and thoughts are conceptual. kind & quantity of info in our sensory state outstrips the represent. capacity of thought |
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Why might you think that the kind of contents in consciousness pose a challenge to HOT theory? |
If kinds and quantities of sensory states are such that they outrun the capacity of thought to express, then we can’t be consci. of sensory by having thoughts representing content of those states. apparently we must not have thoughts representing the the senses if they’re not consci. FALSE. |
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What is the difference between higher-order representationalism and self-representationalism? |
In HOT, M is consci. if represented by another distinct mental state. in self-repre. M is conscious if it is represented by itself.
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What is the relationship between HOT theory and higher-order representationalism? |
HOT theory can account for our awareness of the content of M, but nothing for our peripheral inner awareness of M. It lacks the resources to do this.HOTs are not consci. of themselves.
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What is the inner awareness argument for self-representationalism? |
it accounts for the consci. of mental states and inner peripheral awareness of said state. It only needs 1st order states that represent themselves.
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What major challenge faces self-representationalism? |
its account for how it represents itself is not easily understandable yet. It’s in the works.
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What is PANIC theory? |
a mental state is consci. if and only it has poised (can make an impact on beliefs and desires), abstract (doesn’t involve concrete objects), non-conceptual (consci. exp. outstripts our concepts), intentional content (represents something)
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What are some arguments against PANIC theory? |
can’t account for phenomenal consci. b/c relies on poise (chinese nation case, homunculi-headed robot case.) can’t account for peripheral inner awareness. can’t accommodate consci. cog. states (beliefs) b/c only non-conceptual, so no conceptual content. |
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What is the phenomenal representation thesis? |
phenomenal character can constitute representational content. ‘what it’s like’
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What advantage(s) do externalist tracking theories have over the phenomenal representation thesis? |
It is a clear and easy way of giving a materialistic theory of consci. no mind-body prob.
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What is background illumination theory, and what question does it aim to answer? |
a phenomenal character constitutes the repres. content that it does in virtue of the illumination of that phenomenal character by background context. how does the background affect what it means |
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What is some evidence for background illumination theory, and what sort of reasoning undergirds it? |
butcher’s tongue, rubber hand illusion, the McGurk effect. all these change b/c of visual sensory, or background to the object. |
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